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ABSTRACT
This study examines the evolution of offensive and defensive 
maritime economic warfare, and the Royal Navy's use of commercial and 
naval blockades and mercantile convoys during successive wars, particularly 
its successful use by Britain in the Anglo-American war of 1812-15. Its 
legality, tactical and strategic development and contemporary government 
policy, including impressment are studied. Comparison is made of the nature 
and development of the British and American economies, their vulnerability 
to economic warfare and the expediency of its use by Britain against the 
United States discussed. Legal and practical constraints upon British convoys 
and blockades are studied and practical solutions reviewed. Economic aspects 
of the causes, conduct and effects of the war are surveyed, including the 
impact of Britain's commercial blockade on American commercial, fiscal, 
financial, economic and political infrastructures, and therefore the United 
States ability and preparedness to continue fighting. The effectiveness of the 
naval blockade supplementing Britain's commercial blockade of the United 
States, is also assessed.
The long-standing problem of the relative effects of British 
commercial blockade and the at times contemporaneous American legislative 
'restrictive system', is resolved by comparison of current New England 
commodity prices at specific times. Prices before the repeal of Madison's 
second Embargo are compared with subsequent prices, and with those after 
the British blockades are later extended to neutral trade with New England.
The effectiveness of British economic warfare on the American 
economy under two successive commanders is evaluated. An objective
assessment of the strategy's eventual impact on the war's outcome and later 
policies is made, and of how far each belligerent's war aims were met by the 
negotiated peace. The effectiveness of Britain's use of economic warfare 
against the United States has long been seriously under-estimated.
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Map 1: The Atlantic, Eastern Seaboard, Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean
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Map 2: Chesapeake Bay and the Delaware River.
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Note on US Dollar/Pound Sterling Conversion Rate, 1803-1815.
An exchange rate agreed between the British and American governments on 
16 September 1803 of $4.44 to the pound sterling, seems to have remained 
relatively stable between 1812 and 1815, and has been used throughout.
Source: Foreign Secretary Lord Hawksberry to Anthony Merry, British Minister at 
Washington, 16 September 1803, in Mayo B. ed., Instructions to British Ministers to the 
United States 1791-1812, Washington, Annual Report to the American History Asociation, 
1936, 3 vols., vol. Ill, p.200.
All quotations retain the original spelling and punctuation.
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Introduction.
"[T]he noiseless, steady, exhausting pressure with which sea power acts,[was] 
cutting off the resources of the enemy while maintaining its own, supporting war in scenes in 
which it does not itself appear or appears only in the background, and striking blows only at 
rare intervals."(l)
Careful study of the War of 1812 between Britain and the United 
States began almost as soon as it ended in February 1815. Having been 
described then in America as a "second war of independence", the war 
remains both important and controversial. From the outset, each study tended 
to concentrate on particular aspects of the war. In 1817, William James, a 
British lawyer-turned historian was meticulous in refuting some of the more 
extravagant contemporary American naval claims in his Full and Correct 
Account of the chief Naval Occurrences of the Late War... .(2) Since then, 
almost every separate action has been minutely dissected, and its naval and 
military significance analysed at length.
Alfred Mahan's Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812, 
published in Boston in 1905, also dealt in detail with the war's early single- 
ship actions, which caught the public imagination then and since.(3) Mahan's 
description and evaluation of British maritime blockades against the United 
States, was part of his argument in favour of "a naval force adequate to the 
protection of our commerce".(4) He attributed the bankruptcy of New 
England merchants to British maritime blockade, but stopped short of 
admitting the eventual insolvency of the American government. He quoted a 
"distinguished naval officer", who noted the "stagnation" of "both foreign 
and domestic commerce", and who endorsed the exaggerated claim that 
American coastal trade had been "entirely annihilated", together causing the
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merchant's inability to continue funding the war, and "the cause of that 
impending bankruptcy with which the Government was at one time 
threatened."(5) Mahan then reverted to his theme; the need for a large 
American fleet.
Also in 1905, Theodore Roosevelt's chapter on the naval war of 
1812 in Clowes' History of the Royal Navy, forcefully advocated the United 
States' "possession of a great fighting navy."(6) Citing Henry Adam's 
examples, Roosevelt noted that "the unceasing pressure of the British fleet" 
on America's "extended seaboard", had "created the wildest inequalities in 
the prices of commodities in different parts of the county ."(7) Roosevelt 
conceded that, "throughout the last year of the war, the blockade was so 
vigorous that the shipping rotted at the wharves of the seaports and grass 
grew in the business quarters of the trading towns". He did not however 
discuss the impact of the loss of American foreign trade on tax revenues and 
government borrowing, or the Madison administration's resultant bankruptcy 
and abandonment of its original war aims.(8)
In 1969, Reginald Horsman's War of 1812 briefly discussed, in the 
course of a general history of the war, how its American financing was 
"essentially unsound". Citing an authority on Gallatin, the American 
Secretary of the Treasury in 1812, and Henry Adam's history of Madison's 
administration, Horsman outlined the outcome of each successive attempt of 
the United States government to borrow sufficient funds to continue the 
war.(9) Like Adams, he conceded that when the last attempt failed, "the 
country was bankrupt", and that by 1814, the government was unable to pay 
the interest on its debts. Horsman however, attributed the American
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government's financial difficulties to the lack of preparedness amongst New 
England's Federalist minority to lend the proceeds of their trade, increased by 
their deliberate exclusion from Britain's initial maritime blockades. In doing 
so, Horsman provided an incomplete and unjust explanation, and although 
coming closest to the connection between British blockades and American 
financial collapse, left much unexplained, which the present study will 
rectify.
By 1983, J.C.A. Stagg justifiably felt that, "Certainly, the 
[American] Treasury was increasingly embarrassed by the lack of funds to 
finance the war, but the reasons for this were broadly political in nature, and 
not really the fault of the department itself."(10) He did not go on to attribute 
the erosion of tax revenue, the dislocation of the economy and the 
government's eventual inability to borrow further, to the loss of American 
foreign trade through British maritime blockade. Of the final Ghent peace 
treaty, Stagg conceded that, "the time of making it [was] more fortunate than 
the peace itself."(ll)
In 2006, lan Toll traced the need for the American Navy's 
eponymous Six Frigates without reflecting far on the impact of their inability 
to leave port at will, or more importantly, the fiscal and financial 
consequences of their failure to lift the British commercial blockade of the 
United States until the peace.(12) Jon Latimer's 1812 - War with America of 
2007, discusses the role of British "raids and blockades" in hindering the 
American war effort, and in diverting American attention from the land war 
over the possession of Canada, as well as in confining to harbour much of the
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American navy, but again without dwelling long, or in detail, on the fiscal 
and financial consequences of the blockades.(13)
Recent studies include Wade Dudley's attempt to quantify the 
relative efficiencies of Britain's maritime blockades in a "comparative 
analysis" of those against France, between 1793 and 1802 and between 1803 
and 1814, and of the United States between 1812 and 1815.(14) Valid 
quantification of the effectiveness of blockades so geographically dissimilar 
is almost certainly impossible when important factors apply to only one of the 
two locations of the blockades. The British blockade of Brest, conducted by 
vessels released in turn for repair and re-supply to Torbay or Plymouth, has to 
be compared with the initial blockade of the Chesapeake and Delaware, and 
eventually all of the 2,000 mile American eastern seaboard, by vessels 
repairable only by the limited facilities of Halifax, Nova Scotia, or Bermuda, 
or by re-crossing the Atlantic.
Inevitable contact with the American shore involved a greater risk of 
desertion than rarer landings in France, and imposed an unavoidable 
constraint on British inshore operations against the United States, applicable 
only there. Apparently objective 'scores', attributed by Dudley to the 
consequences of each blockade, purport to measure their effectiveness, 
although attempted quantification of the "public outrage" induced by each 
blockade must surely be largely subjective. The assertion that London's 
increased marine insurance rates indicate a significant risk to British overseas 
trade from American warships, including privateers, is apparently 
contradicted by Rodger's finding that generally, rates were, "no higher 
between 1812 and 1814 than they had been between 1810 and 1811".(15)
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Dudley's conclusion that the British blockades of the United States were 
comparatively unsuccessful, neither bears close examination, nor appraises 
their consequences.
In 1991, Nicholas Tracy's Attack on Maritime Trade appeared to 
agree with President Madison's legalistic argument that, since some 
American vessels successfully evaded the British blockading squadrons, the 
blockades themselves were ineffective and therefore illegal, and should be 
discontinued.(16) But, no complete blockade of the entire American 
coastline, 'close' or 'distant', was ever either feasible or contemplated. If 
however, the British naval blockade could contain enough of the United 
States navy to prevent any lifting of the Royal Navy's commercial blockade 
until the peace, and prevent American interference with British landings 
almost anywhere on the enemy coast, then by any standards, it was efficient 
enough. If the British commercial blockade was efficient enough to exploit 
the vulnerability of the import-dependent American tax-gathering system, and 
expose the irrationality of lending further to a government unable to pay its 
present debts, then comparison with other blockades is unnecessary. If the 
blockades have combined to dislocate the American agrarian, commercial, 
fiscal, financial and therefore political infrastructures, such as to make peace 
necessary for national survival, they have performed their task. Whether or 
not this was the case, will be investigated by what follows.
It would appear that the results of the long-term imposition on the 
United States of British maritime blockades, both commercial and naval, have 
not been sufficiently discussed, and therefore, their possible effectiveness 
seriously under-estimated. Whether or not the application of Britain's sea and
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naval power to its new enemy was successful, while its war against 
Napoleonic France continued, deserves further attention. The purpose of the 
present study therefore, is to investigate the link between the British maritime 
blockades of the United States, their fiscal, financial, economic and political 
consequences, and the subsequent preparedness of the American 
administration to end the war of 1812 on terms significantly favourable to 
Britain, a task not before undertaken at sufficient depth.
Chapter 1 defines the theory and practice of maritime economic 
warfare, in the form of offensive blockades and defensive convoys, crucial 
manifestations of British seapower. It outlines the legal and practical 
development of blockade and its use in a succession of British wars, with its 
implied conflict with neutrals, including, by the early 19th century, an 
emergent United States. Chapter 2 discusses the practical and legal 
constraints on the use of these forms of economic warfare, and the potential 
solutions then available. Chapter 3 notes the interdependence of the 
economies of Britain and the United States after American independence, and 
the implications of their respective stages of economic, fiscal and financial 
development. It detects the vulnerability of the American agrarian economy, 
especially with the administration's dependence on foreign trade for raising 
its revenue and borrowing funds, especially when in conflict with the world's 
greatest exponent of maritime economic warfare. It compares the economic, 
fiscal and financial infrastructures of the two economies and their potential 
capacity for use in any prolonged conflict.
Chapter 4 traces the development of Britain's economic warfare 
against the United States in the North Atlantic and the Caribbean, under
19
Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, from his assumption of command in 
August 1812, until his replacement in April 1814. Chapter 5 discusses the 
implementation of maritime economic warfare by his successor, Vice- 
Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, from April 1814, until the end of the war in 
February 1815, by which time hostilities had also reached the Gulf of Mexico 
and the Pacific. Chapters 6 and 7 examine in turn the respective effectiveness 
of Britain's economic warfare against America under Warren's and 
Cochrane's leadership, tracing in each case its implications for the economy 
and administration of the United States, and its capacity to continue the war.
Empirical evidence for the impact of the progressive application of 
the commercial blockade of the United States, is presented in Chapter 7, 
found by monitoring changes in the prices of commodities such as sugar, and 
of the American government's securities, such as Treasury notes.(17) 
Comparison of changes in commodity and security prices, and the chronology 
of major political and maritime events will therefore measure the relative 
effects of embargo and blockade, a recurrent and difficult problem in 
assessing the significance of British economic warfare in North America. An 
objective assessment of the effectiveness of Britain's economic warfare 
against the United States is reached in a Conclusion.
The extent to which Britain's seapower - the use of a merchant fleet 
of more than two million tons - was able to continue to support Britain's 
overseas trade, including its vital trade with British North America and the 
West Indies during the war with the United States, forms part of the enquiry. 
The study investigates how far British trade protection allowed the export of 
significant quantities of Britain's manufacturing output, clearly crucial to
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Britain's continued ability to finance its war efforts, and the maintenance of 
international communication, on which Britain's predominant financial 
position partly depended. This study will also attempt to resolve whether by 
the successful convoying of merchantmen, British naval power continued to 
facilitate the importation, not only of crucial raw materials, but also of 
colonial produce then processed into important re-exports.
Whether or not the Royal Navy could at the same time destroy or 
capture sufficient American merchant vessels to make a significant impact on 
the United States' crucial customs duties, the American administration's 
largest single source of tax revenue, and its ability to finance the war, is 
therefore a vital part of the study. Whether or not the British commercial 
blockade could sufficiently deplete the private incomes from which savings 
might be lent to the American government, or so far lower employment as to 
erode the Republican Party's electoral strength, will also be addressed. The 
study will investigate whether prolonged and widespread British dislocation 
of American trade would interfere sufficiently with the United States' money 
supply, and the everyday value of currency in both government and private 
transactions, to erode the user's trust in the current administration, or even in 
the federal structure of American political Union. The work will ask how far 
the inflation apparently caused by commercial blockade would reduce 
American financial support for war, already seen by some, especially in New 
England, as an ill-advised method of addressing concerns over relations with 
Britain.
In short, this study will determine the level of effectiveness of British 
maritime strategies, both the defensive convoy protection and the aggressive
21
commercial and naval blockades. In particular, it will investigate how far the 
blockades contributed to producing a satisfactory conclusion to the war for 
Britain through their fiscal and economic impact. In doing so it will examine 
the part of the Royal Navy in North America between 1812-15 in providing 
an early example of remarkably successful economic warfare.
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Chapter 1.
Convoys and Blockades: The Evolution of Maritime Economic Warfare.
"Fleets employed to cover a coast, are not only precarious in their exertions, which depend 
much upon winds, but are miserably confined as to all the effects of naval war. Those effects 
are only felt when our fleets can keep the sea to protect our commerce and annoy that of our 
enemies, as well as to defend our distant possessions, and to cover descents and continued 
incursions." Wm Eden, MP., Commissioner for Conciliation with America, 1778-9. (1)
Definitions: The Theory and Practice of Economic Warfare
By the early 19th century, maritime blockade was the offensive arm 
of economic warfare, used against an enemy in conjunction with the convoy 
protection of a nation's own overseas trade. 'Offensive blockade' was used to 
describe the interception of an enemy's merchant, transport or naval vessels, 
usually on their entering or leaving harbour. Defensive economic warfare 
involved the gathering of merchant vessels to sail as convoys under the armed 
protection of as many warships as could be spared. Belligerents with 
sufficient naval means were increasingly expected to impose a policy of 'stop 
and search' on all vessels found in specified areas, and those carrying goods 
'interdicted' by proclamation as 'contraband', were at best turned back, or 
otherwise detained. Crews and cargoes thought likely to benefit an enemy 
were either subject to an enforced sale, or subject to law, confiscated. At the 
beginning of each European war, legislation had been needed to legitimise 
what otherwise would have constituted piracy, almost universally 
condemned, but nonetheless still practised in some parts of the world. As 
each war began, the British Parliament had passed Prize Acts under which a 
High Court of Admiralty could declare vessels found breaching blockades to 
be legally 'prizes of war'.
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Vessels engaged in offensive naval or commercial blockade would 
often have been well placed to take other measures, such as the interception 
of an opponent's diplomatic communications or personnel, perhaps gaining 
foresight of an enemy's intentions, or gathering useful intelligence about the 
effectiveness of their government's own measures. In time, an effective 
blockade might leave an enemy both economically and diplomatically 
isolated, potentially deprived of military, financial, logistical, diplomatic or 
moral support. The psychological pressure of such isolation might eventually 
increase an enemy's willingness to negotiate.
A maritime power could impose a commercial blockade of an 
enemy's ports to hinder their trade. A naval or 'military' blockade, could 
reduce, if not preclude their ability to send out warships to lift a commercial 
blockade, or dispatch transports with troops to fight elsewhere. Overseas 
communication could be delayed or prevented. Used together by a belligerent 
with sufficient maritime resources, in the long run, such blockades were 
likely to prove effective. For neutrals however, it was at best inconvenient 
and costly, and at worst a breach of their maritime sovereignty and as such, 
deeply resented. Traditionally, the practice had evolved that neutrals should 
be given sufficient prior notice by proclamation in an official publication, in 
Britain's case the London Gazette, to allow neutral vessels to avoid 
confrontation. By what was sometimes referred to as the "Law of Nations", 
maritime blockades were also to be conducted throughout by a naval force 
large enough for it to be uninterrupted, and evenly applied to all those whose 
interests might be damaged by them. An insufficiently strong or intermittent 
blockading force would lead to accusations of it being an illegal, 'paper
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blockade', said to contravene the putative "Law of Nations". The legitimacy 
of such a body of law however, was not universally agreed.
In practice, blockading squadrons would routinely be expected to 
perform several roles at once, with perhaps different degrees of importance. A 
naval blockade would aim for the incarceration of an enemy's warships in 
harbour, ideally to take no further part in the war. A maritime commercial 
blockade would seek to deprive an enemy, not only of the physical resources 
and economic benefits of imports, but also of the profits from the export of a 
domestic surplus, or processed re-exports, and therefore the revenue from the 
taxation of overseas trade, such as shipping registration and enrolment fees, 
lighthouse dues, or the customs duties on imports. Governments frequently 
placed duties on the importation of essentials like salt, or luxuries such as 
wine. The demand for such goods was often price and income-inelastic, such 
taxes were therefore reliable, and cheap to administer, but vulnerable to 
foreign interference. By prolonged and widespread interference with an 
enemy's overseas trade, maritime powers could realistically expect to inflict, 
comparatively cheaply, sufficiently serious economic damage on an enemy to 
impair their ability to continue a war.
In such wars at sea, 'public' warships were often supplemented by 
'privateers', armed and often heavily-manned, privately-owned warships, 
primarily intended to make shared profits by capturing enemy merchant 
vessels, although sometimes also carrying cargoes. Their hostile actions were 
legitimised by government-issued 'letters of marque'.(2) They commonly 
complemented the activities of state-owned warships provided by
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governments, or nominally in Britain's case, the Crown. Privateers will be, 
generally, outside the scope of this work.
Royal Naval prizes sent into Halifax, Nova Scotia between 1812 and 
1815 are shown as Appendix A, Table 1. In measuring the effectiveness of 
the Royal Navy's economic warfare and its blockades of the United States, all 
prizes of privateers have been excluded from this list, and from calculations 
based on the totals. Fay Kerfs comparison of British prize tonnages taken 
into Halifax after capture by privateer and Royal Naval vessels throughout the 
war, shows that privateers appear to have concentrated on taking smaller 
enemy vessels.(3) In 1813, for example privateers took an almost 6% greater 
share of the total tonnage of vessels under 100 tons than the Royal Navy, but 
took only 7.7% of the Royal Navy's capture of vessels over 200 tons. All 
enemy vessels of over 200 tons were taken in 1814 and 1815 by Royal Naval 
vessels, as distinct from privateers.
The priority for privateers was profit making, their tactical decisions 
being based on expediency, even risk avoidance, rather than the strategic aims 
of their national government, beyond its definition of'enemy' and 'neutral'. 
Those operating privateers were less accountable than naval officers 
commanding warships, and links with government policy more likely to be 
found in official correspondence than in the largely unrecorded views of those 
simply seeking profit. Since this study will concentrate on the effectiveness of 
the traditional British government policy of economic warfare, especially 
blockade, it will focus on the activities of the British Royal Navy, or those of 
the 'public' warships of the United States Navy, and the commercial vessels 
of both countries. It will attempt to measure the economic, fiscal, financial
26
and political effects of Britain's blockades of the United States as the major 
part of the economic warfare waged by the Royal Navy between 1812 and 
1815.
Vice Admiralty Courts: The Process of Law
Captured vessels were usually sent under a prize crew into a port of 
the captor's country, in either homeland or colony, to be 'libelled' and 
brought before a specialist court to be tried. For British prizes, this would be 
in one of thirty Vice-Admiralty Courts established in such ports around the 
world. The prize would normally be brought under the jurisdiction of the 
Court nearest to the point of capture. Judges expert in maritime law would 
hear evidence and legal argument before deciding whether or not a vessel 
should be 'condemned' as in breach of a properly constituted blockade. Such 
a vessel, and probably its cargo, would be liable to confiscation and 
subsequent sale, or if found to be within its rights when captured, restored to 
its legitimate owners. The legal process was inevitably lengthy and 
expensive.
Eventually, the net proceeds of sale at auction were shared on a 
sliding scale based on seniority and responsibility. According to scales 
revised in 1808, captains would receive two-eighths of the prize money, less a 
third paid to directing flag officers. Naval lieutenants, masters, physicians, 
and captains of marines would share another eighth. Midshipmen and senior 
petty offices such as gunners, bosuns and carpenters would receive shares of a 
further eighth. The remaining half of the prize money was divided between
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petty officers and ratings, a distribution system which successfully motivated 
blockading operations until 1815.(4)
Once condemned, particularly when new, vessels taken as prizes 
could legally be taken into the blockading force, often as tenders to larger 
vessels, useful for entering harbours and penetrating estuaries. Less properly, 
captured cargoes were sometimes immediately confiscated at sea, and 
diverted to the captor's own use. Other prizes were burned, or even blown-up, 
to avoid the captor's need to allocate a prize crew, with the real risks of 
under-manning. Often unpopular with crews deprived of prize-money, such 
tactics nevertheless effectively reduced the cost and inconvenience of 
maritime blockade. Governments often paid 'head money' to captors as an 
incentive for the capture of enemy crew members, often highly and 
expensively trained seamen, further reducing the opponent's ability to 
continue fighting.
Captured enemy vessels and cargoes were not infrequently, although 
often illegally, released on payment of a cash ransom, paid in specie, money 
in precious metal form. Such vessels could complete their present interrupted 
voyage, but might be captured again on a subsequent voyage, adding further 
to the illicit rewards of maritime blockade. Conversely, blockading vessels 
would often intercept and re-capture vessels of the same nationality as 
themselves or their allies, releasing their crews from often lengthy captivity, 
and making prisoners of the enemy's prize crew.
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Close and Distant Blockade
Close blockade could be conducted 'inshore', defined as being 
within sight of land. Especially when long enemy coastlines were to be 
blockaded, small, shallow- draught vessels could more easily avoid natural 
obstacles, and could prove useful in penetrating estuaries and inlets. Light, 
handy vessels could intercept coastal shipping and fishing vessels, interrupt 
communications, and gather intelligence by observing activity in enemy 
harbours, reporting to heavier forces further offshore, which could be 
summoned to prevent enemy attempts to enter or leave port. Distant blockade, 
conducted by larger vessels better able to withstand heavier seas, possibly 
remaining beyond the horizon, could cover a wider stretch of enemy 
coastline, and perhaps several ports. Their sometimes unseen but continual 
presence could exert psychological pressure on those blockaded. In good 
visibility, patrolling squadrons of far separated vessels, signalling to each 
other with flags by day and lights by night, could detect enemy activity within 
distances of up to thirty miles. By 1812, such blockades had been used by 
Britain since January 1793, often with great effect against both Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic France, broken by the Peace of Amiens for only 14 months, 
between March 1802 and May 1803.
Convoys and Blockades: The Evolution of Maritime Economic Warfare
The use of maritime blockade however, had long been controversial. 
The denial of free passage at sea to enemies or commercial rivals had been 
practised in medieval Europe by those maritime powers able to enforce
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claims of sovereignty over neighbouring and quite distant seas. Venice 
enforced its ownership of the Adriatic, Denmark and Sweden had disputed 
control of the Baltic until agreeing to share it in 1622, while the English had 
claimed sovereignty of the 'British Seas' from the coasts of Norway to those 
of Spain. Formalised maritime rights were initially based on accumulated 
decisions taken around the Mediterranean known as the 'Consolato del Mare', 
the Consulate of the Sea, first published in 1494, and long widely accepted. 
(5)
However, in 1604, the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius applied 
international and 'natural' law, as distinct from traditional or ecclesiastical 
rulings, to maritime prize taking, and in 1633, re-published De Mari Libero, 
which argued that seas were free for common use, a principle welcomed by 
neutrals.(6) English writers however, including John Sheldon and John 
Boroughs re-asserted the national right to exclusive control of defined areas 
of sea. Sir John Borough's The Sovereignty of the British Seas Proved by 
Records had been written in 1633, but not published until 1651. It was 
followed by Charles Malloy's Treatise of Affairs Maritime and of Commerce, 
first published in 1676, and regularly reprinted to become, "the standard 
English language interpretation of international maritime law". Malloy's 
Treatise is described as, "one of the most extreme legal arguments for 
England's sovereignty of the sea, which he claimed extended from Cape 
Finisterre to Van Staten in Norway." (7) This body of legal opinion, 
especially where it concerned the maritime rights of neutrals, was to become 
significant on both sides of the Atlantic.
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Maritime blockade had played a practical part in English politics 
between 1649-53 when used in eradicating resistance to the Commonwealth 
by containing a small royalist naval force under Prince Rupert. Successively 
blockaded in a number of ports, the royalist force was eventually disbanded in 
1653. Only after the English republic's navy had blockaded the port of 
Dunkirk in 1652, had it obtained the diplomatic recognition of France.(S) 
Maritime blockade could be diplomatically powerful.
It was during the first Anglo-Dutch war of 1652-4 that maritime 
economic warfare developed characteristics later to become familiar in North 
American waters. Competing Dutch merchantmen were obliged to pass 
through the North Sea and English Channel where they were vulnerable to 
attacks from English warships. The Dutch countered this de facto commercial 
blockade by attacking English warships with their own, and by convoying 
their merchantmen with some success. Contact between the rival warships led 
to successive fleet actions, but Dutch commerce had been temporarily 
disrupted. Although Dutch seaborne trade was to recover quickly after the 
Treaty of Westminster ended the war in 1654, a workable English strategy of 
commercial blockade had been developed.(9) Britain had by this time 
established the basics of its offensive and defensive maritime economic 
warfare. Any of the enemy's trade was contraband, and the defence of 
Britain's trade was a naval responsibility, to be implemented respectively by 
commercial blockade, protected by complementary naval blockade, and by 
the convoy protection of merchant vessels, principles to be further developed 
in a succession of future wars.
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English blockade of the Spanish coast was less successfully 
attempted during Cromwell's war with Spain, although some New World 
silver was seized in the Canaries, reducing Spanish capacity to finance war 
elsewhere. A blockade of Dutch commerce in the Channel had been resumed 
in a second Anglo-Dutch war between 1665-7, together with the destruction, 
north of Texel in 1666, of 150 Dutch merchant vessels estimated to be worth 
the equivalent of over a million pounds.(lO) During the following year 
however, English trade suffered Dutch harassment, and the Royal Navy, 
defeat on the Medway.(l 1) A third Anglo- Dutch war had begun in 1672, 
again partly aimed at curtailing Dutch maritime trade, having first disposed of 
the Dutch fleet in battle. In 1673, after indecisive preliminaries, an attempt to 
blockade the Dutch coast and impound a Dutch East India Company convoy 
had failed. Although another Treaty of Westminster in 1674 had ended this 
less successful attempt at commercial blockade, if properly financed, as 
Charles IPs had not been, the strategy remained potentially viable and 
effective.(12) Furthermore, the rights of belligerents under international law, 
to attack merchant vessels and limit the trading activities of neutral shipping 
in wartime, were clarified in 1697, after a neutral Swedish fleet carrying war 
supplies through the Channel to France was captured by the Royal Navy.(13)
During the War of Spanish Succession, from 1709-13, the Tories 
advocated direct maritime attacks on enemy trade as an alternative to a 
Continental policy which implied a standing army to which they were 
opposed, and on which a strong central government relied, as in Cromwell's 
time. Although "corn was contraband", the corollary of naval blockade was 
still limited by practicalities. "Naval developments, particularly in the field of
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hygiene and supply, had not yet reached a point where close and continuous 
blockade of enemy bases, which in the new circumstances was bound to be an 
important strategic requirement, was practicable".(14) During the eighteenth 
century, this lack of logistical support was to become less of a limiting factor 
in the employment of maritime blockades, and their significance as a strategy. 
Royal dockyards were steadily developed in Britain throughout the century. 
Furthermore, "Throughout the eighteenth century, in spite of government 
procrastination in providing proper facilities, the superiority of the navy's 
victualling service afforded significant operational advantages." Among these 
advantages was the feasibility of maritime commercial blockade.(15) The 
prospect of prolonged maritime blockade in North America however, would 
not become practicable until further port facilities were created in Nova 
Scotia and Bermuda, facilitated by the accelerating growth of Britain's 
economic and financial strength.
During England's war with France between 1744-8, Admiral Martin 
had had twelve ships with which "to annoy the enemy's ships and commerce" 
to be found on the French trading routes south-west of Ushant.(16) With 
France the enemy, more ready access to the Atlantic had been required than 
that offered by the ports of south-eastern England, and Britain's western 
harbours and dockyard facilities had become strategically invaluable. The 
workforce of the Royal Dockyard at Plymouth had "doubled in size between 
1739 and 1748, overtaking that at Woolwich", and had continued to grow. 
Real fear of French invasion between 1744 and 1759, together with the 
increasing need to defend distant colonies, promoted Plymouth dockyard's 
continued growth.(17) Thereafter, the availability of repair and re-victualling
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facilities in western England, acted as a 'force multiplier', making the Royal 
Navy's close blockade of the French a practical proposition.
The use of maritime economic warfare in the eighteenth century 
inevitably affected neutrals. In wartime, they could potentially replace a 
belligerent's carrying trade, interdicted by their enemy's commercial 
blockade, even if such trade had been forbidden to them by protective 
legislation in peacetime. Britain sought to clarify its own position by a 
doctrine known as 'the Rule of 1756', which maintained that trade closed to 
neutrals in peacetime could not be conducted in wartime, thereby profitably 
nullifying a British blockade. According to this 'rule', trade between enemy 
colonies and their home ports, was forbidden to neutrals. As the volume and 
range of seaborne trade increased, this British position was to become 
increasingly important.
Maritime economic warfare had been employed by Britain against 
France during the course of the Seven Years War. On 19 February 1757, 
Walter Titley, the English Minister at Copenhagen, had written to Robert 
D'Arcy, Earl of Holdernesse, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, 
that, "the only way to prevent" French "Superiority over us.. .is to drain the 
French of Men & Money by a War upon the Continent, while England cuts 
off the chief sources of their Wealth by destroying their Trade & Navigation." 
It should be, "By this Method, & this only...as Her Finances, (tho' Great) are 
certainly not sufficient to carry on a successful War on both Elements at 
once." He added, however that Holdernesse knew best, "how far this Scheme 
may be practicable; and whether England, on whom the weight of the whole
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Machine must repose, is able to support it".(18) Maritime blockade was again 
considered practicable, and the necessary Prize Act passed.
The continuous blockade of the Brittany coast by the ships of 
Admiral Sir Edward Hawke had been made possible by relieving ships in 
rotation for re-fitting and re-supply in south-west England. Having escaped 
blockade in a gale, the French took refuge in Quiberon Bay, but were caught 
and decisively beaten there by Hawke on 20 November 1759. French 
invasion of Britain having been averted, the blockade thereafter decimated 
French seaborne trade and prevented the reinforcement of overseas colonies. 
Pondicherry in French-held India, was captured in January 1761 after naval 
blockade since the previous spring. Similarly, blockades had contributed to 
successes in relieving Gibraltar, and on the St Lawrence.(19) The blockade of 
the French coast during 1759 had interrupted coastal shipping so effectively 
that their Atlantic dockyards were deprived of timber, seamen and supplies, 
the ports of trade and the French government of revenue.(20) During the 
Seven Years War, including those taken in 1755, the Royal Navy captured 
959 enemy vessels, of which almost 83% were condemned as lawful 
prize.(21) Maritime blockade had been proved practicable.
Blockade and the War of American Independence
Discussion of the potential of both naval and commercial maritime 
blockades became urgently topical with the outbreak of rebellion in Britain's 
American Colonies during the 1770's, culminating in the War of American 
Independence. Before the fighting had begun in earnest, the British Secretary 
at War, Lord Barrington, had considered blockade especially appropriate
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when considering the transport and communication difficulties imposed by 
great distances. In December 1774 he wrote,
A conquest by land is unnecessary when the country can be reduced first to distress, 
and then to obedience, by our Marine totally interrupting all commerce and fishery 
and even seizing all the ships in the ports with very little expense and bloodshed.
(22)
A memorandum apparently written in July 1775 by Rear-Admiral Sir 
Hugh Palliser, British commander in North America until 1774, had 
estimated that a minimum of fifty vessels would be needed on the coasts of 
America "to annoy the rebellious provinces". Crucially, these should "attend 
the operations of the army" as well as convoy, blockade and 'cruising' duties. 
Palliser thought that, "A less number of ships.. .will be insufficient", and that 
more would be needed if rebellion spread beyond New England. In the event, 
Rear-Admiral Thomas Graves was to have only twenty-seven, excluding 
three surveying ships.(23) By Dec 1777, the Earl of Sandwich, First Lord of 
the Admiralty, wrote to Prime Minister Lord North that, "Lord Howe has had 
this year about 90 ships of all sorts", and that "with a force properly 
stationed" in America, "could have made it very difficult for the Americans to 
receive their supplies, carry on their trade, and fit out privateers to annoy the 
trade of Great Britain. The contrary has been the case."(24)
Conventionally, Kennedy argues that, "the Royal Navy could control 
the eastern seaboard and river estuaries; but further west the rebels could act 
with impunity."(25) But, as much then as later, the bulk of accumulated 
wealth to pay for imports was concentrated in the Colonial coastal and 
estuarial towns. While at least initially self-sufficient in food, until the end of
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1777, nine-tenths of the rebel's manufactured weapons, ammunition and 
gunpowder, as well as textiles and footwear, would have to be imported from 
France into these eastern ports.(26) Foreign reinforcements would always 
have to be brought by sea. Therefore, even a Royal Navy in need of 
modernisation and expansion as in 1775-6, could have made a more useful 
contribution in the crucial early stages of this American war by applying 
economic warfare. Freed of its priority to protect army transports and 
supplies, the Royal Navy could have been concentrating primarily on 
depriving its opponents of French manufactures. Rodger argues that blockade 
"would rather encourage than suppress rebellion".(27) It may, however, have 
proved economically effective. A promised end to blockades, together with 
fiscal, political and commercial concessions from London, could well have 
brought the rebellion to an earlier negotiated settlement.
Admittedly, without expansion, Britain's North America squadrons 
would have struggled to cope with the number of Colonial ports, harbours and 
undeveloped creeks. Equally, as Rodger points out, such blockades would 
inevitably have had to include the Caribbean, since the prevailing clockwise 
Atlantic winds and currents meant that European ships customarily dropped 
down to around latitude 15 degrees North to cross the ocean, passing close to 
the French, Dutch and Danish West Indies and the Bahamas. British 
searching of neutral ships for contraband would have risked widening the 
war.
Nonetheless, especially at the outset, a "more effective use might 
have been made of an unchallenged supremacy at sea".(28) By Glete's 
calculations, Britain's naval strength in 1775 exceeded that of either France
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or Spain, both in total, and in their respective numbers of battleships and 
cruisers. The navies of France and Spain combined, however, had six more 
battleships than Britain in 1775, and twelve more by 1780. While the number 
of British battleships stayed at 117 between 1775 and 1780, the French fleet 
of battleships grew from 59 to 70, an increase approaching 20%. The total of 
French warships had grown by 38%, compared with Britain's 26%. Over the 
same period, the number of British cruisers increased from 82 to 111, while 
the cruisers of France and Spain combined rose from 65 to 92, a bigger 
increase than Britain's. However, the number of Britain's 'small ships' more 
than doubled in the same time, from 28 to 58.(29) These may have been 
precisely the weapons most suitable for both blockade and convoy protection 
in Britain's American war.
Earlier explanations as to why "the British fleet could have imposed 
a total ban on American ports but, instead,... rode at anchor in New York 
harbour", have been modified.(30) Syrett argues that, although British 
blockades of the American eastern seaboard were feasible, the Royal Navy's 
cooperation in amphibious military operations against Charleston, New York 
and Philadelphia, was given priority at the outset, precluding effective 
blockade.(31) Priorities would change later in this war, and in Britain's later 
wars in North America.
Buel notes that, until the end of 1777, Admiral Richard Howe put his 
naval resources at the disposal of his brother Sir William, commander of the 
British land forces.(32) The British need to deal American armies a decisive 
blow before foreign intervention became conclusive, gave land campaigns 
precedence over maritime blockade, at best, a slow and cumulative process.
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Later Parliamentary prohibition of this ancillary naval role allowed the British 
maritime blockades of 1782 to be made sufficiently effective in disrupting 
coastal shipping for the Continental economy to be damaged by inflation. 
Difficulties in raising revenue by taxing commerce, also damaged the 
American Confederation's cause.(33) Belatedly effective maritime blockade 
came too late to prevent the loss of the American Colonies to Britain in 1783. 
Valuable experience of successful blockade of the American eastern seaboard 
nonetheless remained amongst those who had conducted it. Moreover, the 
development of the Royal Navy's western bases had continued. The 
workforce at Plymouth's Royal Dockyard had increased by more than 70% 
between 1711 and 1782, moving it from fifth to first place in the size of its 
skilled dockyard labour.(34)
In 1780, British maritime blockade had been sufficiently effective to 
provoke opposition in northern Europe. Russia, Denmark and Sweden, 
combined as a League of Armed Neutrality, had threatening war if the Royal 
Navy continued to interfere with neutral vessels, declaring that "a blockade 
would be recognised only.. .where it constituted literally a physical barrier to 
entry into a neutral port".(35) The coalition, and its threat, had however 
dissolved for the time being, in 1781. The legal position countries adopted 
tended to reflect their naval potential.
The Royal Navy's Blockade of France, 1793-1812.
When France declared war on Britain on 1 February 1793, 
Parliament enacted the necessary Prize Acts in 1793 and 1798 to facilitate
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Britain's use of its maritime blockade strategy.(36) The main purposes of the 
Royal Navy's blockades had been to prevent the combination of France's 
Brest and Toulon fleets and the invasion of Britain, as well as to deprive 
France of its unhindered access to world trade. There had been no Brest fleet 
at Trafalgar.(37) The blockades had made the sea-transport of French troops 
extremely difficult, precluding any large-scale, or successful invasion of 
Britain and Ireland, so that British blockade could be aimed, primarily, at the 
economic isolation of France.
After 1800, St Vincent had revived the use of close blockade of the 
French in the Channel.(38) The effectiveness of the British blockade meant 
that neither the naval protection of French colonies, nor the dispatch of 
reinforcements to colonial garrisons had proved possible. As a result, France 
had been deprived of all its overseas possessions, with their raw materials, 
tropical produce and protected markets for manufactures. This policy had 
been recommended to Parliament by Henry Dundas, later Lord Melville, First 
Lord of the Admiralty, in March 1801.(39) The loss of colonial markets had 
reduced French manufactured exports, thereby stimulating demand for British 
manufactured goods. Although not as precisely quantified at the time, the 
blockades had reduced French customs receipts by four-fifths between 1807- 
O9.(40) The Royal Navy's blockades of France had preserved British political 
autonomy, and heavily damaged the French economy.(41)
According to French sources, the British maritime blockade of 
France had quickly proved successful. As early as 1797, the head of the 
French Bureau of Commerce had written,
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The former sources of our prosperity are either lost or dried up. Our agricultural, 
manufacturing and industrial power is almost extinct...The maritime war paralyses 
our distant navigation and even diminishes considerably that of our coasts; so that a 
great number of French ships remain inactive, and perhaps decaying in our ports. 
(42)
As well as in daily newspapers of varying quality and allegiance, 
details of the Royal Navy's blockading activities were discussed in such 
specialised periodicals as the Naval Chronicle, published in London since 
1799. British reports were often reproduced in contemporary American 
publications, particularly in New England. The public in both Britain and the 
United States were therefore familiar with the maritime commercial and naval 
blockades of Britain's enemies. In Britain, blockade was evidently supported, 
both by influential newspaper editors and office-holders alike.
As a result however, the controversies surrounding the use of 
maritime commercial blockade were again sharpened by other trading 
nations, largely focussed on the definition of contraband, and the treatment of 
neutrals found to be carrying it. Britain's specific difficulties with the United 
States centred on American wartime trade with France and the shipment of 
French colonial produce. Precisely what constituted enemy property, liable to 
confiscation or diversion, had long been contentious. The inclusion of 
weapons and ammunition had always seemed unambiguous, and the 
confiscation of specie not unexpected, but foodstuffs, clothing and footwear, 
timber and building materials for example, which could be for either military 
or civilian use, were debatable.
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A lack of clarity either in the orders of policy-makers, or those 
charged with implementing them, may have contributed to what in retrospect 
looks like the loss of a valuable opportunity for effective economic warfare 
earlier in Britain's war with France. Although in an Atlantic action on the 
"Glorious First of June" in 1794, Admiral Lord Howe captured six French 
ships of the line while a seventh sank, the valuable convoy of 116 
merchantmen which they had been protecting, laden with much-needed 
American wheat, had been allowed to reach Brest unharmed. An opportunity 
for gaining military and political advantage by fostering hardship and unrest 
amongst the civilian population of France had apparently been lost, when 
more than British public jubilation might have been achieved.(43)
Sustained maritime blockades became an ever more practical 
proposition as repair and victualling facilities were further developed in a 
greater number of harbours in Britain and abroad.(44) British governments 
were both politically prepared and economically able to allocate the necessary 
funds, victuals, naval and manpower resources to prolonged blockades. As 
O'Brien demonstrates, a relatively wide tax-base and sound financial 
institutions made heavy taxation and enormous long-term government 
borrowing feasible.(45) Occasional alarms apart, Britain's fiduciary paper 
currency and monetary mechanisms were reliable. Administrative facilities, 
with accumulated skills and experience, and a comparative absence of 
corruption, made logistical support systems possible. Britain's wealth from a 
developing science-based agriculture and internal transport, advanced work- 
force specialisation, world-wide trade and increasing industrialisation 
underpinned a national capacity to support campaigns of maritime blockade.
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Furthermore, Britain's blockade of an enemy's trade coincided with 
a desire to protect the market for its own carrying trade. Britain's merchant 
fleet was the world's largest, importing raw materials and supporting an 
imperative need for outlets for its increasing surplus output of manufactured 
goods and re-exports. Britain's total registered shipping first exceeded 2 
million tons in 1804. By 1804-6, Britain's seaborne trade imported over 40% 
of its food, and enabled its textile manufacturers to export almost 60% of 
their output. Between 1772 - 1804, Britain's total imports had grown by 
50.3%, and total exports by 111.44%. War with France had so far failed to 
cause significant damage to British trade. Between 1792-1804 alone, British 
imports had increased by almost 49%, and total exports by 50.4%. 
Complementing the protective use of convoys, made compulsory in 1793, 
stringently so after 1803, Britain could use naval blockade to confine to port 
those enemy vessels which might otherwise have attacked its merchant 
vessels engaged in such trade all over the world, on which its prosperity, and 
therefore its ability to continue fighting, ultimately depended.(46)
The Problem of Neutrals
Britain's maritime blockade of France inevitably involved contact 
with neutral merchant vessels of various nationalities, and gave rise to 
irreconcilable interpretations of maritime law. By December 1800, the French 
had contrived a revival of the concept of 'Armed Neutrality' amongst the 
countries of northern Europe including Denmark, Russia and Sweden, as a 
means of countering the British blockade. The Danish fleet had been seen in 
Britain as the most capable of enforcing French requirements in the Baltic.
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Diplomacy having failed, on 2 April 1801, the Royal Navy destroyed the 
Danish fleet at anchor off Copenhagen, significantly weakening a European 
threat to the effectiveness of the British commercial blockade of France. 
The elimination of French trade with their overseas possessions 
made an important contribution to Britain's avoidance of defeat, and towards 
securing the sound British economy essential to hopes of eventual victory. 
While inflicting serious economic damage on France, Britain's economy 
could benefit, remaining sufficiently viable to subsidise Prussia and Holland, 
paying out a further £35m to allies between 1810-15.(47) The great danger 
for a belligerent power investing in the maritime blockade of an enemy with 
overseas trade and possessions, was that the enemy's displaced merchant fleet 
would simply be replaced by that of a neutral eager to profit from the 
vacancy. The American merchant marine had expanded rapidly since 1800, 
exceeding a million tons by 1807.(48) If French merchantmen were to be 
replaced by American vessels, the expensive commercial blockade of both 
French homeland and colonies would be nullified. On renewal of war with 
France, prize law as interpreted in England ruled that the "goods of an enemy 
on board the ship of a neutral might be taken, while the goods of a neutral on 
board the ship of an enemy should be restored."(49) Britain insisted that 
French cargoes on American ships were liable to seizure, but Americans 
argued that any such cargo, unless obvious contraband, was immune from 
confiscation or diversion. "Free ships" they argued, made for "free goods". 
Controversy became sufficiently acrimonious for Sir Christopher Robinson's 
work reporting on "the Cases argued and determined by Sir William Scott in
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the High Court of Admiralty", published in London in 1799, to be re- 
published in 1800, in Philadelphia.(50)
It was now that Scott distinguished between naval blockade of 
immediate strategic importance, and maritime commercial blockade. He 
wrote in 1800 that,
A blockade may be more or less rigorous, either for the single purpose of watching 
the military operations of the enemy, and preventing the egress of his fleet.. .or on an 
extended scale, to cut off all access of neutral vessels to that interdicted place; which 
is strictly and properly a blockade, for the other is in truth no blockade at all, as far 
as neutrals are concerned. (51)
The first was later to prove effective, and of great significance outside Brest, 
and both, used together, were to be decisive when employed by the Royal 
Navy in North America between 1812 and 1815.
From the outset, Britain had again sought to enforce the Rule of 
1756, thought to be applicable to American carriers replacing blockaded 
French merchant vessels. Initially Britain had condoned its breach by 
American vessels on "discontinuous voyages", ostensibly importing goods 
from the French West Indies to the southern United States, unloading, but 
immediately reloading, and re-exporting them to Europe. Shippers paid 
customs duties on the 'imports', which the American government had 
customarily re-imbursed as "drawback", a rebate less administrative costs. 
This conciliatory policy, formalised by a British Admiralty Court decision 
involving the American vessel Polly in 1800, had however contributed to a 
marked increase in American shipping between the Caribbean and Europe.
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American re-exports had increased almost thirty times, from $1.8m in 1792, 
to $53.2m in 1805, causing concern to Britain's West India Committee, 
which represented sugar growers, merchants and shippers, as well as to the 
British government.(52)
An Admiralty Court ruling on the detained American vessel Essex in 
May 1805, had then reversed a policy which had seemed to threaten the 
effectiveness of the British maritime blockade of France. Sir William Scott 
ruled that the routine American re-imbursement of customs duty as 
'drawback', meant that such French colonial goods had not legally been 
imported into the United States, and were not therefore neutral American 
goods, but liable to British confiscation. Some Americans referred 
indignantly to their trade being as controlled by Britain as it had been before 
independence, and James Monroe, the American Minister in London, went so 
far as to demand financial compensation from the British government for lost 
trade.
However, after a brief flurry of detentions of American vessels by 
the Royal Navy, during which American insurance rates rose and shipper's 
profits fell, a newly elected British government under Grenville and Fox, in 
effect reversed the Essex ruling. The "Fox Blockade" of northern Europe, 
proclaimed in May 1806, was absolute only between the Seine and Ostend, 
and was taken by its lack of reference to American 're-exports', to imply that 
such discontinuous voyages could be resumed. (53) Monroe however, 
although initially impressed by British pragmatism, began to assert that only 
American force would prevent such British interference in future.
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The Continental System, and Orders in Council
Economic warfare between Britain and France had escalated after 
January 1806, with France increasingly using her domination of other 
European countries to strike at British trade. In February 1806 the French had 
procured the exclusion of British vessels from Prussian ports, adding to 
Britain's list of enemies. In November 1806, after Prussia had itself been 
defeated by the French, the Berlin Decree had launched a Continental System 
designed to close all European ports to British vessels. In reply, in January 
1807, the first of fourteen successive British Orders in Council had extended 
the naval blockade of France, and eventually declared all ships trading in 
ports from which British vessels were excluded, liable to capture. Spencer 
Perceval had succinctly summarised the purpose of Britain's measures as, 
"The objects of the Orders in Council were not to destroy the trade of the 
Continent, but to force the Continent to trade with us."(54)
A short-lived alliance between Britain, Russia and Prussia had ended 
with the defeat of Russian and Prussian armies at Freidland. The resultant 
Treaty of Tilsit in July 1807, had recruited Russian co-operation into the 
economic warfare against Britain, in which the Prussians were again 
included. In September 1807, the Royal Navy had only dissuaded Denmark 
from joining economic war against Britain, by a second bombardment of 
Copenhagen. Britain's fifth Order in Council, made on 11 November 1807, 
had in effect forced trade in neutral vessels with French dominated Europe, to 
pass through British ports, with the transit fees paid adding to British 
revenues. In December 1807, Napoleon's Milan Decree had sought to extend 
the Continental System by detaining neutral vessels, often American, which
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had traded with Britain. It was further widened the following year by its 
inclusion of the ports of Spain and Portugal. Nonetheless, some in Britain saw 
the profitable expansion of neutral American maritime trade as an 
opportunistic and unprincipled exploitation of the British pre-occupation with 
an undemocratic European tyrant. Given Britain's earlier relationship with 
Americans, actual co-operation was probably too much to expect, but not 
perhaps the avoidance of active opposition. An attempt by the Americans to 
resist European interference in their neutral trade with economic pressure, by 
passing a Non-Importation Act in April 1806, had greatly harmed Anglo- 
American relations.(55)
The Issue of Impressment
Bad feeling between the governments of the United States and 
Britain were further aggravated by the impressment by the Royal Navy of 
apparently British seamen from American merchant vessels at sea. Desertion 
from the Royal Navy had long been a major problem, despite being a capital 
offence.(56) Therefore, the "allegiance" of British seamen found on neutral 
vessels was, according to the Prince Regent, "no optional duty which they can 
decline or resume at pleasure", but "began with their birth and can only 
terminate with their existence".(57) Nevertheless, higher wages, better 
conditions and a reduced risk of impressment, had so much encouraged the 
transfer of British merchant seamen that, by 1807, of 55,000 seamen engaged 
in American overseas trade, "not less than 40% were British born".(58) Their 
loss would be a serious economic handicap, and a Republican Congressman
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had denounced their reclamation by the Royal Navy, as an "odious and 
tyrannic practice".(59)
Accounts of the number of allegedly British seamen impressed from 
American vessels, had varied. Hezekiah Niles, a Baltimore journalist, 
estimated that 6,257 seamen, mostly American, had been impressed into the 
Royal Navy by 1812.(60) After the war, the British lawyer-turned-historian 
William James, cited a Boston newspaper's account of a Congressional 
speech, to reduce the number to 156.(61) Perhaps more credibly, William 
Dudley's "conservative estimate" of 9,991 American seamen impressed 
between 1796 and 1 January 1812, "compensates for duplication of 
names".(62) The British Foreign Office did investigate some authenticated 
mistakes, although repatriations appear to have been few.(63)
Some Royal Naval officers reclaimed apparently British seamen 
whenever opportunity arose, their decisions complicated by the "similarity of 
language and manners", the availability of false naturalisation papers, and the 
American need for trained seamen.(64) The British search for deserters 
however had political implications when the examination of coastal vessels 
involved the violation of American territorial waters, and even the exchange 
of gunfire between British and American warships. When in June 1807, 
deserters from the British squadron off Chesapeake Bay had joined American 
vessels, including USS Chesapeake, then leaving for sea, HMS Leopard had 
been ordered to retrieve them. When the Chesapeake's captain had refused 
permission to board, Leopard opened fire, killing three Americans. Three of 
the four men taken from the Chesapeake were found to be American and 
released, the fourth, a British subject was hanged.
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News of the incident reaching Washington had strengthened 
President Jefferson's determination that an Anglo-American treaty "of amity 
commerce and navigation", which had been signed on 31 December 1806, 
should not be submitted for Senate approval.(65) The Monroe-Pinkney treaty 
had settled all outstanding trade issues, but attempts to agree on clauses 
defining legitimate impressment had failed, and despite the allocation of extra 
time, the treaty was never ratified. In March 1807, a return to Tory 
government in Britain had hardened attitudes, and meant that Foreign 
Secretary Canning would not agree to any re-negotiation. War had probably 
been averted by the Admiralty's recall of the North America station's 
commander, Vice-Admiral George Berkeley, tacit agreement that British 
impressment policy could not include the stopping of neutral warships. 
Britain was eventually to offer financial compensation, but not before 
Jefferson, in July 1807, had excluded British warships from all American 
waters.
A Tradition of British Blockade
On the morning of 6 August 1807, an editorial in London's Morning 
Post expressed exasperation with American maritime, commercial and 
foreign policy, and volunteered its opinion that, "Three weeks of blockade of 
the Delaware and Boston Harbour would make our presumptuous rivals 
repent of their puerile public conduct."(66) That any section of British public 
opinion should recommend so unambiguously the blockade of a transatlantic 
partner turned rival, while still engaged in a prolonged war with France,
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measured the breakdown of a markedly interdependent commercial 
relationship.
However, from the outset, independent Americans had been aware of 
their vulnerability to British maritime economic warfare. Perhaps partly as a 
result, Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin wrote from Washington to President 
Jefferson on 25 July 1807 that, "All those places which deserve the name of 
towns, & which, by the shipping they contain, or as deposits of produce & 
merchandise, offer a temptation of plunder or destruction, ought to have at 
least a battery to protect them against attack by a single frigate or other small 
force."(67) Specifically, he thought "the practicality of preventing an enemy 
from keeping possession of the Chesapeake by anything short of a superior 
naval force", should be "inquired into". He realised that the United States 
could not deploy such a force since earlier in the year, Jefferson had made it 
clear that he preferred gunboats, suitable only for sheltered waters, and in 
February, Congress had ordered an additional two hundred.(68)
Gallatin thought that the risk to,
Charleston... next to New York, the greatest deposit of domestic produce in wartime, 
may be greater still...the Potomac may be easily defended. But, an active enemy 
might land at Annapolis, march to the city, and re-embark before the militia could be 
collected to repel him...Washington will be an object, in order to destroy the ships 
& naval stores, but particularly as a stroke which would give the enemy reputation & 
attach disgrace to the United States. (69)
Gallatin next raised the possibility of an American pre-emptive strike, 
timed for "this autumn" or "this winter", that is, of 1807.
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But, as long as the British hold Halifax they will be able, by the superiority of their 
naval force, to blockade during the greater part of the year, all our principal 
seaports, and particularly New York, including the Sound, Philadelphia, the 
Chesapeake and Charleston. If we take it, the difficulty to refit and obtain 
refreshment will greatly diminish that evil, and enable us to draw some advantage 
from our small navy on our own coast. (70)
Gallatin's intention seems to have been the permanent occupation of at least 
part of Canada, rather than as a bargaining-chip in any future negotiation over 
British naval encroachments into American territorial waters or about 
impressment. The Americans would surely have realised that having once 
captured Halifax, any future withdrawal from it could result in an immediate 
resumption of the British practice to which they had previously objected.
Gallatin next discussed war finance. Gross customs revenue for 1806 
had been $ 14.6m, and given American neutrality, was likely to exceed $15m 
in 1807.(71) Gallatin estimated that these "present imposts" would be reduced 
by war to about $8m. This could be rectified by "additional duties and taxes" 
of $2.5m, income from government land sales worth $0.5m and the call for a 
loan of $7m, a subtotal of $ 10m, making available, if the loan call was 
successful, about $18m.(72) He next discussed practicalities. "As for 
transports on the coast of Maine for [attacks on] New Brunswick and Nova 
Scotia, the embargo by Congress will give enough to us" - the envisaged 
legislative ban on American overseas trade would make available sufficient 
merchant ships to transport troops to the Maritime Provinces.(73) In the 
event, Jefferson's Embargo was not to be put into effect until December 
1807.(74) A swift American attack on Britain's lightly held Halifax naval
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base, while Britain was heavily engaged in its war with France, might just 
conceivably have resulted in a precipitate peace based on uti possidetis, each 
signatory keeping what it held when the fighting stopped. Influential though 
Gallatin may have been, Jefferson evidently had not thought so.
Jefferson's Embargo
In December 1807, Jefferson had made an attempt to impose on 
Britain a fundamental change of policy by the use of economic sanctions in 
the form of an Embargo on all American seaborne trade with Britain. He had 
intended cutting off the American export of crucial raw materials like cotton, 
and the importation of British manufactured goods. In the event, Jefferson's 
Embargo was to cause greater economic harm to the United States than to its 
intended victim, and cause irreparable damage to his political career and 
subsequent reputation, having left office in March 1809, according to one 
British historian, "a beaten man".(75) British vessels nevertheless remained 
excluded from American waters, and trade with Britain forbidden by a Non- 
Intercourse Act.(76)
Both Jefferson and James Madison, his Secretary of State, had 
believed that American trade restrictions would force both European 
belligerents to respect 'neutral rights', although the far greater extent of 
Anglo-American trade had meant that Britain would be more affected than 
France. Despite Jefferson's experience, having succeeded to the Presidency in 
1809, Madison had signed Macon's No 2 Bill on 1 May 1810, which had 
offered resumed trade to whichever European power repealed its restrictions
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on neutral trade. Napoleon's deceptive Cadore Letter to the American 
Minister in Paris, apparently dated 5 August 1810, had made it look as if 
France had done so, thereby ensuring that after 2 February 1811, American 
trade restrictions applied solely to Britain.(77)
Furthermore, in an effort to monitor British vessels and to reduce 
impressment from coastal shipping, United States warships had increasingly 
patrolled the American eastern seaboard. On 16 May 1811, the American 
heavy frigate President had been sent from Annapolis to investigate reports of 
both British and French warships stopping American vessels offshore. In 
darkness, gunfire was exchanged between the President and the British sloop 
Little Belt. The smaller vessel was badly damaged. Nine British seamen were 
killed and twenty-three others wounded. Diplomatic relations between Britain 
and the United States were further strained. The incident had apparently been 
triggered by American opposition to impressment rather than interference 
with neutral American trade.(78) But if, as Tracy argues, the incident was 
seen by contemporary Americans as, "a sign of the growing tendency in the 
United States to resist British exercise of maritime commercial control, even 
if it put the republic in the balance on the side of the Buonapartist Empire", 
then, at least until the defeat of Napoleon, further Anglo-American conflict 
was, if not inevitable, then extremely likely.(79)
Madison's Addresses to Congress
By 5 November 1811, Madison was complaining in his Presidential 
Message to Congress that, "our coasts and the mouths of our harbours have 
again witnessed scenes, not less derogatory to the dearest of our natural
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rights, than vexatious to the regular course of our trade. Among the 
occurrences produced by British ships of war hovering on our coasts", he 
specifically mentioned the Little Belt incident, "rendered unavoidable" by the 
British sloop having fired first on the heavy frigate, "being therefore alone 
chargeable with the blood unfortunately shed in maintaining the honour of the 
American flag".(80) Britain's Orders in Council, and opposition to American 
designs on the Spanish territories in West and East Florida, had been added to 
Madison's catalogue of complaints, making war between a neutral engaged in 
trade, and a belligerent imposing maritime blockade on a third party, seem 
ever more likely.
Madison had then announced that American "gunboats have, in 
particular harbours, been ordered into use. The ships of war before in 
commission, with the addition of a frigate, have been chiefly employed as a 
cruising guard to the rights of our coast." "[Tjhe British Cabinet", he 
concluded, "perseveres ...in the execution, brought home to the threshold of 
our territory, of measures which.. .have the character, as well as the effect, of 
war on our lawful commerce".(81)
On 1 June 1812, Madison had again addressed Congress, and 
complained that British efforts to prevent neutral American carriers nullifying 
the blockade of France meant that, "British cruisers have also been... violating 
the rights and peace of our Coasts. They hover over and harass our entering 
and departing Commerce.. .and have wantonly spilt American blood within 
the sanctuary of our territorial jurisdiction".(82) He had ignored the violation 
of territorial jurisdiction involved in the United States annexation of Spanish 
West Florida in October 1810, which had lead to Britain's reinforcement of
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its North America squadron, and left unmentioned the current American 
designs on East Florida.(83) He also accused "British traders and garrisons" 
with arming and inciting the 'Indians', "connecting their hostility with that 
influence" in explaining renewed warfare on America's northwest frontiers. 
Alternative explanations for the possession of British muskets by the 
indigenous tribes were not explored, although it was not apparently until 
November 1812, with the war already begun, that the British government was 
to supplement the same "articles which were sent out last year with the 
Addition of 2000 Light Musquets adapted for the use of the Indian 
tribes".(84)
Madison had not mentioned that Republican 'War Hawks' argued 
that renewed hostility with northwest frontier 'Indians' would provide the 
pretext for the United States' invasion of Canada, which they thought could 
be completed before Britain could respond with sufficient strength, 
particularly once the naval base at Halifax, Nova Scotia had been seized.(85) 
Jefferson told Madison that the occupation of Quebec in 1812 and Halifax in 
1813, would allow "the final expulsion of England from the American 
continent".(86) While still at war with France, and with Baltic supplies 
vulnerable, Britain could not afford to abandon Canadian bases or supplies of 
timber, naval stores and provisions.(87)
John Morier, Britain's charge d'affaires in Washington, had long 
suspected the Madison administration of "eager Subserviency to France", and 
had in January 1811, reported as much to the Foreign Office in London.(88) 
Twelve days later he described a letter written to the American Secretary of 
State Robert Smith, as, "a pretty plain declaration that the French government
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& that of the US, regarding Britain as their common enemy, are united in 
pursuing certain measures against her." He described Smith as having 
"displayed evident Symptoms of a Fear of Displeasing the French."(89)
The Declaration of War
On 10 April 1812 Foreign Secretary Castlereagh reminded Augustus 
Foster, the British Minister in Washington, of the likely origins of the war. 
Since the Americans "co-operated with France by prohibiting, in concurrence 
with her, the importation of British produce and manufactures into the Ports 
of America... and continue to exclude British Commerce and British Ships of 
War from her Ports, while they are open to those of the enemy, it is then clear 
that we are at issue with America upon principles which, upon the part of this 
Govt. you are not at liberty to compromise."(90)
Castlereagh nevertheless thought that war was not yet inevitable. "It 
is more probable that the near aspect [that] the question has now assumed 
may awaken them to the ****** folly of attempting either to force or intimidate 
Gr. Br., & that alarmed at the danger seen to themselves of the former attempt 
and the hopelessness of the latter, they may see an opportunity of receding 
without disgrace."(91) Far from seeking any such opportunity, Madison had 
referred the question to the House Foreign Relations Committee, which 
supported a declaration of war. The House of Representatives voted for war, 
but the Senate delayed its approval, although eventually agreed. Ironically, as 
the House of Commons considered the revocation of the Orders in Council as
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far as America was concerned, on 18 June 1812, the United States declared 
war on Britain.(92)
A week before war was declared, the First Lord of the Admiralty, 
Robert Dundas, Lord Melville, had written to Admiral Lord Keith,
The American Government are proceeding [at] great lengths in the way of 
provocation, with a view probably to local objects & to produce irritation against 
this Country...undoubtedly such dangerous conduct may involve us in a quarrel.
Local British diplomats, naval and military commanders, he thought, "seem 
to be using their utmost endeavour to guard against such an extremity; but it 
may be beyond their power to avert."(93) He was soon to be proved right.
The possible use of maritime economic warfare and blockade was 
seldom far from either public minds or those of British decision-makers. The 
strategy seemed equally applicable to the Mediterranean as to America. 
Earlier in the year, the Foreign Office had instructed the Admiralty to 
"institute a strict and rigorous Blockade of the Islands of Corfu, Trano & 
Paxo & their several Dependencies on the Coast of Albania".(94) It would 
now seem that just such a policy would need to be applied to the United 
States.
Unsurprisingly therefore, when in June 1812, mutual Anglo- 
American irritation culminated in an American declaration of war, the British 
Admiralty was in due course instructed to implement just such a policy of 
naval and commercial blockades of the United States. By 21 November 1812, 
after a fruitless British attempt to restore peace, the Secretary of State for 
War, Lord Bathurst, had ordered a precisely similar blockade of the American
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Atlantic seaboard, to start "forthwith" with, specifically, "a strict and rigorous 
Blockade of the Ports and Harbors of the Bay of the Chesapeake and of the 
River Delaware".(95) By 27 November, the Admiralty had relayed the order 
to its Commander-in-Chief of the "United Command" of the West Indies and 
North America, Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren. On 26 December 1812, 
their Lordships reinforced the order with a further letter calling for "a 
complete and vigorous Blockade".(96)
The outbreak of war with the United States hardened attitudes and 
suspended much further debate in Britain on the legality of maritime 
blockade. British public opinion largely reflected the government's 
determination that Britain could,
never acknowledge any blockade to be illegal which has been duly notified, and is 
supplied by an adequate force, merely upon the ground of its extent, or because the 
ports or coasts blockaded are not at the same time invested by land. (97)
Therefore, by the Spring of 1813, despite Britain's preoccupation with the 
ongoing Great War against Napoleon, the Royal Navy began its maritime 
blockades of the United States in earnest. From the outset however, in the 
event of the States bordering on British North America seceding from the 
Union, their trade with Britain, "shall not be interrupted", but "allowed to be 
carried on without molestation".(98)
Both before and after the American declaration of war, Melville 
received a great deal of unsought advice, some potentially useful.(99) One 
letter of January 1813, from Admiral Sir Henry Stanhope, a veteran of the 
War of American Independence, was better informed than most.(lOO) He
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recommended a survey of the warships laid up 'in ordinary' and selection of 
the best to be cut down as 58 gunned razees. He realised that British attacks 
on "Sea Port Towns" would, for the present, be "unavailable and disastrous 
without such a Land Force as the Circumstances of the Country could not 
perhaps readily admit". He would however "effectually blockade them by 
such a well connected Chain of commanding Force as They should not be 
able to oppose, composed of small Squadrons under the Command of active 
and intelligent officers". Knowing from personal experience that "the Coast 
of America in its vast Extent, has innumerable small Harbours and Inlets as 
well for Trade as for the building and equipping of Armed vessels", he 
recommended "keeping them in perpetual Alarm" by using Marines for feint 
and genuine attacks on coastal targets, before "the speediest Reembarkation". 
Over the remaining two years of war, much of this advice was to be followed 
with great effect.
60
Chapter 2: Constraints and Solutions.
"I think the fact is that the Admiralty have merely humbugged Sir J... They have equally 
tricked him in withdrawing reinforcements and most shamefully neglected the squadron in 
the West Indies, and on this Coast. What the devil they intend is hard to divine, bur certain it 
is to say that our navy will be disgraced and our trade ultimately ruined unless very speedy 
addition is made to every division in these seas." George Hulbert, Flag Secretary and Prize 
Agent to Admiral Sir John Warren, to his brother John Hulbert, 2 January 1813.(1)
War at a Distance
If the Royal Navy was to impose the hardships of economic warfare 
on the enemy, its new war would generally have to be fought across the 
Atlantic. There, its main North America base at Halifax, Nova Scotia, was 
almost 2,500 miles from London or Liverpool, and over 600 miles from New 
York, the United States major port and commercial centre. As shown by Map 
1, it would need bases at St John's, Newfoundland and St John, New 
Brunswick to contribute to the defence of Canada. It would also have to use 
its base in Bermuda, itself 650 miles from the nearest American mainland at 
Cape Hatteras, North Carolina. This however, was 700 miles from New York, 
and 1,000 from Savannah, Georgia. Prevailing winds, currents and trade 
routes all meant that vessels from Europe would frequently approach North 
America from the Caribbean, and the West Indies would therefore be 
involved in Britain's war with the United States. Bases in Jamaica, the 
Bahamas, and Antigua in the Leeward Islands, would also be needed.
It would take the first Commander-in-Chief of a new United 
Command of North America and the West Indies, Admiral Sir John Borlase 
Warren, six and a half weeks to reach his post from Portsmouth, typically 
encountering contrary winds and autumnal gales.(2) On arrival, he would be 
responsible for British naval and diplomatic affairs over an American eastern
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seaboard of over 2,000 miles, without taking into account major estuaries and 
innumerable creeks and inlets, or the circumference of many major islands 
like Long Island off New York.
Geographically therefore, Warren's responsibilities would range 
from Newfoundland and New Brunswick, at latitude 48 degrees north, to 
include the entire American eastern seaboard to the Mississippi estuaries, 
Mobile and New Orleans, and extend across the Caribbean to the Leeward 
Islands to latitude 12 degrees north. Even during Britain's engagement in a 
world-wide war against the French Empire, this vast area represented an 
intimidating responsibility, and for all but the most able and energetic, itself 
an intellectual burden and psychological constraint on decision-making. 
Decisions on one area would affect others, often far distant and beyond reach, 
in ways difficult to predict. Although far from being the oldest serving naval 
Commander in Chief, this might well have been a daunting prospect for a 
man aged 59 when appointed. Even after receiving some urgently needed 
reinforcements, Warren reminded the First Lord of the Admiralty in late 
December 1813 that, "The Extent of this Coast however is immense; that to 
shut up all ports would require Twice my Numbers."(3)
Delays in communication over such distances would present a major 
problem both before and throughout the war. Dispatches from the American 
coast might occasionally reach Liverpool or Plymouth in a minimum of 24 
days, but still need express overland transport to London before governmental 
decisions were possible. Any initial advantage gained by rapid eastward 
transit would be offset by the six week westward voyage with any reply.(4) 
Within the North American theatre, written communications, often
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necessarily duplicated to safeguard against loss or delay, could take weeks to 
reach those expected to implement them. Such delays would have to be 
allowed for in the transmission of political instructions relayed by the 
Admiralty in London to the commander-in-chief, and in his tactical orders to 
subordinates.
Before the American declaration of war, Foreign Secretary 
Castlereagh's instructions to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on 9 
May 1812, ponderously attempted to cover every eventuality, "in 
consideration of the length of time that must necessarily elapse between any 
hostile measures on the part of the United States and any orders which the 
commanders of His My's Ships & Vessels upon their coasts could receive 
from your Lordships." British commanders in North America were to have 
"Instructions & Authority to repel any hostile aggression", but were "at the 
same time to take especial care that they commit no Act of Aggression".
If warlike American intentions were "certified to them" by 
documentary evidence, they were to "pursue such measures either offensive 
or defensive as may be most effective for annoying the Enemy", and 
"protecting the Trade of His My's Subjects". Castlereagh reiterated to their 
Lordships that they must "strictly command and enjoin the Commanders.. .to 
exercise all possible forbearance".(5) This constraint so impressed itself on 
Vice-Admiral Herbert Sawyer, C in C North America at Halifax that, even 
after HMS Belvidera had been attacked by USS President, on 23 June, and 
lives lost on both sides, he was to release the three American prizes the 
Belvidera took as she made good her escape to Nova Scotia. When Belvidera 
reached Halifax on 27 June, Sawyer had not received any official
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confirmation of war, and so remained cautiously averse to any risk of 
reprimand.
The lack of rapid transatlantic communication had itself contributed 
to the outbreak of the war. Britain's eventual acceptance of Napoleon's 
apparent renunciation of the French Berlin and Milan decrees, which had 
attempted the economic isolation of Britain, would lead to Parliament's 
revocation of Britain's retaliatory Orders in Council.(6) Two-thirds of 
Madison's catalogue of complaints against Britain to Congress on 1 June 
1812, had been his denunciation of the Orders, and in the absence of 
diplomatic progress, on 18 June 1812, the United States had declared war. 
Unknown to Congress, Parliament was to revoke the Orders as far as America 
was concerned, on 23 June, to be effective from 1 August. The issue of Royal 
Naval impressment of Americans at sea however, remained unresolved, and 
subsequent British attempts at armistice were to come to nothing. Most of the 
American maritime trade that Britain would seek to disrupt was to be found 
on the United States eastern coastline at some stage of the transaction, and 
therefore for the British, this was to be a war fought at a distance.
When the United States declared war on Britain in June 1812, the 
Royal Navy was, from the outset, constrained by the number of vessels it 
could keep in North America. The fact was well recognised in Britain, with 
the war against France in its nineteenth year. Despite a British numerical 
superiority in warships, demands were such that shortages became critical. 
On 17 June 1812, Admiral George Hope, of the Board of Admiralty, confided 
privately to Admiral Lord Keith, that intelligence grew of a build-up of 
French warships at Aix Roads, causing such anxiety that a pre-emptive strike
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was contemplated. "We are bringing forward frigates as fast as we can, but 
how it will be possible to keep up the system of Blockade [of France] as he 
increases his Force, is beyond my comprehension for it is totally impossible 
to increase our navy in that ratio." Nevertheless, he added, "America.. .at this 
moment is very doubtful & we must provide for whatever may happen there." 
(7)
That Britain's Royal Navy was overstretched was also recognised by 
some in Congress. Recommending American naval expansion to the House in 
January 1812, Republican Representative Langdon Cheves rejected the 
argument that an American navy would inevitably be overwhelmed by the 
Royal Navy. A British fleet with "the high sounding number of a thousand 
ships appals the mind", but was "a great misconception" when subjected to 
"an examination of its actual force and the numerous requisitions which are 
made upon it".(8)
Furthermore, in his speech opposing American naval expansion, 
fellow Republican Adam Seyburt was mistaken in asserting that Halifax, 
Nova Scotia and Bermuda could "afford every facility to fit and repair" 
British vessels in North America. Therefore, he had wrongly argued, that the 
29 British vessels in Halifax and Newfoundland, specified in his copy of 
Steel's List for July 1811, alone constituted "a force in itself very superior to 
that of all the vessels belonging to the American navy".(9) In common with 
the Royal Navy's Caribbean bases, neither Halifax nor Bermuda had dry- 
dock facilities, and in other respects, like the persistent shortage of skilled 
labour, Britain's naval bases in North America were far from ideal. Vessels 
needing major repair would have to return to Britain.(lO)
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A later list of the "active sea-going material of the Royal navy, 
exclusive of harbour vessels and inefficient or non-fighting ships", compiled 
from earlier sources, reduced Britain's effective fleet still further. According 
to Clowes, Britain had in 1811, a total of 657 vessels, of which 124 were 
ships of the line. By 1812, continued hard use had reduced these figures to 
623 and 120 respectively.(11) In reply to Warren's persistent pleas for 
reinforcements, the Admiralty insisted, that by 10 February 1813, his 'United 
Command' had no less than 97 vessels, including "Eleven Sail of the Line", 
34 frigates, 38 sloops and 12 smaller craft, so generous a proportion as to be 
creating strain elsewhere. He had, the Admiralty insisted, a force "much 
greater in proportion than the National Navy of the Enemy.. .would seem to 
warrant". Therefore, "it may not be possible to maintain on the Coast of 
America for any length of time a force so disproportionate to the Enemy as 
that which, with a view of enabling you to strike some decisive blow, they 
have now placed under your orders".(12) The American navy however, was 
not conveniently concentrated to facilitate any immediate 'decisive blow', nor 
would blockade produce immediate results. The Admiralty's ill-considered 
criticism shows, at least, a confusion of objectives.
If, by then, Warren had indeed been sent "about one seventh of all 
the Sea going Vessels in the British Navy", the Royal Navy would have had a 
total of 679 vessels.(13) In fact, not all of the vessels promised had arrived, 
and others were so unfit for use on arrival as to need immediate repair. On 
such an extended coastline, all those vessels available to him would not even 
allow Warren to place, "all of the Enemy's Ports in a state of close and 
permanent Blockade".(14)
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Furthermore, during the first six months of the war the number of 
vessels available for blockading or any other duties, was to be depleted by a 
succession of unexpected British defeats in single ship actions. The defeat of 
HMS Guerriere, 38, by USS Constitution, 44, on 19 August 1812 had come 
before Warren's arrival in Halifax, and was not therefore due to his personal 
"want of due precaution", but other "naval Disasters" were to follow, and did 
indeed "make a strong impression on the public mind", both then and 
since.(15) The loss of the Macedonian to the American heavy frigate United 
States followed on 25 October 1812. The defeat of HMS Java also by the 
Constitution, although under a different commander, came on 29 December 
1812. These major defeats were accompanied by those of smaller British 
vessels. On 14 August 1812, HMS Alert, 16, had surrendered to the American 
frigate Essex, 32, to be followed on 13 October by the schooner Laura,\Q. 
The Frolic, 18, was taken by the Wasp, also of 18 guns, on 18 October, and 
although later recaptured, had been amongst those British vessels unavailable 
between August and December 1812.(16) Moreover, on 10 September 1813, 
an entire British squadron of six vessels was to be lost in a fleet action with 
nine American vessels on Lake Erie, a defeat, which in the event, the 
Americans proved unable to exploit fully.(17)
Nonetheless, these surrenders came as a profound shock to naval 
professionals, politicians, newspaper editors and the nation as a whole, many 
of whom had come to regard the Royal Navy as practically invincible. 
Complacency, a preference for paint and polish and in some cases an absence 
of regular gun-drill, were each to contribute to a series of British ships 
striking their colours to American opponents. At the resultant court-martial,
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the loss of the Peacock to the USS Hornet., on 24 February 1813, was 
attributed at least in part to a "want of skill in directing the Fire, owing to an 
omission of the Practice of exercising the crew in the use of the Guns for the 
last three Years...".(18) Warren ordered that "times of exercising the Great 
Guns and small Arms be always entered in the Ships Log conformable to the 
General printed Instructions."(19) The Admiralty later issued a circular order 
that the scouring of iron stanchions and ring bolts should be "gradually 
discontinued" and replaced by "exercise at Arms".(20) The early defeats were 
to some extent redressed in British minds by the capture, on 1 June 1813, of 
the American frigate Chesapeake by the British frigate Shannon, where gun 
drill had long been exemplary. More importantly however, these actions did 
not prevent the Royal Navy's now persistent application of an increasingly 
effective commercial blockade of the American population.
Less unexpectedly, navigational hazards would also reduce the 
number of British vessels available on the North America and West Indies 
stations. The first was the sloop Emulous from the Halifax squadron, 
grounded and lost on Cape Sable on 2 August 1812, soon to be followed by 
the loss of the schooner Chub. A more serious loss on 5 October 1812 was 
that of the sixth rate Barbadoes, 24, newly transferred to the Leeward Islands 
squadron, and carrying £60,000 as the payroll for Halifax Dockyard.(21) 
Another significant loss was that of the frigate Southampton, 32, of the 
Jamaica squadron, which struck a Caribbean reef on 27 November 1812, 
together with Vixen, an American prize taken five days before.(22) On 5 
December 1812, the brig Plumper, carrying £70,000 from Halifax to St John, 
New Brunswick, was lost off Point Lepreau.(23) For British blockading
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squadrons, and the American vessels attempting to evade them, shifting 
sandbars were to pose a navigational problem throughout the war.
The Navy Estimates
In Britain, Parliament regularly made the necessary financial 
provision for warship building, manning the Royal Navy, and for repairing 
wear and tear. Annual estimates of the cost of its operations across the world 
were debated and voted on. The 'ordinary estimate' for ships and dockyard 
facilities was fixed at £1.6m in 1811, and £1.4m in 1812. It was to exceed 
£1.7m for both 1813 and 1814, and approach £2.3m in 1815.(24) 'Extra' 
estimated expenditure, customarily intended for meeting increased 
maintenance and adding new ships, exceeded £2m in 1811, but was reduced 
to £1.7m in 1812. It was to rise by more than 66% in 1813, to more than 
£2.8m, and to remain above £2m for the following year.(25) The annual 
parliamentary vote for the number of seamen and marines was a financial 
formula which provided theoretically for 145,000 men in both 1811 and 1812. 
Having fallen to!40,000 in 1813, this was to reach a total of 207,400 in 1814. 
In practice, these figures meant that around 130,000 men were financially 
allowed for between 1812 and 1814.(26)
Ultimately, financial constraints governed the logistical support for 
the war in North America as elsewhere, and determined the supplies of 
provisions, and ordnance. The Navy Estimate fixed annually by the House of 
Commons had reached £19.8m in 1811, and despite having fallen slightly to 
£ 19.3m in 1812 was to reach a record £20m in 1813. It reverted to £ 19.3m for 
1814. Clearly, Britain's economic strength and relative financial and fiscal
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efficiency was such that as well as the political will, the necessary finance, 
although customarily in arrears, was nevertheless available to fight the 
Americans as well as the French between 1812 and 1815.(27)
According to the Admiralty, on his arrival at Halifax on 26 
September 1812, Warren's United Command was to be comprised of 83 
named 'Ships in Sea Pay'. Some however, were in urgent need of 
refurbishment or repair. Thirty-seven were based either at Halifax or 
Newfoundland, and the rest in the Caribbean.(28) Among them were the 
elderly 64 gunned Africa., launched as long before as 1781, and the 
obsolescent Antelope, 50. Eight frigates, with between 38 and 32 guns, were 
supplemented by 25 brigs and sloops with less than twenty guns, and by two 
receiving ships.
The Royal Navy in North America was opposed by a United States 
Navy of 17 vessels, of which seven were frigates.(29) Three were heavy 
frigates, nominally of 44 guns but mounting more, the practise of most sailing 
navies. Sturdily constructed, with crucial parts of southern 'live' oak, they 
had proved resistant to damage, and were usually fast enough to outsail 
potentially superior opposition, such as a British 74, in all but the heaviest 
seas. Three further frigates were rated as having 36 guns, and a fourth with 
32. Ten years of Republican opposition to naval expansion and economising 
on maintenance had however contributed to a deterioration in their condition. 
Two frigates, the Boston and the New York were found to be beyond repair, 
and another, the Adams was razeed into a 28 gun corvette.(30) Only eight 
other sloops and brigs, carrying between 18 and 12 guns had been built since 
1800, including the brig Viper, added as recently as 1810. Flotillas of
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gunboats intended to guard harbours and estuaries had been built, but had 
proved unusable beyond sheltered waters, and were unpopular and difficult to 
man. Seagoing traditions in American coastal regions meant that skill levels 
in the United States 'public' vessels were often very high, and morale had 
been raised by American naval successes against North African pirates and in 
the Quasi War against France between 1797 and 1801.(31) By December 
1812, the United States Navy had lost to the Royal Navy nothing bigger than 
the Wasp, 18.(32)
Despite its comparatively small size, the United States Navy formed 
a significant constraint on both British strategic planning and tactical 
operations. It posed a potential threat to British seaborne trade, especially in 
the early stages of a maritime economic war, with voyages begun before its 
declaration still incomplete. British vessels used to convoy economically 
important merchant ships could not at the same time be used to blockade 
American ports. British vessels stopping to deal with one American threat to a 
merchant convoy, could not guard it as it sailed on, against the possibility of 
attack by other American vessels, including privateers. Even with relatively 
small numbers, American warships presented the British with a problem of 
priorities.
Re-Provisioning, Refit and Repair
Whatever the number of British warships available on the North 
American station, they would inevitably need continual re-provisioning, refit 
and repair, and their crews time to recover from the cumulative effects of 
illness and injury, especially after action or bad weather. Theoretically, only a
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third of the force available might be deployed at any one time since one third 
might be under repair and another third in transit to or from its base. In 
practice, operational necessity and the expertise of specialist crew members 
such as sailmakers, riggers and carpenters would make it possible to postpone 
a return to port. Copper sheathing, routinely applied to the hulls of Royal 
Naval vessels since about 1779, offered protection against marine worms and 
weed growth, and had increased the time before hull-cleaning was again 
necessary.(33) Nevertheless, in October 1813, Warren had reported to the 
Admiralty that one-fifth of his force was either on passage, or needed refitting 
or heavy repair.(34)
An acute shortage of food and water might make return imperative, 
and occasionally this factor is evidently a constraint on Britain's 
implementation of maritime economic warfare. One of the most serious 
potential limits to a strategy of blockade which, in order to be both legal and 
effective required a continuous presence, was the need of blockading crews 
for provisions. To a great extent however, the basic supplies of food and drink 
for blockading squadrons was to be provided by the Victualling Board's 
provisioning service, which has been described as "the most important 
triumph of eighteenth-century British naval administration", and which 
continued its work into the early years of the following century .(3 5) Failing 
or contrary winds might take a squadron off station, or prolong a passage to 
another, but generally the crew's needs for food and drink were reliably and 
efficiently catered for. The availability of basic foodstuffs allowed the Royal 
Navy in North America to remain "on station, performing the tasks of 
seapower".(36)
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Provisioning agents in Halifax and Bermuda would make local 
purchases to supplement supplies of preserved food sent out from Britain by 
contractors such as Andrew Belcher, responsible in 1813 for victualling the 
North America station. (37) Salt-beef, salt-pork, split-peas, butter and cheese 
was sent out in casks, with bagged biscuit. 'Strong' beer and spirits, including 
rum, complemented or replaced often long-stored water, while fresh meat, 
milk and eggs might be supplied by livestock kept aboard. Provisions might 
be acquired by ad hoc arrangements made offshore, such as fishing over the 
side, or by the confiscation of an enemy cargo.
Shortages might be resolved with illicit American supplies, bought 
or taken from the shore, from visiting boats, or from those encountered at sea. 
Profit-seeking Americans had long been a handicap to the United States war 
effort. Madison's second embargo attempted to reduce if not eradicate "the 
palpable and criminal intercourse held with the enemy's forces blockading or 
invading the waters and shores of the United States".(38)
While in Massachusetts Bay in October 1813, Captain Hayes of the 
razee Majestic found that, "The Inhabitants of Province Town are disposed to 
be on friendly terms, and have promised to allow the ships to take water from 
their Wells and on reasonable terms will supply them with fish Fruit and 
Vegetables & also good firewood." In return, Hayes provided "a note to 
several Owners of Schooners going for a Cargo, stating the assistance 
afforded the Majestic and recommending their being permitted to pass."(39) 
The Royal Navy's need for food and water therefore occasionally prevented 
the achievement of a completely impervious commercial blockade of the 
United States.
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Recruitment and Desertion
Recruiting and retaining sufficient manpower was a problem in both 
navies, especially limiting operations involving contact with the shore. 
Although better paid than British crews, American seamen transferred from 
the sea to gunboats or the Lakes, and so deprived of their bounties or 
incentives, tended to desert or fail to re-enlist on completion of their agreed 
term. As the war progressed, and British commercial blockade increased 
unemployment amongst American merchant seamen, the problem for the 
United States Navy might have been eased but for the dissatisfaction caused 
by lack of pay other than in Treasury notes subject to up to 25% discount. 
(40)
Between 1811-13, 29,405 men were press-ganged into the Royal 
Navy, but in the same period, 27,300 deserted.(41) Recruitment and retention 
was so great a problem for the navy in Britain that even when ships were 
newly available, crews were hard to find. On 4 June 1813, Melville wrote to 
Warren that, "Some of our Fir Frigates have been launched, and others are 
coming forward. The whole will probably be completed in the course of this 
year, but we have great Difficulty in procuring men for them."(42) For the 
British, desertion was such a lasting concern that soon after arriving in 
Halifax, Warren had issued a proclamation promising deserters leniency, and 
encouraging British seamen in American service to return. It was something 
his predecessor had already tried, although with little success in either case. 
Warren went further. He wrote asking Melville to suggest to the Prince 
Regent that a royal pardon of deserters would prove effective.(43)
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The desertion problem may have been worsened by low morale 
caused partly by delay in the distribution of prize money. On 5 November 
1812, Warren wrote to Melville that such delay caused,
a bad effect among the Seamen as the Contrast is too great for their feelings to 
observe the Americans as Capturing, Condemning Selling and Dividing the profits 
of the British ships [taken] & that not one of the enemy vessels brought in by their 
Exertions has as yet been bestowed upon them. (44)
After the early months of 1813, even unshared prizes, which formed the 
majority, took a year to settle.(45) Adjudication for the sixth of prizes shared 
between a number of captors took longer. As Warren's accounts were later to 
show, some disputes remained unresolved until long after the war, by which 
time some beneficiaries were untraceable, or possibly dead.(46) Especially 
when commanders sank or burned prizes in order to avoid delays and the 
need for sending away prize crews when already shorthanded, blockade duty 
became unprofitable and unpopular with both officers and men. A motive for 
remaining in naval service was gone, and blockade appeared to vacillate 
between tedium, danger and disappointment.(47)
The problem remained no less acute in 1814. In both January and 
February, Niles' Weekly Register, a Baltimore periodical, mentioned the 
"mass desertions" of British seamen from Albion, Superb and New castle.(4$) 
This may not have been merely propaganda, since on 25 June 1814, Rear- 
Admiral George Cockburn was to write to Warren's successor, Vice-Admiral 
Alexander Cochrane that, although blockade "this last Month has cost the 
Enemy around us more than a Million of Dollars", desertion remained a
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problem, with "Many instances of our Marines walking over to the Enemy". 
(49) A "significant number" of deserting British seamen evidently enlisted in 
the United States Navy or in American privateers, despite the risk of capital 
punishment if captured, or at less hazard, into the American merchant 
service.(50)
It is often more or less explicitly suggested that a major constraint on 
the Royal Navy's use of maritime economic warfare in North America and 
West Indies between 1812 and 1815 was the mediocre, or even poor quality, 
of some British naval personnel. Individual captains and lieutenants are often 
praised for their competence and courage, such as Broke of the Shannon. He 
is rightly admired for his innovation and dedication to gun-drill, vindicated on 
1 June 1813 by his swift defeat of the Chesapeake. Nonetheless, criticism is 
made of both Sawyer and Warren, and some of the seamen and marines they 
commanded, with the implication that twenty years of almost continuous war 
with France had by then involved some scraping of Britain's barrel of 
manpower.(51)
Warren himself however had been selected as commander-in-chief 
from a number of possibilities. Sir Alexander Cochrane, his eventual 
successor, had written to Lord Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty in April 
1812. "Should the Embargo said to have taken place in America end in a War 
and there is a vacancy for that Command they have the offer of my services 
having a perfect knowledge of the Coast from my having served there in the 
American War and five years since while France aided the United States." 
Having been Governor of Guadeloupe after contributing to its capture in 
1810, he added, "Should my services be required in the Western World either
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here or on the Coast of America I will be ready in twenty four hours notice to 
embark on board any ships that may be sent for me".(52)
Warren was nonetheless preferred, partly because of his diplomatic 
experience as plenipotentiary extraordinary to St Petersburg between 1802-4, 
apparently thought likely to equip him for dealing with the potential armistice 
to which the British government hoped the Americans might agree on 
learning of the revocation of its Orders in Council, as far as they affected 
America. Furthermore, Warren's service record was impressive. As well as 
having dealt successfully with an earlier French threat to Ireland, Warren had 
expertise in precisely the sort of economic warfare now to be employed 
against America. Warren had earlier commanded one of the independent 
squadrons engaged in the blockade of France, which, "with the best young 
captains and a free hand to cruise" had in doing so "won a large share of 
glory and prize money". The effect of these squadrons "on French coasting 
trade [had] reduced Brest by 1795 to near starvation".(53)
Warren's success however had led, perhaps inevitably, to a 
reputation for acquisitiveness. By 1806, he seems to have made an enemy of a 
somewhat misanthropic Admiral of the Fleet, Earl St Vincent, who felt that 
"Sir JW is a mere partisan, preferring prize money to the public good at all 
times".(54) Earlier in the year he had accused Warren of duplicity and greed, 
writing that he would, "intrigue for a chief command.. .He wants money and 
will not be contented with the small pittance likely to be the lot of the puisne 
flag officer in this fleet".(55) By November 1806, others shared a poor view 
of Warren, one writing that he was "indefensible", and "now good for nothing 
but fine weather & easy sailing & is no longer enough in earnest about the
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duties of his profession to go through them with credit to himself & 
advantage to the service". The writer, Thomas Grenville, then First Lord of 
the Admiralty, added that he was "very sorry for it".(56) But, even if wholly 
deserved, Warren's reputation might seem to have made him well-suited for a 
war based on the capture of as much American commercial property at sea as 
possible, and the destruction of strategically important infrastructure ashore.
On 17 June 1812, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh's "Most 
Secret" letter had told Warren that, "In a few days you will receive some 
formal Documents upon the Subject, with Instructions as to your Conduct 
towards the American Govt", in advance of his appointment to the 'United 
Command' on 3 August. At least initially, Warren clearly enjoyed not only 
the respect and confidence of Melville, the current First Lord, and the 
Admiralty's political representative in the Cabinet, but also that of 
Castlereagh, whom he met in early August 1812, to receive his instructions in 
person.(57)
However, success in maritime commercial blockade was necessarily 
a slow and cumulative process, and criticism of Warren's operational conduct 
was renewed in the tone and substance of First Secretary of the Admiralty 
Croker's letters, conveying their Lordship's disappointment at the lack of 
prompt success against the United States Navy. Croker commented on 
Warren's lack of "judicious arrangement" of "adequate" resources.(58) Many 
subsequent historians have taken their cue from these observations without 
making sufficient allowance for the complexity of the circumstances and the 
timescale in which Warren was expected to succeed. The self-interested 
machinations of the West India Committee was eventually to secure re-
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separation of the United Command, and Warren's displacement by Cochrane, 
just as the temporary end of the war in Europe eased Britain's shortage of 
vessels and manpower.
The prevalence of sickness amongst naval personnel at every level 
also limited British operations in North America. At Halifax, Vice-Admiral 
Sawyer did not long survive Warren's arrival. On 7 October 1812, Warren 
used Sawyer's poor health as the ostensible reason for suggesting his 
removal.(59) Warren's secretary and prize agent George Hulbert welcomed 
Sawyer's replacement as second in command by Rear-Admiral Sir George 
Cockburn. "The change is favourable to Sir J and instead of an old woman he 
has got a devilish active fellow and just such as he wanted".(60) By 3 March 
1813, Cockburn's squadron was blockading the Chesapeake. Blockading 
operations there however, were curtailed for 1813, as early as 6 September, 
when Warren was obliged to leave Lynnhaven Bay for Halifax, "as the men 
have been afflicted with a fever and ague sometimes prevalent in this 
Climate". Warren's postscript added that he too had "been unwell" but hoped 
that "a few weeks in Nova Scotia will recover my health".(61)
The climates found in various parts of the Warren's 'United 
Command' may well have exacerbated the shortage of those available for 
duty. The problem of sickness was again experienced the following year 
when almost 44% of two battalions of Royal Marines raiding the Chesapeake 
in November 1814 were thought by Captain Barrie of the Dragon to be "such 
poor things naturally and so very sick that I shall be able to do little with 
them."(62)
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Warren's shortages of vessels and manpower, especially at the initial 
stages of the war, were all the more severe when seen in relation to the wide 
range of responsibilities imposed upon him by the Cabinet, where naval 
views were represented by the First Lord, Viscount Melville. The 'pleasure' 
of the Prince Regent and Privy Council, agreed by the Cabinet, and sent as 
instructions by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, to the Lords 
Commissioners of the Admiralty, were duly transmitted as orders from 
Melville and the Board of Admiralty. Warren was made responsible for 
exploring the possibilities of an armistice, "as was [e]nunciated by Lord 
Castlereagh", in early August. Before sailing on 14 August, Warren was 
supplied by the Foreign Office, via the Lords Commissioners of the 
Admiralty, with precise instructions, and an agreed draft letter to Madison, or 
Secretary of State Monroe, "should he find it suited to circumstances at the 
time of his arrival off the Coast".(63)
On his arrival at Halifax, Warren found that 46 American vessels, 
over half of them full-rigged ships, had been detained before 17 September 
under the terms of the General Embargo on American shipping which the 
British government had applied on 31 July, "in any of the ports, harbours or 
roads within any part of his Majesty's domains".(64) But Castlereagh's 
"secret instructions" of 6 August, given to Warren before he left, were to 
"make a proposition to the American government". In the event of the 
Americans revoking their letters of marque, Warren was to suspend 
hostilities.(65) Since American prizes taken between May and 1 August were 
"to be restored less costs", energetic pursuit of further American prizes was 
effectually constrained by the wait for an American answer, as well as by
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Warren's need to employ his limited resources to protect British merchant 
vessels from American privateers. While waiting, Warren noted that no 
revocation of American letters of marque appeared, and that privateers were 
still being equipped and manned.(66)
Warren had sent his letter to Madison, via Secretary of State Monroe, 
on 30 September 1812, but was not to receive Monroe's answer until 16 
November.(67) Until receipt of Monroe's reply, full-scale implementation of 
the Royal Navy's commercial blockade had been greatly restrained by the 
British diplomatic effort, for which Warren had in part, been selected. 
Whereas 110 American vessels had been detained in Halifax harbour, or 
brought in for adjudication between the declaration of war on 18 June and 
Warren's armistice proposal of 30 September, only eight had been captured 
during October and none at all in November, while Warren waited for an 
American reply. Only two had been taken during December while news 
spread that the Americans had, in effect, again chosen war.(68)
If in November, a two-month delay in a British response was to be 
avoided, Warren had had to make an appropriate decision on Monroe's reply. 
In the event, the American answer made any armistice conditional on a prior 
British abandonment of impressment. Deciding that this was unacceptable, 
Warren resumed the maritime blockade. Britain could not reasonably have 
been expected to concede any of its sovereign rights before negotiations 
began. Warren's naval initiative had been limited by political instructions 
which, while imposing heavy responsibilities, had left him ample scope for 
serious error.
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"Licences without Number' 
Similarly, Warren had to deal with the complexities of neutral 
vessels carrying' Letters of Protection 0 against British detention, often called 
'Commercial Licences for Trading with the Enemy'. These were issued, with 
varying degrees of propriety, to neutral shippers including Americans, to 
export American flour and grain to British armies in Canada, the Iberian 
Peninsula, Gibraltar and the British West Indies, as well as to the civilian 
populations. By allowing neutral and even United States merchant vessels out 
of some American ports, and by permitting their eventual return, even if only 
in ballast, such licences were held by some to render all British blockades 
illegal, even when neutrals were warned by proclamation. Some Americans 
argued that, "by the maritime law. any blockade abrogated all licences to 
trade; if otherwise the blockade was to be deemed to be broken".(69) Those 
boarded could claim vociferously that Britain could issue licences, or 
proclaim blockades, but not both. In any case, licences seemed to Warren to 
have proliferated "beyond all idea for Spain Gibr & the West Indies from the 
Americas", having been issued, not only by Augustus Foster, the British 
Minister in Washington, but also from Halifax by Vice-Admiral Sawyer, by 
Andrew Allen the former British Consul in Boston, and from Britain, by the 
Home Secretary, Viscount Sidmouth. By October 1812. Warren had 
successfully sought Sawyer's replacement. and Allen's conduct was being 
officially questioned.(70) By February 1813, Warren felt that it was 
"impossible to Institute a Blockade of the Enemies Ports in the Face of 
Neutral Licences and protections without Number", a situation "which 
82 
required from the Admiralty clear and explicit Instructions to enable me to act 
withEffect".(71)
Such licences were familiar to all concerned since officially, an 
average of almost 10,000 a year had been issued between 1807 - 1811 alone, 
part of a total of 53,156, valid for up to nine months.(72) A conciliatory 
British offer in May 1812, to share equally with American applicants the 
number of licences issued for trade with Europe, had come to nothing. By the 
end of August 1812, another 500 had been issued. The number of licences 
encountered by British blockading squadrons had also been increased by 
convincing forgeries, openly on sale in American cities for up to $5,000, 
complicating the day-to-day decisions of boarding officers.(73) Such British 
difficulties in the early months of the war contributed to something 
approaching American complacency. On 11 September 1812, John Maybin, a 
Philadelphia commercial agent, wrote,
I believe with some of our Merchants the Confidence they have that the British 
Cruisers will not Molest them going to Lisbon and Cadiz - others have a Pas[s]port 
under the Authority from Admiral Sawyer & Mr Foster - for which I am told they 
pay one Dollar per Barrel. (74)
Warren's frustration is occasionally evident, possibly straining his relations 
with London. As late as August 1813, he complained to Melville that, "The 
swarm of Licences to Neutral Flags to the Eastern States renders the warships 
of no avail & is beyond an idea in consequence."(75)
Vessels flying false colours also constrained British commercial 
blockade at sea, with potentially career damaging reprimands awaited junior
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officers guilty of creating misunderstandings with, for example, Russian, 
Swedish and Danish neutrals. "If the war is to proceed, Warren wrote, "it 
should be with activity against the South", which had sent "to Sea Numbers 
of Ships under Spanish, Portuguese and of late obtained Swedish Colours 
from St Bartholemews: the property is thus covered...".(76) If commercial 
blockade of the United States was to be effective, the problems posed by both 
unrestricted licences and the use of false colours would have to be resolved.
Warren himself felt a lack of unequivocal instructions, and on 7 
October 1812, asked Melville for unambiguous orders. He seems to have felt 
particularly aggrieved after meeting a newly arrived American agent for 
prisoners of war who "enquired if I had been informed that Orders by the 
King and Council had been issued in England to permit all Ships with 
Supplies of Provisions to The Peninsula to pass free, which I answered in the 
negative having received no Instructions on that Head."(77) Warren's 
inherently ambiguous orders were a major constraint on the operation of an 
impervious commercial blockade. By April 1814, the problems brought by 
licences had been largely resolved for his successor by the end of 
Wellington's need for American grain and flour, the re-separation of 
Warren's United Command, and the extension of the British blockade to 
include the ports of New England.
The Demands of Convoy
Especially during the early stages of the war, the reconciliation of the 
simultaneous demands of both offensive and defensive maritime economic 
warfare in North America, constituted a real constraint on each. By March
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1813, the Times had castigated both government and Admiralty for the loss of 
"Five hundred merchantmen and three frigates" to American warships.(78) 
From the outset however, the Admiralty had revoked almost all existing 
licences to sail without convoy protection, and given Warren "positive 
direction that no Merchant Vessels should be permitted to sail without 
Convoy and that frequent and regular protection should be afforded between 
the different Ports" of Warren's command.(79)
The West India Committee, a powerful pressure group representing 
growers, merchants and shippers, regularly reminded government and 
Admiralty that British merchant vessels would need protection in the 
Caribbean, and during their voyages to and from Britain. As a result, Melville 
wrote, in part reassuringly, to Warren from London that,
The clamour has been great here, though apparently unfounded, on your 
withdrawing a large portion of the West India force to the northward. The provision 
of sufficient convoys between Quebec & Halifax & the West Indies will not escape 
your attention. (80)
Other vessels trading between Canada and Britain would also have to be 
convoyed. The need to defend British trade from American attack was 
undeniable, but placed a strain on Warren's limited resources. By September 
1813, earlier losses, vessels on "numerous Blockades" and "Others gone 
home with Convoys", had together produced "the greatest Difficulty.. .to 
answer these Several Demands of Service." Warren would "find it difficult to 
preserve & relieve the several Blockades and to guard the Islands & furnish 
the Convoys constantly Demanded & Ships".(81)
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Warren had little choice. He had been provided with an abstract of 
the 1798 Convoy Act, which it was "their Lordships intention to enforce", 
and reminding him that "no persons" were "authorized to grant Licences to 
Sail without Convoy." It specified severe penalties for masters leaving a 
convoy without permission.(82) For shippers, costly delay in assembling 
convoys was partly offset by reduced insurance premiums, but for Warren 
there were few advantages. One solution was to use vessels returning to 
Britain for repair, or to order vessels to complete a convoy duty before 
returning to patrol. Another was to allow escorts to leave a convoy just long 
enough to burn or sink a capture before rejoining the slower merchantmen. In 
December 1812, the Shannon, ordered to escort a convoy bound for Britain, 
had been "prowling about, half convoying and half cruizing and very angry at 
our want of success" hoping to "dismiss our merchantmen in a week or ten 
days" and "then stride about more freely".(83)
The possibility of separate squadrons of American warships escaping 
simultaneously in order to join forces to lift the British blockade of a major 
American port formed another constraint on the allocation of Warren's 
blockading squadrons. Too great a concentration at one port, might leave 
another blockading squadron vulnerable. In early June 1813, an anxious 
Melville wrote privately to Warren trusting that his "Squadrons off New York 
and Boston will be on their guard against being caught between two fires by 
the junction of the Enemy from those Ports". Melville hoped that he would 
soon "learn that your most important object, the blockading [of] the Enemy's 
Ships of War in their Ports has been attained, as also the other objects of 
putting a total stop to their Trade and Annoyance of their Coast".(84) The
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first was clearly vital in order to achieve the second and third objectives while 
unmolested by American warships, particularly any acting in concert. 
Warren's solution was to ensure, as far as possible, that at least one 74 and 
several frigates were stationed at each important port. Although a welcome 
change from equivocal instructions about vessels carrying licences, or flying 
false neutral colours, without adequate reinforcements, such exhortations 
would not help.
Naval Help from the French
The possibility of French intervention in this Anglo-American war, 
as in the last, took up time and effort in London as well as in North America. 
Although theoretically, French warships blockaded in the Channel should not 
be able to cross the Atlantic, in unfavourable weather and visibility, an escape 
would not be impossible. The need for maintaining the blockades of French 
ports acted as a constraint since it meant that fewer British vessels were 
available for service against the United States. In October 1812, Warren had 
alerted Melville that, "There is a report in the U: States that bonaparte has 
pledged himself to Lend them 20 Sail of the Line a Division of which may be 
Shortly Expected".(85)
A 'Secret & Confidential' letter from the Admiralty Office to 
Warren, dated 19 June 1813, again discussed concern that escaping "French 
Squadrons from Brest or Rochfort" were "not unlikely to appear off the North 
American coast". Warren was further warned to "prevent surprise of any of 
your blockading squadrons". On the same day, Admiral Lord Keith was 
ordered to instruct the senior officer of any relieving force to take under his
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command on arrival, only enough of Warren's North American squadrons to 
enable him to match a potentially combined force of French and United States 
warships on the American eastern seaboard. He was to be reminded of the 
importance of the British blockading squadrons, and warned not to "weaken 
or divert any blockading squadron off any of the Ports in which any American 
National Ship may be".(86) Although unlikely, the prospect of French 
intervention acted as a constraint on British actions on both sides of the 
Atlantic. In the event, any hopes Madison might have entertained of French 
naval, military or financial help, were made unrealistic by the British 
maritime blockade of France.
Nevertheless, Melville's increasingly evident concern was at least in 
part a reflection of the domestic political climate in which he held office. 
Melville represented the Admiralty in Cabinet and in Parliament, where 
Warren's perceived lack of progress was subject to Opposition scrutiny and 
barbed comment. How their conduct of the American war would be seen at 
home was a constant factor in the decision-making of both men. Warren 
particularly knew that, all the while, well-placed applicants were eager to 
supplant him.
The officers and men comprising the British blockade's boarding 
parties were clearly expected to conform not only to current legal constraints 
but also to the moral and social standards of their time, as shown by the note 
book of one young officer evidently expected to learn the comprehensive and 
strict regulations concerning maritime blockade. Those painstakingly written 
out by James Dunn aboard the frigate Spartan between 1811 and 1813, 
contained precise legal and practical "Directions for examining Ships at Sea,
and sending them for adjudication". "In the visitation & search of Neutral 
Vessels" for example, he "must exercise as little hardship or personal 
vexation as possible and must detain Ships no longer than is necessary for a 
fair examination into the use, property & destination of the Ship's 
Cargo".(87)
The rules were punctiliously applied. On 12 May 1813, for example, 
HMS Hague took and burned the 366 ton American merchantman Acteon, 
returning in ballast from Cadiz to Boston with a licence to export grain 
granted by the British Minister in Cadiz. Two years later, the American 
owner claimed damages against Captain Thomas Capel of the Hogue, in 
London's Admiralty Court. There, Sir William Scott, Lord Stowell, ruled that 
the owner had been "unjustly deprived of his property", and awarded 
"restitution with costs and damages" totalling £4,000, payable by Capel, who 
could make "representation" to the British government for compensation if it 
thought his decision to burn Acteon acceptable.(88)
Proper conduct was also expected towards captured enemy 
personnel. Civilian passengers on vessels intercepted, especially women and 
children, would generally have expected courteous, even generous treatment 
at the hands of the Royal Navy, and according to contemporary American 
newspapers, prisoners evidently received it on most occasions.(89) Seven 
rioting American seamen killed on 6 April 1815, while still held at Dartmoor 
prison in England, proved an unfortunate exception.(90)
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Weather and Climate
The most consistently frustrating constraints on the Royal Navy's 
operation of economic warfare in North America were probably those posed 
by climate and the weather. Temperature inversion in warmer weather caused 
spring fogs and summer mists known as "frets". In June 1813, Warren had 
confessed that, despite a 74 and three frigates outside Boston, both President 
and Congress had escaped "in a fog which is prevalent at this Season".(91) 
Reduced visibility was common even in August. By late November 1813, 
"Gales of wind & fog which so frequently occurs on this coast", had caused 
stragglers to lose sight of convoy escorts, so becoming more vulnerable to 
risk of capture.(92) On 30 December 1813, Warren had to admit that "on dark 
Nights with Strong Winds", several fast merchant ships had escaped to 
sea.(93) Such set backs were likely to produce recriminations, and to lower 
morale.
Even before an unseasonal hurricane did severe damage at Halifax 
on 12 November 1813, later described in detail in Chapter 4, the constant 
demands of blockade and convoy duties in such weather conditions had 
strained the North American dockyard's resources. All of them were running 
seriously short of materials and even of provisions.(94) In April 1814, 
Lieutenant Napier in the frigate Nymphe, wrote in his journal of "damp 
penetrating fogs, constantly and alternately changing to rain". Easterly 
onshore winds brought "snow and sleet". Poor visibility hindered contact 
with other blockading vessels and, especially at night, allowed blockaded 
vessels to escape. "Hard frosts" made necessary thick winter clothing which 
hampered movement. In June, a three-day westerly gale drove patrolling
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vessels off station, as the prevailing wind so often did, threatening the 
continuity essential to blockade, to be followed in August with the start of the 
hurricane season.(95) The continual demands of blockade resulted in 
casualties even in relatively good weather, as in HMS Marlborough on 26 
December 1812. The journal of ordinary seaman George Hodge on that day 
recorded, "A fresh breeze - a strange sail in sight. Fell from the for[e] top 
mast Matthew Donelson and was drownded".(96) Donelson's loss underlines 
the relentless year-round cost of maritime blockade, naval or commercial, to 
the Royal Navy on the coasts of North America in the early nineteenth 
century.
The Royal Navy's economic warfare in North America was 
evidently heavily constrained, especially in its early stages, by the conflicting 
demands of diplomacy and economic warfare, and by the number and 
severity of the practical problems involved, but it was nonetheless, ultimately, 
to prove remarkably successful.
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Chapter 3
Britain and the United States: Developing Economies in Peace and War
"[W]ith an extensive and fertile country, and a small population compared to the extent of 
our territory, we have annually a large surplus to export to foreign markets;... on the export 
of this surplus, which is cut off by war, depends in a great degree, the ability of the farmer to 
meet taxes". 'State of the Finances', John Eppes, Chairman of Ways and Means Committee, 
House of Representatives, 10 October 1814.(1)
The Treaty of Paris, securing the independence of the United States 
from Britain in September 1783, had been preceded by a British Order in 
Council of 2 July that year, changing the terms under which Americans had 
traded as colonial Britons.(2) It was thought by some that Britain's major 
trading partners were about to become foreign trading rivals. John Holroyd, 
Lord Sheffield, argued in his influential pamphlet that to allow the Americans 
any trading advantages for which they no longer qualified, could threaten 
Britain's long-term commercial and maritime supremacy.(S) Conversely, the 
West India Committee, lobbying Parliament on behalf of the plantation 
owners, shippers and merchants of the British West Indies had argued as early 
as April 1783 that permission for "American ships as heretofore, freely to 
bring the produce of the dominions of the United States to the sugar colonies 
and to take back our produce in return is.. .essential".(4)
Despite the debate, "a single Atlantic economy" had, in fact, soon re- 
asserted itself.(5) An "extensive flow of goods, ideas, skilled migrants and 
capital" had again contributed to a great degree of economic interdependence 
between the United States and the United Kingdom.(6) Britain still shared, 
especially with the American eastern seaboard, both a common language and
culture. Moreover, despite enormous potential and natural advantages, 
American economic development had initially been hampered by shortages of 
both real and financial capital, difficult terrain and great distances. The high 
cost of overland transport had offset all but local comparative advantage, and 
secondary industry had remained largely domestic and small scale. The 
United States was therefore still heavily dependent on European imports for 
manufactured goods including metal goods, pottery and textiles from Britain.
Nonetheless, especially after independence, American primary 
industries like agriculture, forestry and fishing had quickly produced 
exportable surpluses. Tertiary industries, including both coastal and trans- 
Atlantic shipping had developed, to distribute imports and export agricultural 
surpluses. American vessels increasingly transported the colonial products of 
European countries. Commercial and financial centres grew on the American 
eastern seaboard, among them Boston, Philadelphia and Providence, Rhode 
Island. American population growth had been rapid. A colonial population of 
about 2m in 1770 had grown to around 3.9m by 1790, and to 5.3m by 1800, 
with an average annual increase of almost 3.6% for the previous ten years.(7) 
By 1810, the total population of the United States was about 7.2m, compared 
with approximately 17.9m for the United Kingdom.(8)
Conjoined Economies
The population growth of the United States had provided a vital 
market for British manufactured textiles by creating more demand than the 
small American textile industry could meet. British output had expanded
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beyond domestic demand after a succession of technological innovations 
developed by entrepreneurs with access to financial capital. After 1793, when 
war had closed European markets, Britain had replaced them with New 
World outlets, such that by 1798, 60% of British textile manufactures went to 
North America and the Caribbean.(9) British cotton exports to North America 
alone had grown from 37% of total cotton exports in the 1780's, to 53% in 
the 1800's. British woollen exports to the United States over the same period 
had also increased.(lO)
Cotton played a crucial role in the early nineteenth century Atlantic 
economy for both Britain and the United States. As a bulky crop, the raw 
cotton grown in the southern United States had been regularly shipped in 
large American vessels to Liverpool. As cotton manufacturing concentrated 
in Lancashire, external economies had contributed to a British advantage in 
selling price, so that by 1805, manufactured cotton formed 42% of British 
exports.(l 1) Therefore, by the early years of the nineteenth century, Britain 
and the United States were not only major trading partners but were also 
mutually dependent as both source and market for the other's specialised 
output. American wheat, flour, rice, timber, tobacco and raw cotton found 
outlets in Britain, and as a largely agrarian economy and expanding market 
for manufactured and processed goods, the United States was crucially 
important to Britain's economic development. Trading, financial and family 
links continued to develop between London, Liverpool, and Manchester, and 
Baltimore, Savannah and New Orleans.
On both sides of the Atlantic, many recognised the importance of 
this interdependence, and some sought to preserve it as political and
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diplomatic relationships deteriorated. After the war, Republican Congressman 
Adam Seyburt, reflected that between 1802-4, American exports to Britain 
and its dependencies had averaged $23.7m annually, representing 34.6% of 
the total, almost twice those to France, the United States' next most important 
customer.(12) American imports from Britain and its dependencies between 
1802-4 averaged $35.7m a year, which Seyburt calculated to be 47.4% of the 
total. It was almost three times the 16.4% of American imports from France. 
Anglo-American trade between 1802-4 had shown an unfavourable balance 
for the United States of $ 12m, almost three times its next largest trade deficit 
of $4.4m with "China and other native Asiatic parts."(13)
Specifically, between 1806-11, Britain had imported from America 
an annual average of 34.6m Ibs of raw cotton. In 1811 alone, British imports 
of raw cotton from the United States had reached 46.9m Ibs, compared with 
an annual average for the years 1805-9 of 69.2m Ibs imported into Britain 
from all parts of the world.(14) Seyburt's figures suggest that at this time 
more than two-thirds of Britain's raw cotton imports usually came from the 
southern United States. Furthermore, Seyburt noted, on aggregate between 
1805-11, the United States "received annually, 20.1% of the manufactures 
and produce exported from Britain", even when excluding "foreign and 
colonial produce". During the same period, the total value of British exports 
to the United States "of every description", including foreign and colonial re- 
exports, averaged $36.5m a year.(15)
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The Question of Advantage and Cautious Accounting
Seyburt later argued that, in the years before 1812, Anglo-American 
trade had been at a marked advantage to Britain. He attempted to quantify 
Britain's comparative advantage by claiming that, "It is generally calculated 
that raw materials gain sevenfold by being manufactured."(16) Similarly, "In 
1800, the merchandise exported from the United States to Great Britain was 
worth $74.23 per ton", whereas, "that imported from Great Britain was worth 
$240 per ton."(17) Therefore, between 1795 and 1801, the average annual 
imbalance against the United States "in favour of Great Britain, of $15.2m, 
was only $70,166 less than the apparent unfavourable balance produced by 
our trade with all parts of the world collectively taken."(18) Of 1795-1801's 
aggregate imbalance of $106.1m, no less than $92.5m resulted from "our 
trade with England and Scotland whence we chiefly import manufactured 
articles."(19)
Between 1790 and 1815, American exports had totalled $847m, 
while "foreign goods imported and not re-exported", reached $1,231m, 
producing an adverse balance of visible trade of $384m.(20) However, as 
Nettels showed, these figures did not present a complete or accurate picture of 
contemporary American trade. In colonial times, the British Navigation Acts 
ensured that such exports were probably carried in British bottoms and 
insured in London. Perhaps as an accounting legacy, exports were still valued 
as their price in America before being sent abroad, and although the now 
foreign buyers would have to pay shipping and insurance costs as part of the 
total price paid, such costs were not added to United States export values. By
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1807 however 90% of the value of exports was carried in American 
vessels.(21) As the American merchant fleet expanded, the selling merchant 
was often at least part ship-owner. This was the case with the New England 
firm of Brown and Ives, affluent and influential importers and export 
merchants of Providence, Rhode Island, sole-owners of five vessels, and part- 
owners of four more.(22) Shipping costs were therefore not always separately 
recorded in their overall profit and loss accounts, and although freight 
earnings and insurance premiums were, what would later be called 'invisible 
exports', they were not added to the 'prime cost'. Exports were being 
conservatively counted as 'free on board'.(23)
Imports too seemed to show that Anglo-American trade was very 
much to British advantage. By 1807, 94% of the value of United States 
imports was also said to be brought in American vessels, despite almost half 
of the imports coming from Britain, which with the world's largest merchant 
fleet, traditionally offered both shipping and marine insurance.(24) However, 
after 1790, the offices of marine insurance brokers were to be found in many 
American ports, including those of Campbell & Richie in Boston, sometimes 
used by Brown & Ives.(25) Many American merchant vessels carried 
'supercargoes', trusted agents responsible for the profitable disposal of export 
cargoes, and the arrangement of return cargoes. Prices of return cargoes from 
foreign ports during round trips may have included an insurance premium, 
but many insurance contracts for vessels, and both outward and return 
cargoes, would have been made in America at the outset. The sometimes 
unnecessary inclusion of all shipping costs and insurance premiums would 
therefore have increased the apparent value of American imports, but made
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comparison with contemporary export earnings even more invalid. Some 
imports were counted when taxed ad valorem, according to their value as 
'prime cost', others at specific rates per weight. Still others were tax-free, and 
therefore practically ignored by record keeping customs officials. Estimates 
of such tax-free imports have been a lasting cause of inaccuracy.
Contemporary overseas trade figures also excluded "foreign 
exports", that is re-exports, often imported and processed natural products 
including spices, blended teas and coffee, carried mostly to Europe and the 
West Indies. These were so extensive and valuable that between 1798-1800, 
and again between 1805-8, that they exceeded the value of "domestic 
exports" sold abroad, such as timber, grain and increasingly, flour.(26) 
Between 1803-7, the United States annual average adverse balance of trade 
was $19.8m.(27) According to Bogart, Nettels' authority, freights earned 
during this time by American shipping, averaged $32m a year.(28) Given the 
accuracy of Bogart's estimate, Nettel's conclusion that, "Whatever the exact 
figures, it seems certain that freights and profits" from re-exports, when 
added to American 'domestic exports', "gave the Union a profitable status in 
world commerce", is important.(29) In modern terms, although the United 
States had an adverse annual balance of visible trade with Britain, overall, 
when 'invisible items' like the earnings of American shipping were included, 
it had a favourable balance of payments. This makes what was to follow seem 
all the more remarkable. An incomplete understanding of America's foreign 
trading position may well have motivated Madison's preparedness to risk 
maritime blockade by a declaration of war on Britain.
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The apparent imbalance in Anglo-American trade, although based on 
an incomplete understanding of it, was often greatly resented. "Such", wrote 
Seyburt, "have been our contributions for the advancement of the skill and 
industry of a nation which, for raw materials, is the most dependent on other 
countries". Quoting the British Member of Parliament, banker, financier and 
pamphleteer Alexander Baring, Seyburt concluded that, "Our tribute, 'paid, to 
a considerable extent, for the support of the fleets and armies' of Great 
Britain."(30)
Britain's almost continuous war with France since 1793 had in fact 
contributed considerably to American prosperity, although David Warden, 
"Late Consul for the United States at Paris", exaggerated when claiming in 
1819 that, "The state of European warfare from the year 1802 to 1812 gave to 
America almost all the carrying trade or freight of the commercial world, 
valued at 10% upon the capital".(31) Nonetheless, the United States merchant 
marine had certainly reached l.lm tons by 1807, and by then, 92.7% of the 
tonnage engaged in the United States foreign trade was American.(32) 
Furthermore, Warden argued, "The United States also gained 5% by 
exchange, so that the annual profit of commerce and navigation have been 
estimated at 15% upon the capital."(33) More plentiful financial capital also 
meant that by 1806, more cargoes were American owned, leading Barnabas 
Bidwell to assert in Congress that, "We are no longer mere freighters for 
foreigners", but work "on our own capital, and for our own account".(34) 
However, an aggressively expanded United States merchant fleet would 
increasingly encounter both competing British merchant vessels, and the
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Royal Navy, intercepting neutrals while conducting its effective commercial 
blockade of France.
Diplomacy and Debate
In 1794, it had looked as if the Jay Treaty would resolve the 
difficulties of Anglo-American trade by defining neutral rights in 
wartime.(35) During the following period of prosperity, American visible 
exports had almost trebled, from $33m in 1794 to $94.1m in 1801, and, after 
falling during a temporary European peace, had again peaked in 1807 at 
$108.3m.(36) But, from the outset, American access to trade with and 
between the British West Indies had been a bone of contention on both sides 
of the Atlantic. The American Senate had ratified the treaty only when Article 
XII, restricting American access, was suspended. Orthodox British 
mercantilists objected to it on principle, as reducing the overall value of 
British trade.(37)
According to Article XII, either British or American vessels could 
import livestock, timber, grain and flour to the West Indies, without any 
higher or additional duties becoming payable. American vessels could export 
"any molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa or cotton" from the West Indies, but only 
to the United States, and certainly not to wartime European markets, on 
which American traders would have made most profit.(38) Subsequent 
American trade with the West Indies was to be the focus of much British 
resentment. Robert Banks Jenkinson, later Lord Hawkesbury and still later 
Lord Liverpool, wrote in January 1796 that, "Our West India Islands will
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never be safe if the subjects of the United States are allowed to have a free 
intercourse with them and import among other articles their democratic 
principles into those islands."(39)
American trade to and from the West Indies had indeed grown 
rapidly, and in clear contravention of the restrictions of Article XII. As soon 
as 1805, James Stephen, a lawyer who had lived in St Kitt's until 1794, 
argued in an influential pamphlet that neutral American shipping of French 
colonial exports, was simply War in Disguise.(40) He noted that, although in 
no position to fight Britain, the Americans were partly negating British war 
efforts by supporting the commerce of the French West Indies, and by 
assisting French competition, undercutting the 'West India trade'of British 
planters and merchants. Stephen predicted that "by the ruin of its commerce 
and its commercial revenue, (infallible consequences of a war with this 
country)", the United States "would have no resources for the great and 
extraordinary demands of maritime war, but very heavy interior taxation". 
Referring to the Treasury Secretary's Report to Congress for 1801, Stephen 
noted that,
external commerce contributes more than nine-tenths of the whole revenue of the 
country; and that if this source of supply were cut off,...there would be a deficit of 
$2,400,000 to be provided for, beyond the interest of the public debt, before any war
fund could be raised. (41)
Joseph Marryat, writing in 1807, also greatly deplored any British 
trading concessions which, "ever led to new demands, as the history of all our 
negotiations with America has abundantly demonstrated".(42) He added a
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note that, by 1807, "General Smith of Baltimore, acknowledged in the senate 
of the United States, that the amount of West India produce annually re- 
exported, after supplying the home consumption of America, was twenty- 
eight millions of dollars, or nearly seven millions sterling."(43) Increased 
American participation in the West Indian carrying trade clearly competed 
with British colonial shipping, which Marryat recognised as "the nursery of 
seamen and naval power".(44)
Alexander Baring however, argued in 1808 that Britain's evident 
recession was caused by "the restrictions of the enemy", the Berlin and Milan 
decrees of Napoleon's Continental System, rather than "the intercourse of 
neutrals with the Continent of Europe".(45) Baring considered Stephen's 
pamphlet largely responsible for Britain's retaliatory Orders in Council, and 
deplored one commentator's disappointment that Britain had not taken the 
"opportunity of going to war with America".(46) All trade, Baring thought, 
should be encouraged, and that American neutral trade was, "politically 
inoffensive and commercially beneficial". Britain's Orders in Council, he 
thought, should be repealed.(47)
But until they were, American shippers were to find themselves in a 
dilemma. The Milan decree of 17 December 1807 had announced the French 
intention of detaining neutral vessels found trading with Britain. A series of 
British Orders in Council had retaliated by requiring that neutral trade with 
French occupied Europe should first pass through British ports, paying transit 
fees. As a result, Hickey argues, "If American ships complied with the French 
decrees, they were subject to seizure by the British; and if they submitted to 
British decrees, they could be seized by the French."(48) British concessions,
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such as reduced transit fees and the increased issue of licences to carry 
imports into Britain, did little to help, since the principle of Britain's 
perceived right to interfere with neutral American trade was not conceded.
Nevertheless, the level of American prosperity had increased 
markedly until moderated by French decrees, British Orders in Council, and 
Jefferson's anti-British Embargo. It had reflected the strength of American 
foreign trade, both rising exports, and the level of imports, and had important 
and lasting consequences. As more American farmers, merchants and 
shippers had become affluent, spending had increased on imported luxuries 
including sugar, tea, coffee, wines and silks. Since the population of the 
United States had grown between 1791 and 1801 by almost 35%, and its 
imports by over 280%, spending on imports could become the major source 
of government tax revenue by the imposition of customs duties on imports. 
To these could be added, as a less important corollary, shipping registration 
and enrolment fees, and lighthouse dues.(49) Furthermore, although demand 
for such imports would rise as incomes increased, it would decline less than 
proportionally, if at all, when import duties raised the price. Internal excise 
duties, used by the opposing Federalists to pay for America's largely 
successful undeclared maritime war against France, had been unpopular, 
contributing to the Federalist's electoral defeat in 1800. Taxation of imports 
therefore had seemed ideal in peacetime. While equitably targeting the rich, it 
could be avoided by the poor, and met the philosophical requirements of 
those who had read Adam Smith's, topical 'Canon's of Taxation', long 
available in America.(50) Being predictable, cheap and convenient to 
administer, as well as difficult to evade, import duties produced revenue so
103
efficiently that Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin argued that the 
Republican's less unpopular import duties would allow progressive reduction 
of the United States National Debt, then considered an important objective. 
This had proved so successful that since 1805, as shown in Appendix B Table 
5, the National Debt was still being reduced as late as 1813.(51)
But however successful in peacetime, even allowing the avoidance 
of internal excise duties and 'direct' taxes on property, the United States 
government's almost sole reliance on import duties to provide more than 
92.3 % of its tax revenue in 1812, made it fiscally dependent on the 
continuation of normal trade relations with Britain, its major trading partner. 
However, both Jefferson and Madison after 1809, believed that Britain was 
vulnerable to the withdrawal of American trade, and could be compelled to 
reduce the Royal Navy's interference with neutrals during its blockades of 
France, and its reliance on impressment. Economic sanctions against Britain 
as an alternative to war however, contradicted the taxation of imports for 
raising revenue, and placed Gallatin in a difficult position. The political 
requirement to support the President's economic sanctions against Britain, 
and the maintenance of sound government finances dependent on import 
duties, would be extremely difficult to reconcile. Even the alternative of an 
American export embargo ran the risk of retaliation. Britain could find 
permanent sources of raw cotton, for example, in Brazil, Egypt or the East 
Indies, as an alternative to the southern United States.
After December 1807, Jefferson's export embargo and non- 
importation legislation, collectively known as the "restrictive system", had 
damaged most sectors of the American economy. Officially recorded
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American total exports had fallen by almost 80% from $108.3m in!807, to 
$22.4m in 1808. Exports had recovered by 1811, but to only $61.3m.(52) 
More importantly, however, and as shown in Appendix B, Table 1, imports 
fell by almost 60%, from $144.7m in 1807 to $58.1m in 1808.(53) This effort 
to curtail British naval activity caused such serious damage to the American 
economy that even fellow Republican John Randolph compared it to an 
attempt "to cure corns by cutting off the toes".(54) Despite the 
unemployment, inflation and hardship caused by Jefferson's economic 
sanctions, which had brought no productive British diplomatic response, 
Madison persisted with Macon's No 2 Bill, and a Non-Importation Act which 
banned British imports from February 1811.(55) This did much to reduce 
Anglo-American trade. Furthermore, a severe shortage of specie in Britain 
made payment in cash for continuing American exports to Britain, 
increasingly difficult.(56) Since, after the Non-Importation Act, Americans 
could not legally receive British manufactures in payment, credit built up in 
American accounts in London, which holders became increasingly anxious to 
repatriate in some form. Some attitudes had also hardened. Some British 
opinion regarded American neutral trade as unprincipled profiteering on 
Britain's war against French tyranny, while some Americans resented British 
restrictions on maritime trade as an attempt at quasi-colonial subjection.
Madison was to compound the problem by the imposition of his own 
90-day Embargo on 4 April 1812, supplemented, before its end, by a 
declaration of war against Britain. This was to be without the prior 
introduction of a workable system of taxation of a wider cross-section of the 
American population by either a 'direct' tax on property, or the re-
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introduction of excise duties on internal production and trade, or both. The 
pre-war American retention of revenue-raising methods so narrowly based on 
import duties and shipping fees, demonstrates that few in Congress 
understood the vulnerability of the American economy, or had forecast 
accurately the impact of either their own restrictive legislation, or a British 
commercial blockade, much less the possibility of the two being in operation 
at the same time.
Gallatin had long intended that any war should be financed by 
government borrowing.(57) The prospect of this being a sustainable success 
was rendered improbable by the Republican trade legislation. Such 
restrictions on American overseas trade, including the possibility of heavy 
financial penalties for non-compliance, would seriously damage the interests 
of precisely those people best placed to make long-term loans to the 
government. This would include farmers seeking to dispose of agricultural 
surpluses, merchants buying and re-selling such goods, or to the shippers 
arranging their transport. These men were often part of an articulate 
international network long practised in finding profitable alternative 
investments. The lost political support of those whose livelihoods were 
threatened was probably a foregone conclusion, but the forfeit of their 
loanable funds should also have been predictable.
Lending to the American government by buying its securities at par, 
until then the usual practice, could well seem less attractive than investment 
in developing American industries like textiles, largely freed of competition 
by British blockade, or in British government securities, readily available for 
cash, and at discount, in London or Canada. The potential lender's co-
106
operation was all the more unlikely in support of a war against the major 
maritime power best placed to impose a sea-based commercial blockade 
which would damage or destroy their livelihoods. Britain had demonstrated 
such competence in prolonged wars, inflicting real economic damage on 
France.(58) One, or even two, loan-calls might be made on affluent banks, or 
wealthy and politically well-disposed individuals, but whether they could, or 
would, support an expensive war, as prolonged as Britain's against France, 
was of course untested, and apparently un-investigated. Any expectation of 
financial aid from France, itself isolated from overseas trade by British 
maritime commercial blockade, was probably unrealistic. As Gallatin told the 
Senate in November 1811, "In the present state of the world, foreign loans 
may be considered as nearly unattainable. In that respect, as in all others, the 
United States must solely rely on their own resources."(59)
Anglo-American relations had deteriorated quickly after February 
1811. The American Minister in London returned to the United States, to be 
replaced only by a charges d'affaires.(60) The illegality of British imports 
and potentially reduced government income might reasonably have been 
expected to sharpen Congressional attention to fiscal alternatives. On 25 
November 1811, Gallatin appeared cautiously optimistic. In his report on the 
'State of the Finances' he informed the Senate that a forecast deficit of $ 1.2m 
for 1812 could be met from the surplus of $3.9m for the year ending 30 
September 1811. He congratulated the administration on its use of import 
duties for reducing the national debt by $42m since 1805, despite the repeal 
of the duty on salt and "the great diminution of commerce during the last four 
years". This, he argued "considerably lessens the weight of the most
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formidable objection, to which that revenue, depending almost solely on 
commerce, appears to be liable".(61)
He commented on the need for "persevering application of the 
surplus which it affords in years of prosperity", and continued, "if a similar 
application of such surplus be herewith strictly adhered to, forty millions of 
debt, contracted during five or six years of war, may always, without any 
extraordinary exertions, be reimbursed in ten years of peace." "But", he 
added, "to be placed on a solid foundation, it requires the aid of revenue, 
'sufficient at least to defray the ordinary expenses of Government, and to pay 
the interest of the public debt, including that on new loans which may be 
authorized'." Disappointing proceeds from sales of public land could be 
rectified by "an addition of fifty per cent to the present amount of duties". 
"This mode", he added, "appears preferable for the present to any internal 
tax." Another 50% on customs duties, "would", he said, "with the aid of 
loans...be sufficient in time of war". Together, this would later double the 
rate of import duties.
Having so far loyally followed the party line, Gallatin had then 
allowed himself some moments of doubt.
Whether it would be sufficient to produce the same amount of revenue as under 
existing circumstances cannot at present be determined. Should any deficiency 
arise it may be supplied without difficulty by a norther increase of duties, by a 
restoration of that on salt, and a proper selection of moderate internal taxes. (62)
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The fact that continued "years of prosperity" could not be guaranteed, had 
impinged itself on Gallatin sooner than on most, apparently causing a 
perceptible reduction in confidence.
The possibility of raising money by loans to the amount which may be wanted, 
remains to be examined: for, the fact that the United States may easily, in ten years 
of peace, extinguish a debt of forty-two millions of dollars, does not necessarily 
imply that they could borrow that sum during a period of war." (63)
With war against Britain becoming ever more probable, Congress, its 
Committees and the Treasury Secretary, belatedly gave thought to financing 
it. In a reply to the House Ways and Means Committee, written on 10 January 
1812, Gallatin proposed not only borrowing $10m, mostly for use in 1813, 
but also doubling the rate of import duties, already averaging 17%. His most 
controversial proposal however, was his recommendation for raising $3m by 
a 'direct' tax on property, and another $2m by indirect taxes, specifically, 
internal excise duties.(64) He agreed to the Committee's earlier suggestion of 
issuing Treasury notes, to become in effect "a part of the circulating 
medium", but warned that the amount should "never exceed" that "which 
may circulate without depreciation".(65) Gallatin was immediately subjected 
to heavy, often libellous, criticism. Many, including Republicans, could not 
accept that, trade having been diminished by measures they had supported, 
together with currently rising interest rates, would mean radical fiscal reform, 
even perhaps the re-introduction of internal excise duties, if the war that many 
of them had persistently advocated, was to be paid for.
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It was not as if Madison or Congress had lacked advice, based on 
varying degrees of expertise and political disinterest. On 17 February 1812, 
only four months before the American declaration of war, Ezekiel Bacon, 
Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, explicitly warned Congress. 
While almost wholly dependent for revenue on import and shipping duties, 
and especially when taking almost half its imports from Britain, "which in a 
state of war must be entirely suspended", the United States, he said, could not 
afford to be subjected to British maritime commercial blockade. He advised 
Congress "to estimate accurately...not only [Britain's] military and naval 
strength, but what is of equal importance in modern warfare, her pecuniary 
and financial strength".(66) "We have been accustomed to consider the 
situation of British finances to be such that her Government must be on the 
very verge of bankruptcy." By rejecting Gallatin's proposals to widen the 
American tax base, Bacon argued, "we should advance much more rapidly in 
the road to national bankruptcy than Great Britain has ever done, with all her 
follies and all her prodigality."(67) Major fiscal reform, including the raising 
of loans and the re-introduction of disused internal excise duties, was urgently 
required, if not already overdue. After much debate, Congress agreed to 
borrow $11m, but would allow doubled import duties, 'direct' taxes and 
internal excise duties to be levied, only after a declaration of war against 
Britain.(68)
Import duties would clearly prove crucial to any American war effort 
since net customs duties accrued during 1811, to be available as government 
income the following year, stood at $8,958,777, and comprised 91.41 % of 
the American government's income for 1812, of $9,801,132.(69) Customs
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duties accrued in 1812 reflected that year's hurried importation into the 
United States of British goods, into which American profits accumulated in 
Britain since the Non-Importation Act of 1811, had been invested. This raised 
net customs revenue to $13.2m, no less than 92.31% of the American 
government's income of $ 14.3m for 1813.(70) Without net customs revenue 
having been supplemented by wider taxation and successful borrowing, war 
should surely be best avoided, or if already precipitately declared, quickly 
ended by armistice and negotiation, so minimising the damage. Although 
procrastination made a poor alternative to reform, Congress proved itself 
unwilling to demand financial sacrifices from voters until they became 
unavoidable.
The British Economy: 1803 - 15
Britain meanwhile, had had economic difficulties of its own. 
Harvests had been poor in both 1809 and 1810. Average wheat prices had 
risen by 18.6% between 1810 and 1811, reaching an unprecedented peak in 
1812.(71) Despite the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809, which had replaced 
Jefferson's Embargo and officially banned exports, 1.4m bushels of American 
grain and flour had reached Britain that year, followed in 1810 by 786,889 
bushels more.(72) Overall, bread prices in London had risen by more than 
15% between 1810 and 1812, despite a slight decrease in 1811.(73) Napoleon 
had licenced the export of French and German wheat to Britain, perhaps 
seeking to worsen the developing currency shortage.(74)
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Until 1810, British goods had been excluded from most European 
ports, excepting some in Portugal and on the Baltic coast, although in that 
year, Russian ports had been re-opened to Britain. The French invasion of 
Spain and then Portugal after 1808 had weakened their control of their South 
American colonies and British trade, particularly with Brazil, had increased. 
British exports and re-exports to "the foreign West Indies and South 
America", increased between 1807-9 by more than 380%, and imports by 
almost 280%. But, between 1810-12 these exports had fallen by 31% and 
imports by 64.5%.(75) Additionally, the impact of the American Non- 
Importation Act of 1811 had been that British exports to the United States had 
fallen from £ 10.9m in 1810, to £ 1.8m in 1811, a fall of 83.5%.(76) By 1812, 
overproduction by British manufacturers misled by too optimistic merchants, 
had added to the cumulative effects of the American legislation, Napoleon's 
Continental System and the activities of French privateers in the Channel, to 
suppress British business activity.
Despite numerous successful attacks on British merchantmen, 
including those by American privateers, the Royal Navy's protection of 
British trade, and therefore the country's economic and financial strength, had 
on the whole been successful. Britain had remained in a position to supply 
over £35m in subsidies to its European allies between 1810 and 1815, £ 10m 
hi 1814 alone.(77) Overall, between the periods 1804-6 and 1814-16, total 
British exports had risen by 28.7%, and imports by 29.2%.(78) Ultimately, 
Napoleon's Continental System had demonstrably failed. As shown in 
Appendix B, Table 3, total British exports had fallen between 1810 and 1812, 
but while American re-exports were to fall between 1812-14, re-exports of
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British colonial produce had increased between 1804-6 and 1814-16 by 
80.4%, contributing to a recovery of total British exports by 1814.(79)
However, the hardship caused amongst Britain's poor and 
unemployed had evidently been real. By 1813, expenditure on poor relief in 
England and Wales had exceeded £6.7m, 56% higher than in 1803, and which 
had fallen by only 5.4% by 1814.(80) Complaints by some of the 
industrialists effected, and demonstrations by unemployed workers, provided 
valuable material for the government's Whig Opposition, notably for 
Parliamentary opponents of the Orders in Council, and particularly Henry 
Brougham.(81) Fear of popular unrest, and the assassination on 11 May 1812 
of Prime Minister Spencer Perceval, long an advocate of the Orders, had 
probably contributed to their revocation as far as the United States was 
concerned, on 23 June 1812, ironically, six days after the American 
declaration of war on Britain.(82)
British Tax Revenue and Borrowing
But, although these economic problems were significant, neither the 
government's tax income nor borrowing position was ever seriously 
threatened. The British government's gross tax income of £71m in 1812 was 
only 2.7% less than the £73m of 1811, the last year of peace. The fall to 
£70.3m in 1813 was less than 1%, and by 1814 had risen by 6.3% to £74.7m. 
In sharp contrast to the United States, where net custom duties formed more 
than 92% of total government tax revenue in 1812, the British tax base was 
sufficiently wide for customs duties to form only 18.31% of the British 
government's total gross tax income in 1812, rising comparatively little
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throughout the war, and still only 19% of total tax income in 1815, never 
having risen above 20%. (83) Revenue from British customs duties rose 
7.7%, from £13m in 1812 to £14m in 1813, and almost another 3% to £14.4m 
in 1814. Customs and excise duties together formed 57.6% of total gross 
revenue in 1812. British 'property and income' taxes followed a similar 
pattern to the government's gross income by falling 2.2 % from a pre-war 
yield of £13.5m in 1811, to £13.2m in 1812, and falling by only 0.76% to 
£13.1m between 1812 and 1813. The yield of the British tax on land 
ownership was to rise by 7.8 % between 1812 and 1814.(84)
The Royal Navy's protection of Britain's generally successful 
overseas trade position was therefore complemented by a comparatively 
widely based and crudely progressive system of taxation, which 
supplemented by the government's ability to borrow, was capable of 
supporting wars against both France and the United States. As shown in 
Appendix B, Table 36, on average, between 1812-15 British customs duties 
yielded a gross £14.1m, 19.2% of total government income. During the same 
period, gross excise duties yielded an average £27.7m, 37.7 % of the total. 
Stamp duties produced £6.2m, 8.4% of total income. Land tax produced 
another £7.7m, a further 10.5% of the total. Property and income tax yielded 
£14m gross, another 19.1%. Miscellaneous revenues gathered the remaining 
5.1%, of an average total government income of £73.5m.(85)
In contrast to the position in the United States after 1813, "Nearly 
60% of the extra funds raised by [the British] government to prosecute its 
wars between 1793 -1815, came from taxes and not borrowing."(86) The 
British tax strategy had put most of the burden on domestic consumption so
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that a wealthy minority's private investment, essential to maintained 
economic growth, and to their taxable incomes, would continue. Britain's 
interest rates remained relatively stable at "just below 4% before the war to 
just over 5% during it."(87) "While the share of national income 
invested...remained roughly constant...consumption fell sharply, from over 
83% of national expenditure in 1778-92 to around 72% in 1793-1812, and 
reached as low as 64% by 1813-15."(88) While this may be borne out by 
United Kingdom sugar consumption per head, which may have fallen by 
13.3% between 1813-15, the basic cost of living for those in urban 
employment had not become excessive, as far as it can be measured by 
average London bread prices, which had fallen almost 33% from their 1812 
peak, by 1814.(89) The wages of agricultural workers however, had fallen by 
3 index points between 1812-15.(90) Although unwelcome, privation in 
Britain was reportedly much less severe than in the United States where 
prices had risen by 45% between 1811 and 1814.(91)
In further sharp contrast to the United States, as will become evident 
in Chapter 7, British budget deficits were largely met by the successful sale of 
government securities worth over £440m between 1793 and 1815, covering 
between a quarter and a third of wartime government expenditure.(92) The 
British national debt rose from £299m in!793 to £843m in 1815, "without", 
Kennedy concludes, "any visible sign of the country going bankrupt or the 
lenders doubting the government's ability to repay in the future."(93) Even a 
suspension of specie payments by the Bank of England in 1797 produced 
only short-term alarm since, the Bank,
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had so secured itself in the public confidence that its now unbacked money was just 
as acceptable as when gold could be got for it at a fixed price...The banking and 
mercantile community in London and the provinces, with virtual unanimity, 
pronounced its readiness to carry on business as normal with a paper currency. 
(94)
In contrast, Congress had failed to renew the charter of the first United States 
bank in March 1811, contributing to inflation by the resultant proliferation of 
state and private banks, many later called, "unincorporated and 
irresponsible."(95)
Especially since the renewal of war in 1803, some in Britain had 
advocated neutral trade with the West Indies, but encountered the view that 
such American trade in particular threatened the effectiveness of Britain's 
maritime commercial blockade of France. Furthermore, the Royal Navy's 
continued blockade of a militarily successful enemy remained vital to British 
trade, and had been too costly and demanding to abandon before the war had 
been brought to a successful conclusion. Although not written until 1818, 
William James argued that Britain's Orders in Council were simply, "not 
permitting the subjects of the United States under the disguise of neutrals to 
be the carriers of France". He continued that, "the ablest politicians in the 
republic were engaged to prepare a specious manifesto, representing the 
United States as the aggrieved, and Great Britain as the aggressive party." 
(96)
For Americans, the British operation of the Orders in Council could 
prove costly, such as the loss to Brown and Ives, merchants and shippers of 
Providence, Rhode Island, when their ship Arthur and its cargo of cotton was
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captured by HM gun brig Blazer on 20 February 1810. On 25 February, 
Captain Joshua Rathbun wrote to Brown and Ives from London about the trial 
before Sir William Scott, that, "the disposition of the courts [of Admiralty] 
seem very unfavourable towards the Americans at this time, of the many 
which were sent in and tried, but few are Cleared." The judge had condemned 
both ship and cargo.(97)
Nevertheless, one form of American maritime trade was so profitable 
that it continued up to and beyond the American declaration of war on Britain 
in June 1812. The poor harvests of 1809 and 1810 had been particularly 
inconvenient to the British government, since with shortages of grain and 
flour at home, Britain had been ill-placed to send supplies to its troops in 
Spain and Portugal after 1808. Despite the increasingly strained relationships 
over neutral trade, the American need to export its grain and flour surplus had 
coincided with the British need to supply its Peninsula army. The 230,000 
bushels of wheat sent directly under British licences from American ports to 
Spain and Portugal in 1810, had increased to 835,000 bushels by 1811, an 
indirect contradiction of American attempts to apply economic pressure on 
Britain.(98) Britain's urgent need for specie, in sums of up to £76,000 at a 
time, to pay for American grain, flour and biscuit cargoes, caused recurrent 
crises for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nicholas Vansittart, and the 
Governor of the Bank of England, but each emergency had been resolved in 
turn, after some anxiety. American attempts to capitalise on Britain's shortage 
of specie had been forestalled by the timely arrivals of precious metals from 
the West Indies and the East India Company .(99) The strength of Britain's
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overseas trading position had again provided the means for its financial 
survival.
Ex-President Jefferson's rationalisation of this situation may have 
influenced Madison's views on Britain's apparent inability to resist economic 
pressure, and on America's ability to finance dispute, or even war with 
Britain. Jefferson had argued that,
If she [Britain] is to be fed at all events, why may we not have the benefit of it as 
well as others? Besides if we could, by starving the English armies oblige them to 
withdraw from the peninsula, it would be to send them here; and I think we had 
better feed them there for pay, than feed and fight them here for nothing. A truth too, 
not to be lost sight of is, that no country can pay war taxes if you suppress all their 
resources. To keep the war popular, we must keep open the markets. As long as 
good prices can be had, the people will support the war cheerfully. (100)
In time however, the reverse of this view was to prove remarkably accurate 
when British success in the Peninsula ended demand for American grain and 
flour, so reducing American earnings and taxable capacity.
While it lasted, the licenced export of American wheat, rye, flour, 
bread, crackers, rice and coffee to the Peninsula had certainly been profitable. 
On 1 September 1812, Brown and Ives' Hector had sailed from Providence 
with a cargo of flour costing $13,000. It had sold in Cadiz for $40,000, a net 
return of $27,000.(101) The possession of a British licence however, did not 
necessarily protect against inconvenience. The firm's brig Argus sailing for 
Cadiz on 10 September with flour and rice was later stopped by the Royal 
Navy and taken into Gibraltar. Captain Noyce's production of a licence,
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apparently issued by Vice-Admiral Sawyer in Halifax, had led the Vice- 
Admiralty court to restore both vessel and cargo. However, when the British 
need to issue licences for the export of American produce ended in 1813, a 
potential source of finance for the American war effort was also ended, 
without an apparent substitute^ 102)
Despite the trade and personal links of the 'Atlantic economy', by 
1812, some attitudes in both Britain and America had hardened further. The 
American Non-Importation Act appeared to be reducing British exports, 
however ingeniously it was said to be evaded there. British exports to the 
United States worth almost £11m at current prices in 1810, had been reduced 
to £1.8m by 1811.(103) American agents in Britain, holding credit paid into 
their accounts for imports, were not buying British manufactures as they once 
did. In 1812, in London, John Croker, First Secretary of the Admiralty since 
1809, and prolific writer, had published a pamphlet called, A Key to the 
Orders in Council, which reviewed the decrees and orders issued by France, 
Britain and the United States since 1807.(104) It had also sought to explain 
and justify Britain's position, and its treatment of neutral merchants and 
shippers, chiefly American.
Nevertheless, in Washington, two-thirds of Madison's address to 
Congress on 1 June complained of the effects of the Orders on the American 
economy. He argued that,
Under pretended blockades, without the presence of an adequate force and 
sometimes without the practicability of applying one, our commerce has been 
plundered in every sea; the great staples of our country have been cut off from their 
legitimate markets; and a destructive blow aimed at our agricultural and maritime
interests. (105)
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There were those present who understood the fiscal and financial 
consequences of this admission, but who evidently failed to explain 
themselves clearly enough to change the course of events. By 18 June both 
House and Senate had voted for war with Britain.(106) On 19 June, a bill 
which would have raised revenue by allowing most British imports to be 
resumed, was defeated by only five votes.(107)
For months after the American declaration of war, it was hoped by 
some in Britain that revocation of the Orders in Council, as far as the 
Americans were concerned, would lead in time to a negotiated peace, 
allowing for unavoidable delays in communication. Conversely, on 2 August 
1812, James Abernethy wrote to Lord Liverpool as "one that entertains a 
different opinion" since the Americans sought "rights which are 
infringements on our own maritime consequence".(108) He was also, "sure 
that French influence and intrigues hath preponderated." In order, "To 
conduct this war with as little expense" as possible, he enclosed a "plan of a 
Naval War, which, had the same been adopted in what is called the 
'American War' the issue to ourselves would have proved very different". 
His scheme would, "effectually prevent the Enemy's Ships and Privateers 
from getting out of port, most certainly their re-entering with their prizes". It 
would, he said, require two ships of the line, thirteen frigates and 26 sloops 
and brigs of war, 41 vessels in all, to blockade the American coast, ranging 
from the "Gulf of Florida and off New Orleans" to "the Coast of New 
Hampshire, which offers partial security to our Newfoundland and Quebec 
Fleets." The "Line of Battle-Ships" would be particularly useful "should there
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escape a Ship or two of that description from France, to guard against which, 
it might be advisable to have two Ships of the Line at Halifax."(109)
As late as 3 October 1812, Lord Bathurst, Secretary of State for War 
and the Colonies and, until only weeks before also President of the Board of 
Trade, was writing at length to the Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool.(110) 
Decisions were needed on the goods for so long imported from the United 
States, and on which Britain had come to depend. Lord Clancarty, he said, 
had also written to Liverpool on the subject some weeks before. Bathurst 
outlined again the arguments for and against importing under licence the 
grain and flour, raw cotton, rice and tobacco, in neutral, even American ships. 
The only vessels to be disallowed with certainty, would surely, be French. 
The last three commodities were the products of "the most Anti-Anglican" 
parts of the United States, the last perhaps to deserve to benefit from 
continued trade.
Bathurst rehearsed all the arguments about alternative sources for 
each product, particularly cotton, clearly aware of the stocks already held in 
Britain. Licence fees for importing cotton would be, in effect, a form of tax 
on textile manufacturers, and "at least limit their importation" of American 
cotton, one way of hurting its producers. Among the disadvantages of British 
blockade would be that American seamen would be diverted into manning 
privateers, and the United States men of war, well-constructed ships in a 
small but skilfully manned navy. Clearly, Bathurst wrote, these were all 
matters on which Liverpool must decide.
The decision was not much further delayed. On 13 October 1812, 
"HRH the Prince Regent in Council ordered that General Reprisals be granted
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against the ships, goods and citizens of the United States of America."(l 11) 
According to the Edinburgh Annual Register, this Order in Council was in 
effect a delayed British declaration of war, made necessary both by 
unrecalled American letters of marque, and the American decision not to 
ratify a suspension of hostilities agreed between Lieut General Sir George 
Prevost, Governor General of Canada, and the American Brigadier General 
Hull.(l 12) For American merchantmen and their crews, British General 
Reprisals, when eventually learned of in distant European ports, would mean 
internment and long detention. This would include both Brown and Ive's 
Asia, stranded in Copenhagen and the General Hamilton in St Petersburg, 
neither to return to Providence, Rhode Island, until 1815. For the Royal Navy 
in the waters of North America, it was to mean a renewal of arduous weeks of 
maritime blockade.(l 13)
Dependent on imported raw cotton for their livelihood, some British 
cotton spinners had apparently long been opposed to Britain's efforts to 
regulate neutral American trade, and after the outbreak of war, the prospect of 
British commercial blockade completely preventing the importation of 
American cotton. In an open letter to Lord Castlereagh, dated 2 March 1813, 
Charles Lyne reported that, having adapted their machines for its use, the 
spinners argued that superior "bowed Georgia cotton wool" was essential, and 
unobtainable elsewhere.(l 14) They maintained that British blockade of 
American cotton supplies would be "impolitic".
This view, Lyne called "very erroneous". He calculated precisely 
that stocks held, even of Georgian raw cotton, would last "from this time to 9 
May 1814". Additional imports from Brazil would postpone shortage until 27
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November 1814. Imports from British colonies in the Caribbean and South 
America would maintain stocks until 3 March 1815, and Indian raw material, 
imported "very cheaply" from Surat and Bengal, would allow production to 
continue until 17 July 1815. "The additional quantity...will probably be 
imported into Great Britain long before it is possible to consume what is now 
here."
It was also the view of John Whitmore, 'Chairman of the Joint 
Committee of British Merchants Trading to and from the Brazils and 
Portugal', that these imports would be preferable as being "from our own 
colonies and those of our allies, in our own ships, and payable in our own 
manufactured goods... thus proving to the enemy that we can do.. .without 
his assistance for the support of our manufactures"^ 115) Whitmore had given 
evidence to the House of Commons that buying from sources prepared to take 
British cotton manufactures in payment, would replace markets lost since the 
American Non-Importation Act. American manufacturers would admittedly 
benefit from a British blockade, but would be unable to export, and so 
confined to their own market, closed to Britain since before the war. The 
British cotton industry need not therefore oppose any proposed maritime 
commercial blockade of the Americans.
Lyne further reported that "the Manufacturers, Exporters and 
Merchants of Glasgow", were in agreement. Even allowing American 
merchants to continue exporting in neutral vessels would "lengthen this war 
to the detriment of our commerce, navigation, finances and national 
prosperity".(l 16) They all recommended "a strict blockade of the ports of the 
United States" which would be, "the most effectual means of distressing the
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enemy by excluding their produce from the markets of the world."(l 17) 
Unknown to him, as Lyne wrote to the Prime Minister, Admiral Warren and 
Rear-Admiral Cockburn were about to begin the full-scale British blockade of 
the Chesapeake.
Unlike the United States, Britain had the means to protect its 
foreign trade, which in turn provided the wealth which could be efficiently 
taxed and borrowed to finance wars to successful conclusions, both in Europe 
and in North America.
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Chapter 4. Implementation 1: The United States Blockaded 
The United Command of Sir John Borlase Warren. 
August 1812 - April 1814.
Hesitant Beginnings.
The British application of naval and commercial blockades to the 
eastern seaboard of the United States suffered a series of setbacks at the 
outset, due in part to the pre-emptive action of Commodore John Rodgers of 
the United States Navy. Rodgers left New York harbour, unhindered by the 
Royal Navy, on 21 June 1812, three days after Madison's declaration of war 
on Britain.
He sailed in USS President, a large American frigate, nominally of 
44 guns, intending to cruise in squadron strength.(l) President was in 
company with the United States, also rated 44, the smaller frigate Congress 
36, the sloop Hornet and the brig, Argus, altogether a powerful force. 
Rodgers was anxious to avoid the possibility of being blockaded in harbour 
by Royal Naval vessels off Sandy Hook, and hoped that "should war be 
declared, & our vessels get to sea, in squadron, before the British are 
appraised of it... we may be able to cripple and reduce their force in detail: 
to such an extent as to place our own upon a footing until their loss could be 
supplied by a reinforcement from England."(2) He had also heard of a 
valuable British convoy homeward-bound from the West Indies, following 
the north-east trade winds before crossing on westerlies to the eastern 
Atlantic. There he hoped to intercept it.(3)
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Rodgers left before receiving the orders of Secretary of the Navy 
Paul Hamilton, whose letter was delayed, possibly by his reputed 
inebriation by midday, his obsession with detail, and the suddenly increased 
pressure of work and need for decisions.(4) Rodgers seems to have been 
remarkably well informed, having "ascertained, & I think from a source that 
may be depended on, that the British naval force on this side of the Atlantic, 
consists of one sixty-four - seven frigates - seven sloops of war - seven 
Brigs, and two or three schooners."(5) He also knew that the "British frigate 
Belvidera & Sloop of War Tartarus were seen off Sandy Hook yesterday 
morning".(6) Captain Richard Byron of HMS Belvidera, 36, was patrolling 
off Sandy Hook, although out of sight of land, in hope of intercepting the 
French privateer Marengo, expected shortly to leave the harbour of New 
London, almost due north of the eastern end of Long Island.(7)
However, at 6 a.m. on 23 June, "with Nantucket Shoal bearing NE, 
distant 35 leagues", President "sighted a Large sail...soon discovered to be 
a Frigate."(8) The frigate turned out to be the Belvidera, but by 11.30 p.m., 
after a day of unsuccessful attempts at disablement, miscalculations and 
accidents, including the bursting of a chase gun, which killed three and 
wounded thirteen others, including Rodgers himself, the British frigate had 
escaped.(9)
The Belvidera reached Halifax on 27 June, having taken three 
small American prizes en route, since the American squadron's having 
opened fire without any attempt at communication, killing two British 
seamen, had probably seemed to confirm for Byron the outbreak of the 
long-expected war.(10) But in Halifax, Vice-Admiral Herbert Sawyer, C in
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C of the Royal Navy's North-American station remained characteristically 
cautious. On 9 May 1812, the Foreign Office had instructed the Admiralty 
to avoid precipitating war, and clear orders had been sent to Sawyer in 
Halifax that he was to await confirmation from Mr Augustus Foster, the 
British Minister Plenipotentiary at Washington, before sanctioning 
hostilities at sea.(l 1) Sawyer therefore released the Belvidercfs captures. 
This must have seemed an unexpected setback to Byron and his crew, both 
in terms of morale and eventual prize money. Sawyer also sent Captain 
Thompson in the sloop Colibri 16, under flag of truce to New York, to 
obtain an American explanation and unambiguous information.
Rodgers had also noted in New York on 19 June that "the schooner 
Mackerel, with Mr Ruff (the English messenger) sailed last evening for 
Hallifax", presumably without the news from Washington of Madison's 
declaration of war.(12) Despite this lack of confirmation, Sawyer now sent 
Mackerel under Captain Hargrave to England, with his reports and 
dispatches. (13) According to the Hampshire Telegraph, the Mackerel 
reached Portsmouth on 25 July, which caused the Naval Chronicle to 
publish a further cautious interpretation oiBelvidera 's escape. "Our 
Government has expressed an opinion that the attack made upon the 
Belvidera had neither resulted from any new orders of the American 
Government, nor was any proof that war had been decided on. The 
American frigates, it was thought, had acted in conformity to a previous 
order of the Government of the United States not to permit vessels of war 
belonging to foreign powers to cruise within their waters."(14)
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Vice-Admiral Sawyer had also sent HM sloop Rattler 18, to 
Bermuda, the Hunter to Newfoundland, and other craft to the outlying 
cruising stations, with orders for all the vessels under his command to 
assemble at Halifax. This might enable them to intercept and defeat 
Rodgers' squadron. This concentration of the Royal Navy's strength at 
Halifax, including the elderly Africa, 64, had the effect of dismantling 
Sawyer's original intention, in the event of war, of blockading each major 
American port with one of his six larger serviceable ships. As one British 
officer was to complain, "we have been so completely occupied looking for 
Commodore Rogers' (sic) squadron that we have taken very few 
prizes."(15) Whether deliberate or not, Rodgers' distraction of Sawyer's 
intended blockade allowed many returning American merchant vessels to 
reach their home ports safely, and to replenish import stocks. The import 
duties on their cargoes added very significantly to customs revenues, and 
importantly, affected American government thinking. The New York 
legislature was told that "Nearly as great a proportion of homeward bound 
merchantmen have escaped capture as has been customary during the last 
three or four years of peace."(16)
Rodgers meanwhile, had abandoned his search for the returning 
West Indies convoy in the western approaches, and further failed to venture 
into the English Channel, Bristol Channel or Irish Sea, an omission since 
much criticised, particularly his failure to inflict on the Royal Navy the 
potential disruption of its blockades of France, whilst dealing with him.(17)
Although as Mahan pointed out, the loss of one West Indies 
convoy would not greatly have affected the British economy, any merchant
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losses in British seas would be unwelcome, not least because of the adverse 
effects on the Stock Exchange, maritime insurance premiums, public 
morale and political stability.(18) The first round in Britain's maritime 
economic war with the United States, was characterised by a succession of 
missed opportunities on both sides. Much more could have been achieved 
by a larger British blockading force, but given the Royal Navy's current 
European commitments, this was impracticable.
Dual Objectives: War and Diplomacy.
On 4 July, Sawyer received confirmation from Foster in 
Washington that Congress had declared war on Britain. The following day, 
he dispatched the packet Julia, which crossed the Atlantic with the news in 
a remarkably fast twenty-four days.(19) Therefore, it was not until 29 July 
that definite intelligence of the American declaration of war reached the 
British government. Even then, some in Britain hoped that once news 
reached Congress that Britain had revoked its Orders in Council on 23 June, 
a diplomatic solution might still prove possible.(20) Revocation of the 
Orders, as far as they applied to American shipping, was worded so as to 
take effect from 1 August 1812. However, any reply from across the 
Atlantic could not be expected before the beginning of September at the 
earliest.
On the following day, the 30 July, the British Government and 
Admiralty felt more free to act. Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, a man 
with diplomatic experience as well as previous service in North American 
waters, was ordered by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Melville to
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"come up to Town forthwith" to meet the Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Castlereagh.(21) The Foreign Secretary evidently read to Warren his 
"Orders & Instructions", but left some possibilities unspecified. In a letter 
to Melville on 8 August, Warren discussed the potential complications of 
the possible secession of the New England States from the Union, and how, 
in that event, the Royal Navy should conduct itself, in relation for example, 
with vessels from New England.(22) In a letter of 12 August Warren sought 
and received from Castlereagh clarification on the "friendly disposition of 
parts of the United States" and the terms to be fixed for any cessation of 
hostilities for negotiation.(23)
Warren was also to be entrusted with diplomatic responsibilities, 
since Foster, the British Minister had left Washington, and had sailed from 
New York on 14 July in the sloop-of-war Alecto, not to reach Portsmouth 
until 19 August. (24) Warren was authorised to propose an armistice to the 
American Government to allow time for both parties to investigate the 
possibility of a peaceful resolution of Anglo-American differences 
following the revocation of the British Orders in Council to take effect, as 
far as American vessels were concerned, on 1 August 1812.
Embargo and Convoy: Offensive and Defensive Economic Warfare.
But, since diplomatic success could not be guaranteed, the legal 
framework for British commercial blockade was put in place. On 31 July, 
an Order in Council ordered that "commanders of HM's ships of war and 
privateers do detain and bring into port all ships and vessels belonging to
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citizens of the United States." A General Embargo was declared on 
American shipping and goods "now within, or which shall hereinafter come 
into, any of the ports, harbours or roads within any part of His Majesty's 
dominions, together with all persons or effects on board."(25)
The General Embargo contributed to an effective start to Britain's 
economic warfare against the United States. As Albion and Pope 
demonstrate, 46 of the 450 American ships libelled in the Vice-Admiralty 
Court in Halifax during the war, were detained there before 17 September 
1812, and included some of the largest American merchant vessels taken. 
They calculate that no less than 57% of the full-rigged ships and 26.5% of 
the brigs condemned in Halifax were taken in the first three months of the 
war.(26) While just over 10% of the number taken, these vessels represent 
"almost a quarter of the tonnage" taken during the entire war.(27) Most 
were probably seized in or near Halifax harbour, a serious loss even to often 
prosperous American owners whose incomes might otherwise have 
provided loans to the government.
British commercial sanctions against an American economy 
heavily dependent on trade with Britain, began on 31 July with an order that 
"no ships or vessels belonging to any of His Majesty's subjects be 
permitted to enter or clear out for any of the ports within the territories of 
the United States of America, until further order."(28) The same issue of the 
London Gazette announced on 1 August 1812 that the Admiralty revoked 
"all licences granted by us to any ship or vessel to sail without convoy to 
any port or place of North America, Newfoundland, the West Indies or the 
GulphofMexico."(29)
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The need for convoy often added considerably to delays and 
therefore costs, but unless given dispensation as particularly fast or well- 
armed, the penalties for masters of merchant vessels leaving without 
clearance as part of a convoy, or breaking away from the Royal Naval 
escort without permission, were severe. As well as invalidating the ship's 
insurance policy, punishment could include a prison sentence, such as that 
imposed on Mr Newlands, master of the Coquette of Glasgow. He sailed 
from St Thomas' Island in February 1813, under convoy of HMS 
Kangeroo, but "ran away from the fleet" and received "a month's 
imprisonment in the Marshalsea".(30)
Sir John Borlase Warren: Admiral and Diplomat.
The Admiralty now moved quickly, and on 3 August, Warren was 
appointed to take over the hitherto separate commands of Halifax Nova 
Scotia, Newfoundland, Jamaica and the Leeward Islands as a new "United 
Command", an "enlarged and important service", superseding their present 
commanders, Vice-Admiral Sawyer, Admiral Duckworth, Vice-Admiral 
Stirling and Rear-Admiral Laforey respectively.(31) On 6 August, the 
Foreign Office issued to the Admiralty secret instructions similar to those 
given to Augustus Foster, the British Minister in Washington on 8 July, but 
which had not reached him before he left on 14 July.(32) These instructions, 
and more dated 7 August, included a Foreign Office draft of the letter 
Warren was to send to James Monroe, Madison's Secretary of State, on 
arrival in America, and were received by Warren on 8 August, authorising
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him to "suspend hostilities... in the event of the American Govt. revoking 
their letters of marque."(33) He was to propose "the immediate cessation of 
Hostilities between the Two Countries" provided that "the Government of 
the United States of America shall, instantly, recall their Letters of Marque 
and Reprisal against British Ships, together with all Orders and Instructions 
for any Acts of Hostility whatever".(34) The same day, Warren wrote a 
careful letter to Lord Melville, dated 8 August, in which he sought further 
clarification of his complex political and diplomatic instructions.(35)
But even before leaving for Halifax, Warren realised that, should 
diplomacy fail, the resources available in Nova Scotia were inadequate, and 
wrote to the Admiralty that "in the Event of its being necessary for the 
future prosecution of the War to harrass (sic) the Coast and destroy the 
Trade and Maritime Resources of America", he would need reinforcements 
including "small vessels which may be navigated in Creeks and Shoal 
Waters."(36)
On 12 August the Admiralty announced Warren's appointment as 
"C in C of His Majesty's squadron on the Halifax and West India stations, 
and down the whole coast of America."(37) After prolonged preparations, 
including the acquisition of a printing press for issuing future blockade 
proclamations, Warren left Portsmouth in his flagship San Domingo, 74, on 
14 August 1812, accompanied by Poictiers, 74, Sophie, Magnet and the 
schooner Mackerel. The frigates Tenedos and Niemen, both 38's, were, 
according to the Naval Chronicle, "to follow as soon as possible". Warren's 
diplomatic responsibilities were an open secret; the Naval Chronicle 
continued "Sir John, we understand, is gone out with powers to negociate,
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(sic) as well as to act offensively with the ships under his orders; but 
proposals of conciliation are, in the first instance, to be made."(38)
Ten days after Warren left Portsmouth, the Jamaica convoy arrived 
safely. According to the Naval Chronicle,
Great expectations were formed in America of Commodore Rodgers falling in 
with the Jamaica fleet, and capturing the greater part of it. HMS Thetis, however, 
and the whole of the convoy from Jamaica, arrived in the Downs on 24th August. 
On the 6th, Commodore Rodgers's squadron hove in sight of the convoy, upon 
which the Aeolus, the Shannon and the Belvidera frigates, which were escorting it
across the Atlantic, parted company, in chase of the enemy. (39)
However, whichever enemy the British frigates thought they were chasing, 
it cannot have been Rodger's squadron since, according to his own account, 
he had abandoned the chase on 13 July and turned south for the Azores.(40) 
Nonetheless, whilst employed in chasing Rodgers without success, the 
British frigates had been distracted from blockade duties which might have 
made a major contribution to a negotiated peace. Rodgers reached Boston 
on 31 August, and explained, in a self- justificatory letter to Hamilton that, 
with scurvy amongst his crews, he had captured only seven small prizes 
throughout his long voyage.(41)
Warren meanwhile, was not to reach Halifax until 26 September 
after a "boisterous passage" in which the accompanying sloop Magnet, 
Captain Maurice, was lost with all hands.(42) On arrival, Warren promptly 
set about both his naval and diplomatic responsibilities. On 30 September, 
he wrote to the American Government proposing an armistice on the 
strength of Britain's revocation of its Orders in Council as they applied to
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American merchant ships, on condition that America withdrew its letters of 
marque, and began the long wait for a reply.(43) Warren had no unrealistic 
hopes of a diplomatic solution. On reaching Halifax he had quickly 
concluded that "any alteration in the sentiment of the Eastern States 
respecting Great Britain, or a Separation from the General Union of the 
United States" had been "too much relied upon: as the Whole Object 
between the Two Parties is only an Electioneering Struggle for Power".(44)
Warren's United Command: Problems and Solutions.
Warren formally took over from Sawyer in Halifax on 27 
September, and found, perhaps not unexpectedly given Sawyer's reputation 
for inactivity, a number of immediate concerns, including the inadequate 
number and poor condition of the ships available. In Halifax, in addition to 
the 64 gunned Africa., launched as long ago as 1781, he found just five 
frigates, and in Newfoundland, a 50 gun 4th rate, and three frigates. Twenty- 
seven smaller vessels completed the North American part of his command. 
Altogether, his United Command consisted of eighty-three named "Ships in 
Sea Pay", at Antigua on the Leeward Islands station, and at Port Royal in 
Jamaica, as well as the thirty-seven in St John's, Newfoundland and 
Halifax. The list composed in August by Warren's meticulous Flag 
Secretary and prize agent George Hulbert, arrived at a total of seventy-nine 
ships for the United Command. Not all were seaworthy.(45) The disparity 
between these lists of vessels apparently available, and the reality of those 
actually fit for service in American and West Indian waters was to remain a 
constant cause of concern for Warren.
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On 5 October, Warren wrote to John Wilson Croker, First 
Secretary of the Admiralty, reminding him that he had already lost nine 
vessels of his command to capture, loss or reallocation, and "the necessity 
of reinforcing the Squadron on this Coast and in the West Indies...to meet 
the exertions of the Enemy, who seem to be determined to persevere in the 
annoyance and destruction of the Commerce of Great Britain and these 
Provinces."(46) The list of losses included not only, on the afternoon of 19 
August, the frigate Guerriere to the American Constitution, but also the 
frigate Barbadoes which had struck a sandbar off Sable Island on 28 
September, together with two convoyed merchantmen, resulting in the loss 
of £60,000 in specie intended as the payroll for Halifax Dockyard.(47)
Manpower shortage, of both seamen and dockyard workers, was 
another long-standing problem. On 5 October 1812, Warren issued a local 
proclamation, probably more in hope than realistic expectation, offering 
pardon to any Royal Naval deserters who returned.(48) Furthermore, on 7 
October Warren wrote to Melville "I am also sorry to say that Admiral 
Sawyer's Health will prevent him serving as Second with me at this Critical 
Moment and that the Africa is in so bad a State as to preclude me making 
use of her in the Line". By 18 October, he had informed Croker that Sawyer 
was too unwell to serve as his second in command, and sought his 
replacement.(49)
But, before leaving, Sawyer was to contribute to a problem which 
for Warren was to become serious, that of licences held by American and 
neutral trading vessels. Wellington's armies in Spain and Portugal had long 
relied on American flour, wheat, rye and dry goods, shipped by American
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and neutral merchantmen. Now in wartime, these vessels had to be issued 
with British protections, licences to carry their cargoes through British 
blockades. Similarly, the British West Indian islands needed American 
grain, livestock and softwood, traded in the past for sugar, tobacco, rum, 
hardwood and tropical fruit. Both American and Canadian merchants had 
long traded with the West Indies, and many felt that they faced financial 
hardship or worse if not supplied with such licences. On 5 August, Sawyer 
had complied with the proposition of Andrew Alien, the British Consul in 
Boston, to "give directions to the Commanders of His Majesty's Squadron 
under my Command, not to molest American Vessels Unarmed and So 
Laden 'bona fide' bound to Portuguese or Spanish Ports" or those of their 
colonies, "Whose Papers Shall be Accompanied with a Certified Copy of 
this letter Under Your Consular Seal."(50)
But licences, genuine and suspect, together with the use of false 
neutral colours, had quickly proliferated. (51) As many as 500 licences had 
been issued by British naval, military and civilian officials in the first ten 
weeks of the war.(52) The unrestrained issue of British licences appears to 
have induced an air of complacency at least in some American merchants. 
On 11 September 1812, John Maybin of Philadelphia wrote to a business 
acquaintance in Providence, Rhode Island,
I believe with some of our Merchants the Confidence they have that the British 
Cruisers will not Molest them going to Lisbon & Cadiz - others have a Pasport 
(sic) under the Authority from Admiral Sawyer and Mr Foster - for which I am 
told they pay one Dollar per Barrel". (53)
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The availability of British licences created acute difficulties at sea, 
particularly for junior officers in command of British boarding parties, 
responsible for immediate decisions. Warren complained to Melville on 7 
October 1812 that, "The applications for Licences are beyond all idea for 
Spain Gib'r & the West Indies from the Americans & I have not 
countersigned any", although adding pragmatically, "...but for Importation 
into this Province", meaning Nova Scotia. Clearly irritated by the enemy's 
use of false neutral colours, he later added "The Southern States, who are a 
composition of most Vile Materials: have sent to Sea Numbers of Ships 
under Spanish, Portuguese & of late obtained Swedish colours from St 
Bartholemews: the property is thus covered & leaves the field open to a war 
of privateers against the British Commerce."(54)
Meanwhile, senior serving Royal Naval officers seriously 
questioned Andrew Alien's widespread issue of British trading licences and 
his apparent personal gain, which in turn, prompted immediate political 
enquiries.(55) Alien was also involved in the issue of licences to 
Americans trading with the West Indies, in October 1812, as enquiries into 
his conduct began.(56)
A further problem pre-dating Warren's arrival, and hindering the 
prompt implementation of British blockades was that of American 
privateers, and merchant vessels with letters of marque. Before being 
relieved, Sawyer had informed Croker of his command's capture of nine 
American privateers, thereby "protecting the Coast of this Province & the 
Trade." Sawyer was "much gratified that these Vessels were taken so soon 
after their Sailing, as they would doubtless have done much mischief."(57)
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Similarly, Warren was anxious "to clear that part of the Station of the 
Enemy's privateers, of which there are no less than Twenty that have much 
annoyed the Trade."(58) Between 1 July and 25 August 1812, no less than 
twenty-four privateers, accounting for 94 guns and 963 men had been 
captured, followed by two more by the end of the year.(59) On 7 October, 
Warren had reported that "privateers are innumerable there being not les 
than 10 off the Island of Cape Breton & having hitherto no frigates within 
my reach, I have been obliged to dispatch the Africa & San Domingo to 
clear that district of the Station".(60)
These successes in relation to the size of the problem, were small. 
The routes of British vessels travelling between Britain and the West Indies, 
or the ports of Lower Canada, all tended to converge off Halifax. Unless 
convoyed, these offered rich prizes to American privateers. Many vessels 
had hurriedly left American ports before 4 April 1812, in order to beat the 
start of Madison's 90-day Embargo. On returning that summer, most of 
their seamen had escaped capture by the expected British wartime 
commercial blockade. Now, many of them took almost the only sea-going 
employment available, and joined crews of generously-manned American 
privateers, or sought to supplement their incomes in vessels on legitimate 
trading voyages with letters of marque. By American calculation, even 
"before Warren's arrival", the number of British vessels captured by 
American privateers "probably exceeded two hundred", three quarters of 
them between the Bay of Fundy and Newfoundland.(61)
As part of a problem never completely resolved, vociferous British 
traders in the West Indies and Canada were to complain about American
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privateers for the rest of the war, both to Warren and his successor, and to 
the influential at home.(62) Warren was usually to be held responsible for 
the escape of privateers to sea through a porous British naval blockade by 
both Admiralty and merchants alike.
Warren's Order Book, for what he called his "Halifax, Bermuda 
and West Indies Squadrons", reveals both the priorities he set for them, as 
well as his initially limited resources. On 4 October 1812, Warren had 
ordered Africa and San Domingo "diligently to cruise for the especial 
succour and protection of the Convoys", specifically those from Britain to 
Quebec and Nova Scotia and from the Gulf of St Lawrence, "as well as for 
the Trade in General and the Destruction & Annoyance of the Enemy".(63) 
The order in which these tasks are set out is, at this stage of the war, very 
significant. Convoys were an important aspect of Warren's defensive 
economic warfare against the United States, although the escort by Royal 
Naval vessels of grouped British merchant ships, either outward or 
homeward bound, was from the outset, difficult to co-ordinate with the 
implementation of blockades. With the Halifax squadron dispersed, Warren 
complained to Croker that "until the several ships return, it will be 
impossible for me to send the Convoys directed by my Instructions."(64)
Warren's second major order, dated 10 October, was for Poictiers, 
74, and "two frigates of Captain Epworth's Division", including Nymphe, 
38; the sloop Sylph 18, and the schooner Herring, 6. They were "to Cruise 
off the Chesapeake, & Cape of Delaware, taking care to Station some 
vessels of Cape Hatteras", some 150 miles south of the Chesapeake, "to 
intercept any Ships from the East Indies, or Ships of War from France as
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well as for the protection of the Trade from the West Indies stretching 
occasionally towards the Delaware.. .and Sandy Hook but not further to the 
Northward".(65)
As if this were not enough, they were also to inform Warren "from 
time to time of any movements of the Enemy or any intelligence of 
importance" sending information to Halifax until 15 November, and 
thereafter to Bermuda. They were to "continue upon this service for the 
space of Eight Weeks.. .or until you are joined by a Flag Officer, and 
detaching one Ship as occasion may permit, to refit & complete Stores and 
Provisions and Water".(66) This was indeed a tall order for only five 
vessels, especially when at this stage of the war, the intervention of the 
French was not thought an impossibility. By March 1813, Warren was to 
estimate that double that number of vessels would be needed for efficient 
blockade of Chesapeake Bay and the Delaware River alone. By then, he 
would consider three 74's, three large frigates and at least four smaller 
vessels the essential minimum. Moreover, additional vessels would be 
needed to form a relieving squadron, to fill gaps made by exhaustion and 
storm damage.(67)
General Reprisal: The Widening of Economic Warfare.
In London on 13 October 1812, an Order in Council provided the 
legal basis for a wider, and more offensive, commercial blockade at sea, not 
only by Royal Naval vessels, but also by holders of Letters of Marque and 
Reprisal. It sanctioned their "apprehending, seizing and taking of the ships,
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vessels and goods belonging to the Government of the United States of 
America or the citizens thereof" or "others inhabiting the territories." 
British captors should "bring the same to judgement in any of the Courts of 
Admiralty within His Majesty's domains." Importantly however, "nothing 
in this Order contained shall be understood to recall or affect" Warren's 
authorisation to "sign a Convention recalling and annulling, from a day to 
be named, all hostile Orders issued by the respective Governments".(68) 
Furthermore, not wishing to miss any opportunity for taxation, the British 
Government had printed in the London Gazette for 31 October, its 
"regulations for the distribution of Prizes", which could be "sold and 
disposed of" by the takers "for their own use and benefit after final 
adjudication" but "subject to payment of customs duties as if imported." 
(69)
As a further indication of the complexity of the situation in which 
Warren and his squadrons found themselves, on the same day, a further 
Order in Council was made "permitting trade between Bermuda and the 
United States in neutral vessels" in essential commodities.(70) Although 
necessary for normal life on the island which would serve as Warren's 
winter base, this trade would inevitably help the American economy, a 
perverse contradiction to economic warfare. The Royal Navy was further 
instructed "not to molest American vessels that have taken Grain &c to 
Lisbon on their return to the United States provided they have Licence from 
His Majesty or Mr Forster" (sic), the British envoy to Washington.(71) 
Until 13 October, such American vessels were supposed to return from 
Spain or Portugal in ballast, but could now carry return cargoes of "lawful
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merchandise" as well as specie taken in payment, making the detection of 
false licences still more important, but no easier.
In his orders to Broke's squadron on 14 October, Warren 
significantly gave priority to their using their "utmost exertions for the 
protection and support of the Trade and Commerce of His Majesty's 
Subjects", and only then "for the destruction and annoyance of the Enemy". 
Warren also confirmed an established tactical principle, warning Broke to 
"be careful not to weaken the strength of your Ships by sending into Port 
any vessels of small Value". Sending away experienced junior officers and 
seamen as prize crews would leave British vessels shorthanded in the event 
of more important action, although burning or sinking insignificant prizes 
once stripped of anything useful was not popular with either officers or men 
deprived of even long postponed prize money .(72)
As Warren waited for the American government's reply to his 
armistice proposal of 30 September, the London Gazette noted that 
Congress had refused to ratify the ceasefire arranged on land between Sir 
George Prevost, the British Governor-General of Canada and General 
Dearborn of the American Northern Provinces Army, and had directed that 
"hostilities should be recommenced."(73) Personally, Warren might have 
felt that General Reprisals could not be implemented until he received the 
American's answer; certainly, the Bermuda "Copy of Records in Vice- 
Admiralty Court" kept by George Hulbert, Warren's meticulous flag 
secretary and prize agent, does not begin until 25 November 1812.(74) 
Some prize taking by both sides however, seems to have continued 
uninterrupted.
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Economic sanctions at sea however would not necessarily have 
been incompatible with Warren's suggested armistice and potential 
diplomatic solution in that sanctions could be withdrawn and reversed in the 
event of peace. Following a negotiated settlement, captured vessels and 
cargoes could be restored, prisoners released, and even compensation paid. 
A generous British policy after a display offeree might have proved 
persuasive in the long term.
The American reply arrived at Halifax in the Junon, on 16 
November 1812. Not unexpectedly, Monroe's answer, dated 27 October, 
referred back to the issue of impressment, suggesting that it should be 
suspended, pending Congressional legislation to prohibit the employment of 
deserting British seamen on American merchant or 'public' naval vessels. 
That same day, Warren found unacceptable "the surrender, even for a short 
period of one of the most antient (sic) and essential of the Maritime Rights 
of the British Empire". "The Presidents (sic) Speech Containing a refusal of 
the propositions, render any further observation unnecessary."(75)
Now that Junon had returned with Monroe's inadmissible counter- 
proposals, General Reprisals could be put into effect legitimately, although 
hostilities had never been completely suspended; American prizes had 
continued to arrive at Royal Naval bases. In anticipation of commercial 
blockade begun in earnest, Warren had sought to rectify the shortage of 
both adequate resources and clear instructions from London. From Bermuda 
on 7 November, Warren had written to Melville that "several points of this 
Command require a much more numerous Force than I have under my 
orders & I trust you will, as soon as convenient with your other
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Engagements think of our situation, as well as some Decisive Orders 
respecting the number of American ships that have been brought into this 
port as well as in the West Indies."(76) The want of decisive orders, and of 
adequate means of implementing them, were to remain amongst Warren's 
major problems.
Vice Admiralty Courts, Prize Money, Legal and Practical Problems.
Despite Albion and Pope's apparent assumption that "the best 
prize money for the Royal Navy was won in the first three months" of the 
war, the early embargo captures did not mean promptly paid prize money 
for British crews.(77) The protracted process of condemnation of prizes by 
the various Vice-Admiralty Courts of Warren's United Command, 
especially when as punctiliously conducted as at Halifax, meant that 
payment of prize money was to be long delayed. Warren was concerned 
that this lowered the seamen's morale(78) Delay in the payment of prize 
money can have done little in reducing the rate of desertion.
On the Jamaica station, the hazards of navigation produced 
another setback for Warren. The inadequate resources with which he sought 
to implement the multi-faceted policy of commercial and naval blockade, as 
well as the protection of British business property in the Caribbean, were to 
be further reduced. On 22 November 1812, Captain James Yeo in the 
British 32 gun frigate Southampton captured without difficulty the 
American 14 gun brig Vixen, but in returning to Port Royal, just after 
midnight on 27 November, both vessels struck a reef and sank. Both crews
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landed on Conception Island, and later reached Jamaica, but the need for a 
Court Martial was inevitably added to Warren's responsibilities for 
operational planning.(79)
Towards the end of November, Warren complied with the 
Admiralty's order to establish his winter headquarters in Bermuda, at least 
until March, when the weather generally moderated. Although 600 miles 
due east of Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, and 700 miles from New York, it 
was "admirably calculated.. .for an advanced post or a port of equipment in 
time of war, to guard our West India trade from the enterprises of the 
enemy's cruisers, and in particular, those of America."(80)
Diplomacy Suspended: Blockade in Earnest.
Although as yet unaware that Warren had received Monroe's 
unhelpful reply, the British government seems to have been prepared for an 
American rejection of Warren's diplomatic approach. His commercial and 
naval blockades of the United States could now proceed less constrained by 
diplomatic considerations.
Even by early November, apparently unconstrained by Warren's 
diplomatic effort, a British commercial blockade of the southern coast of 
the United States was underway, over five hundred miles west of Bermuda. 
Extending from Charleston, South Carolina, southward to St Mary's, 
Georgia, then the southernmost Atlantic seaboard state, this blockade 
sought to disrupt all southern trade, particularly Georgia's timber trade. 
This supplied America's shipbuilding and repair yards, such as Portsmouth,
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New Hampshire, and New York, giving the blockade a strategic importance 
which would grow as it continued. As early as 7 November 1812, the 
uncertainty of Savannah timber supplies made one American buyer with 
responsibility for naval ship repairs insist that "the Government also bear 
the risque of capture".(81)
Then on 21 November 1812, Lord Bathurst, British 
Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, and until September, also 
President of the Board of Trade, wrote to the Lords Commissioners of the 
Admiralty. He formally instructed them on this first occasion to order Warren 
"in the Event of the American Government having refused to conclude a 
cessation of Hostilities by Sea and Land", he should "forthwith institute a 
strict and rigorous Blockade of the Ports and Harbors of the Bay of the 
Chesapeake and of the River Delaware", and "maintain and enforce the same 
according to the Usages of War in similar Cases." Mindful of the "Law of 
Nations", Bathurst then added, "in the Event of the Blockade... being de 
facto instituted, that he do lose no time in reporting the same, that the usual 
Notification be made to Neutral Powers."(82)
As evident from Map 2, such a blockade would hinder American use 
of the major ports of Baltimore and Alexandria, as well as the harbour at 
Norfolk, Virginia, and disrupt internal trade and communication between the 
smaller towns and settlements on each river. Blockade of the Chesapeake 
alone would hinder commercial traffic on the James, York, Rappahannock, 
Potomac and Patuxent Rivers. Bathurst's proviso, "in the event" of American 
refusal of peace feelers, implies that British commercial blockade of the
147
Chesapeake and Delaware had not so far been rigorously applied while any 
hope of a diplomatic solution remained, even if it had been further south.
The Admiralty issued these initial orders to Warren on 27 November, 
and then, perhaps reflecting the uncertainties of trans-Atlantic 
communications, re-iterated them on 26 December, this time sending Warren 
a copy of Bathurst's letter of 25 December, which repeated his instructions. 
Warren was again ordered to conduct "the most complete and rigorous 
Blockade, of the Ports and Harbours of the Bay of the Chesapeake and of the 
River Delaware", to "establish" the blockade, "and to maintain and enforce 
the same according to the usages of War under the Regulations pointed out in 
his Lordships said Letter."(83)
However, any such blockade would be rendered largely ineffectual if 
the United State's overseas trade could simply be conducted for the duration 
of the war by neutral shippers. Although such a situation would be less than 
ideal for the Americans since tonnage duties on American vessels would be 
lost, import duties would still be payable and the American Treasury partly 
replenished. Therefore Bathurst's instructions to the Admiralty would have to 
address the question of how neutral vessels making for, or leaving, blockaded 
American ports were to be dealt with by the Royal Navy. Accordingly, 
Bathurst's letter of 25 December importantly instructed the Admiralty that 
"all Measures Authorized by the Law of Nations and the respective Treaties" 
between Britain and "the said Neutral Powers will be adopted and executed 
with respect to Vessels attempting to violate the Blockade after such notice." 
The Admiralty was to "give Instructions to the Commanders of His Majesty's 
Squadrons and Ships of War", including "Cruizers", and "particularly to the
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Senior Officer employed... to stop all Neutral Vessels destined" to the 
blockaded ports. If they appeared ignorant of the blockade, and had "no 
Enemy's Property on Board", British blockading vessels were only to "turn 
them away apprising them" of the situation, and "writing a Notice to that 
Effect upon one or more of the Principal Ships Papers."
"But if any Neutral Vessel which shall appear to have been warned, 
or otherwise informed of the existence of the Blockade, or to have sailed 
from her last clearing Port after it may reasonably be supposed that the 
Notification before mentioned may have been made public there, yet shall be 
found attempting or intending to enter" any blockaded port, "such Vessels 
shall be seized & sent to the nearest Port for legal adjudication."(84)
Similarly, any neutral ship leaving a blockaded American port with a 
cargo "appearing to have been laden after knowledge of the Blockade" would 
also be seized and sent in. Any in ballast, or loaded before notification, unless 
previously warned, would be "suffered to pass, unless there be other just 
Grounds of detention". Even then, such vessels would have "notice and 
warning" written on their papers, prohibiting further attempts, and "stating 
the reason for thus permitting them to pass".(85) Such a comprehensive grip 
on enemy and neutral vessels, and command of American waters would, if 
practicable, be likely to make an impact on the United States' overseas trade 
and tax revenues.
Therefore, on 26 December, as part of the British government's 
effort to keep neutrals informed, the London Gazette announced that 
Viscount Castlereagh,
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signified...to the Ministers of Friendly and Neutral Powers...that the necessary 
measures have been taken .. .for the blockade of the ports and harbours of the 
Bay of the Chesapeake and of the River Delaware in the United States of 
America, and that from this time all the measures authorised by the Law of 
Nations will be adopted & executed with respect to all vessels which may 
attempt to violate the said blockade. (86)
After a period of four or five weeks to allow for the slowness of 
communication, neutral European merchant shipping could not claim to be 
unaware of this development and could, if it chose, avoid confrontation 
with the blockading vessels of the Royal Navy.
There was certainly no shortage of American merchant vessels to 
intercept. Despite American non-importation and 'enemy trade' legislation 
designed to prevent such trade, some American-owned merchandise had 
continued to cross the Atlantic throughout the summer and autumn of 
1812.(87) Especially after the revocation on 23 June of Britain's Orders in 
Council concerning American shipping, American merchants in Britain, 
including Jonathan Russell, the United States' charge d'affaires in London, 
expected a negotiated settlement and the resumption of Anglo-American 
trade.
Their financial assets frozen in cash form by the British shortage of 
specie, American merchants had been obliged to convert their capital into 
British manufactured export goods or processed re-exports, strongly 
demanded in America.(88) Russell advised them to dispatch their goods to 
America, and "thought it his duty to countenance the idea that shipments 
made after the revocation of the orders would be admitted into the United 
States."(89)
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Even when British newspapers published the American declaration 
of war on 30 July, Russell's advice to American merchants in Britain and 
British colonies, was to ship their goods to America. Similarly, Anthony 
Baker, the British charge d'affaires in Washington, expressed hopes to 
Castlereagh that revocation of the Orders in Council meant that such 
American shipments would be allowed under special British licences.(90) 
In November 1812, the American Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin 
believed that "On the 30th of July, the account of the declaration of war 
having reached England, a temporary embargo was laid on American 
vessels; but on the following day, they were by order of Council, (sic) 
permitted to take cargoes of British merchandise and to proceed to the 
United States, being for that purpose provided with licenses protecting 
them" at least until 15 September.(91) But all were mistaken. Such 
shipments remained illegal, contravening both American non-importation 
and enemy trading laws until Madison made a specific proclamation 
suspending the acts, which he chose not to do.(92)
By December 1812, American customs officials had impounded 
illegal imports with a "prime" cost-price value of "about £4m sterling", 
then officially worth almost $18m, and accepted bonds on them for that 
amount. The goods had an American market value nearer $30m.(93) After 
suggestions that the merchants should pay $9m, only half the value of the 
bonds, even this was waived by Congress. Later, even Gallatin's plans to 
modify the non-importation and enemy trade laws to allow the collection of 
revenue on hitherto illegal imports, failed to gain Congressional approval. 
(94)
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Shortages, and Internal Dissention.
Even before the Admiralty's orders of 27 November for the 
commercial blockade of the Chesapeake and Delaware can have reached 
him, Warren wrote to Croker complaining of the paucity of his resources 
relative to the demands on them. On 29 December he wrote from Bermuda 
observing bluntly that,
the Force under my Orders is extremely small, the extent of Coast very 
considerable, and with many Convoys to furnish, it is impracticable to cut off the 
Enemy's resources, or to repress the disorder and pillage which actually exists in a 
very alarming degree and will continue, both on the Coast of British North 
America, and in the West Indies, as will be seen by the Copies of the Letters 
enclosed from Sir George Beckwith and Governor Elliot upon that subject. (95)
The demands of Beckwith, Governor of Barbados, and Elliot of the 
Leeward Islands, represent the relentless pressures indirectly exerted by the 
wealthy and often influential British owners in the islands, to which Warren 
was to be subjected during the twenty months of his "United Command".
It soon became evident that Warren's United Command was not to 
be entirely based on friendly co-operation. Sawyer's eventual departure 
from Halifax had overlapped with difficulties with the West Indies. In 
February 1813, Warren had confided to Melville that the West Indies had 
already cost him "more trouble & pain than it is easy to Describe", 
especially "Jamaica: where I am sorry to say that Admiral Stirling is acting 
in a very unhandsome way". Stirling had been dispatching ships and
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allocating men without consulting Warren and aiding "political intrigue or 
outcry.. .against the Administration", and laying "all the odium of every 
protest...upon my shoulders".(96)
Warren hoped that "after receiving their Lordships Orders" Stirling 
would cooperate. Also, that "the Board will perceive the necessity of 
making that Officer answerable for the employment of the Ships left under 
his Immediate Direction" especially since "a few privateers is the only 
warfare waged in that Quarter: & which with 13 or 14 sail of Pendants I 
should think he might prevent; if he employed the Ships upon the Public 
Service instead of Convoying Money". Stirling had been benefiting 
personally, illicitly charging for convoy protection as well as for bullion 
shipment, and was eventually court- martialled and replaced, but Warren's 
perceived mismanagement of the West Indies Station was to prove a 
recurrent problem for all involved. Warren hoped in vain that Melville 
would "arrange this Disagreeable business & relieve me from such 
Insidious combinations that would require every Moment of my Time to 
revisit".(97)
Earlier however, Warren had made some well-informed and partly- 
practicable suggestions; "that the Squadron would be much benefited by Six 
or Seven good Sailing, old Ships of the Line, such as the Canada, Captain, 
Bellona, Monarch, cut down and reduced as Razies, to Carry their Lower 
Deck Guns and heavy carronade on their Quarter Deck, Gangways and 
Forecastle, manned with three hundred Seamen and Sixty [Marines]". In 
view of the size of the crews of the large American frigates, Warren went 
on "likewise.. .twenty five or thirty Marines and some Seamen should be
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added to the complements of the Frigates on this station"(98) Given the 
demands on the Royal Navy of the ongoing war in Europe, the manning 
suggestions were, for the time being at least, unrealistic.
Blockade in Place: Chesapeake Bay and the Delaware River.
On 6 February 1813, Warren had supplemented the London 
proclamation of the Chesapeake and Delaware blockades, with a local 
declaration to neutrals.(99) Meanwhile, Warren had learned in a letter from 
Melville dated 3 December 1812, that Rear-Admiral Sir George Cockburn 
had been appointed as Warren's second in command in place of Sawyer, 
and that he was "understood to be a very intelligent and enterprising 
Officer".(100) In the same letter Melville had confided,
You will receive an Order for instituting a rigorous blockade of the Chesapeake 
and Delaware, & I must confess that I have been surprised that some measure of 
that description had not been already resorted to in regard to the Enemy's Ships 
although of course it required an Order from hence to extend it to Neutrals. I 
presume their can be no difficulty in anchoring at all times of the year within the 
Chesapeake & that the Delaware may also be rendered very unsafe for the 
Enemy's cruisers to enter. (101)
Cockburn was ordered to leave Cadiz on 18 November, and join 
Warren in Bermuda. Sailing on 23 November, he arrived there on 17 
January 1813, to learn that he was to be responsible to Warren for the 
Chesapeake blockade. After urgent repairs to Marlborough, he left for the
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Bay on 18 February, although not arriving until 3 March.(102) Warren's 
assurance to Melville on 19 February that Cockburn "immediately went into 
the Chesapeake and placed that Bay and the Delaware in a State of Strict 
and Rigourous Blockade" was therefore somewhat premature. He was also 
compelled to refer to a problem perhaps all too easily overlooked in the 
comfort of an Admiralty office in London; "The Port of Boston and Rhode 
Island cannot be blockaded; without much loss of men & risk of Ships, 
from the Month's of Nov[ember] untill March;(sic) owing to the Snow 
Storms & severity of the Climate."(103) Nonetheless, by 21 February, 
Warren felt able to inform the Admiralty that the blockade was in place, 
although so far comprised of only four vessels.(104) But by then, the 
American Secretary of the Navy had already complained that "The enemy 
having penetrated the Bay.. .with their tenders and Boats,.. .are now greatly 
annoying the trade".(105)
When the frigate Narcissus, 32, arrived in company with the 
Dragon, 74, and the 44 gun frigate Acasta in Lynnhaven Bay, at the 
entrance to Chesapeake Bay on 4 March 1813, Captain Lumley found that 
Marlborough, Poictiers and Victorious, all 74's, had arrived the day before. 
He also found that the 36 gun frigates Maidstone and Belvidera, and Junon, 
38, together with the smaller Laurestinus, had been in Chesapeake Bay 
since 4 February and had already "Formed the Blockade previous to our 
arrival with Rear-Admiral Cockburn," to whom the Maidstone 's Captain 
Burdett now relinquished command.(106) Burdett's force, augmented by 
Statira, had already captured the American armed schooner Lottery, en
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route from Baltimore to Bordeaux with a valuable cargo of coffee, sugar 
and logwood.(107)
By now, despite Warren's estimate often vessels being necessary 
for Chesapeake Bay and the Delaware together, the blockading force in the 
Chesapeake alone now consisted of more than ten vessels; four 74's, six 
frigates of between 44 and 32 guns, and several smaller vessels. This 
situation may have been temporary since Captain Lumley's list, adopted by 
Hulbert, shows a rotation of vessels, some arriving and others leaving 
within days, for replenishment or deployment elsewhere.(lOS)
Cockburn's arrival in force coincided with an attempt by Captain 
Charles Stewart in the American heavy frigate Constellation to reach the 
open sea beyond Hampton Roads. Stewart retreated, initially to Norfolk, 
and then further up the tidal river, beyond the reach of potential cutting out 
expeditions, but nevertheless unable to escape. To commercial blockade 
had been added naval blockade. Constellation was to remain incarcerated 
for the remainder of the war, and therefore unable to attack vessels of the 
British blockading squadrons, or by doing so, mitigate the economic effects 
of British commercial blockade.
Warren himself arrived in Chesapeake Bay in San Domingo on 22 
March, his initial stay lasting until 5 May. On 23 March, Rear Admiral 
Cockburn made an evaluation of British progress to date in blockading the 
Chesapeake. He reported to Warren that even with the collaboration of a 
captured American pilot, all efforts to reach the blockaded Constellation, 
now in the shallow Elizabeth River, were seen as impracticable. Boats from 
his squadron did however capture some American merchant vessels, and "it
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appears the Capture of these Ships so high up one of their Rivers" and "the 
probability of their other Rivers being subject to similar visitations" 
contributed to, "the state of alarm in which our arrival has put the whole 
country ".(109)
The resident's "ineffectual application to Government for means of 
defence" added to "the rigorous blockade of the bay and the Delaware, and 
the check lately given to the Licence trade.. .have caused the continuation 
of Hostilities with us to be now as unpopular in this as it has been in other 
parts of the United States". "The Virginians", he added, "who a few Months 
back so loudly called for war, are beginning to be as clamorous and 
a[n]xious for Peace.(l 10)
An "intelligent Merchant of Richmond" had, Cockburn reported, 
"never seen since his entering into Business such Commercial activity in 
America, offering such Prospects of general Profit to all concerned" as in 
the first four or five months of war. The needs of the British army in Spain, 
and of the British Caribbean colonies had increased demand for grain and 
flour while "the Superabundance of British Licences...at a reasonable Rate" 
had meant that "the Shipowners were able without risk to get Freight the 
moment their ships were ready to receive it". Meanwhile, "Merchants had 
more orders for Shipments to Europe &c than they could well execute and 
Farmers... consequently got higher prices for the produce of their Labor 
than had been known for many years".(l 11)
Cockburn's informant maintained that the British blockade of the 
Chesapeake "not only put a Stop to these advantageous prospects but 
having also thrown back into the Country an immense quantity of last years
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produce and caused an entire and complete stagnation of all Commerce and 
profit". This, the merchant said, had "a proportionate effect on the minds of 
the People, and there was now only to be heard from one end of the Country 
to the other Lamentations of Individuals who were now beginning to suffer 
from the effects of the war". The American "added with much apparent 
pleasure that Mr Maddison had lost all the latter measures he had proposed 
to Congress.. .for prosecuting the War with rancour, and he assured me 
from the present state of the Country the President would neither be enabled 
nor permitted to continue it".(l 12)
As a matter of course, Warren would have expected a situation 
report immediately upon his arrival at the scene of operations. However, in 
the absence of independent confirmation, Cockburn's report of the naval, 
economic and political consequences of the blockade of the Chesapeake, so 
soon after its beginning, might seem premature, exaggerated or even 
sycophantic, designed to tell Warren what Cockburn thought he wanted to 
hear. It might merely reflect Warren and Cockburn's conversations in 
Bermuda, between Cockburn's arrival in mid-January, and his departure in 
mid-February, in Marlborough for Chesapeake Bay. No American 
merchant, keen for largely commercial reasons to see the end of Anglo- 
American conflict, can be seen as an entirely disinterested commentator.
Further, the apparent results so quickly observed by the Richmond 
merchant, so clearly match the ideal outcome of British strategy, as to invite 
some scepticism. While the cancelled plans of American farmers to grow 
for the international market, and the fears of shippers who cancelled 
attempts to reach the open sea, are no doubt significant, they are difficult to
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measure. Similarly, and most importantly, both the merchant's impressions 
and Cockburn's report, are wholly subjective, where an objective analysis 
of commercial captures and their fiscal, financial and therefore political 
consequences, would be much more valuable.
However, a letter written by a committee of Baltimore insurance 
underwriters to Secretary of the Navy Jones in February 1813, predating 
Cockburn's somewhat effusive report to Warren, to an extent vindicates the 
impression given by Cockburn's informant, and reflects the concern felt by 
some other American businessmen. Having begun their letter, "Under the 
Circumstances of the present Blockade of the Chesapeake, and the 
extraordinary Hazards to which our Commerce is exposed", the 
underwriters proposed a measure of self-help by providing up to four " fast 
sailing and well equipped and well armed Schooners" to oppose the British 
blockading squadron's tenders and launches, allegedly being used to "decoy 
and intercept" American merchantmen, causing their insurers financial loss. 
Apparently anticipating rejection, the underwriters disingenuously added 
that they were "aware that the protection of Commerce is the proper 
provence (sic) of the General Government, with which they do not desire to 
interfere" in suggesting their "auxiliary measure".(l 13)
Jones replied promptly on 16 February 1813 that he would put the 
suggestion to Madison, unknowingly naming the now blockaded "Frigate 
Constellation" and "17 Gun boats and a Cutter now at Norfolk" as the 
existing American naval defences of the Chesapeake, " now directly 
menaced with an attack".(l 14) He also made a realistic assessment of the
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American capacity to defend their overseas and coastal trade against British 
blockade. Jones wrote,
It is true that the Government of the United States is Constitutionally charged with 
the protection of Commerce, but its means are limited and inadequate to protect at 
all points our extensive Coast and coasters against a powerful Naval foe whose 
Superiority enables [them] to attack a vulnerable point with a celerity and force 
that cannot be repelled but by the Cooperation of the voluntary local force, whose 
interests & feelings are directly assailed. (115)
Less realistically, Jones also hoped that, "if it were practicable to get below 
their tenders and launches in the night so as to intercept them and chastise 
their temerity, it would probably confine them to their ships in future." 
(116) In the event, even a combination of federal government and local 
forces were unable to offer sufficient resistance to British blockades of 
increasing scope and power.
Throughout the early spring and summer of 1813, the thirty vessels 
named in Captain Lumley's list of the "Blockading Squadron in the 
Chesapeake", arrived to maintain the naval and commercial blockades of 
the Chesapeake, or left for re-supply, re-fit and repair.(l 17)) An early 
indication that the Admiralty's orders were being carried out, was a report 
in Baltimore's Niles' Weekly Register that the American ship Emily, 
carrying flour from Baltimore to Lisbon, apparently with a valid British 
licence, had been stopped in Chesapeake Bay, and its papers "indorsed", 
with a statement that the bay had been placed under rigorous blockade.(l 18)
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In the months which followed, Narcissus initially captured vessels 
in ballast, which were usually sunk or burned, but later took four ships 
carrying flour. The Rolla from Norfolk, Virginia, bound for Lisbon, was 
followed by the Finland and two others unnamed in Hulbert's list of 
captures up to 12 June 1813. The schooner Flight, returning from Bordeaux 
to its home-port of Baltimore with a cargo of silks, brandy and wine was a 
richer prize. The schooner Vista, also en route from Bordeaux to Baltimore 
"with Oil, Brandy and Wine" was "Drove on shore, the Cargo sav'd by 
Victorious and Spartan". Two Baltimore schooners, Racer and Lynx each 
laden with coffee, sugar and flour for Bordeaux, were captured, as were two 
schooners and a sloop, each carrying maize, described as "Indian 
corn".(119)
The Narcissus was obliged to share many prizes with other vessels 
present at the time of capture, but the ship Beauty of Baltimore, laden with 
"Whiskie and Iron", and the sloop Butler of New Bedford carrying corn, 
were unshared. Whilst the majority were commercial vessels, some were 
out of the ordinary. The schooner Dolphin, listed as "on a Cruise", was 
apparently a privateer, for which "head money" was later paid on each 
prisoner taken. Narcissus' list of prizes ends on 12 June 1813 with the 
capture of the American Revenue cutter Surveyor, of ninety six tons, with 
twenty-six men and six guns.(120) For the American administration, as well 
as for merchants and owners, the accumulation of such losses was 
becoming financially more significant, as well as a source of inconvenience 
and irritation.
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These blockades, of the southern coast and of the Chesapeake and 
Delaware rivers, were accelerating a process of erosion of many American 
livelihoods and living standards. The Royal Navy's method is exemplified 
by Warren's order to Broke's squadron, composed of Shannon, Nymphe, 
Tenedos and Curlew, dated 27 November 1812. Broke was "occasionally to 
Cruise with the whole or part of your Squadron, for any period not 
exceeding five or Six weeks, upon St Georges Bank, and as far as Block 
Island and Montauq (sic) Point, so as to intersect the passage to Long Island 
Sound, Rhode Island and the Ports near Boston". This work was not 
without its navigational hazards. He was to remember that "when employed 
Cruising upon that station or upon St Georges Bank and off Nantucket 
Shoals, great attention is to be paid to Sound every two hours." Broke's 
squadron, later joined by Valiant and La Hague, was to be deployed "so 
that a Division may always occupy the Quarter Specified for Cruising and 
cutting off the Enemies Supplies."(121)
Among the consequences of this rigorous commercial blockade 
was the isolation of Nantucket Island, thirty-five miles off the 
Massachusetts coast, eventually reducing the population to extreme poverty, 
later to have significant political results. By depriving many Americans of 
their capital and markets, the blockades eroded their means of generating 
incomes, and their ability and preparedness to continue to finance a war by 
an increasing number and level of taxes, and the government's repeated 
calls for loans, well beyond the end of 1814. Of necessity a protracted 
process, and not obviously at the outset, these commercial blockades,
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supplemented by naval blockade, were nevertheless, the beginning of the 
end for realistic hope of achieving American war aims.
Nonetheless, the defensive aspect of economic war with the United 
States could not be overlooked, including the protection of Britain's 
important trade in North American timber. As a result, on 2 December 
1812, Warren had issued orders for a squadron to, "take the Merchant 
Vessels Laden with timber for the Several Ports of the United Kingdom 
under your protection and afford them Convoy 150 Leagues to the 
Northward and Eastward of the Grand Banks of Newfoundland and having 
done so you are to cruise in search of the Enemy's Ships reported to be at 
Sea."(122) Reconciliation of the defensive and aggressive priorities in these 
instructions necessarily heightened the need for quick decisions by watch 
keepers, whether to remain with the convoy or investigate potential 
enemies, with potentially grave consequences for mistakes. Nonetheless, 
trade protection by convoy escort was to remain a vital part of Britain's 
economic war with the United States, although never easy to co-ordinate 
with blockades.
In addition to the operational decisions for the blockades of the 
Chesapeake and Delaware, Warren was occupied in corresponding with 
London, both privately with Melville, and more officially with Croker. 
However, in a letter to Croker marked 'private' for official reasons, dated 
25 January 1813, Warren alluded to the important intelligence-gathering 
function of the Royal Navy's blockade of the United States. Warren's 
squadrons occasionally collected both informative American newspapers 
and onshore agent's reports, usually brought out by boats prepared to trade
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with British vessels, not only in fish, fruit, and vegetables, but also in 
intelligence, often remarkably well-informed, accurate and up to date.
The role also included monitoring, and where possible intercepting, 
American communications with potential European allies, as well as the 
interrogation of captured crews. On 25 January, Warren informed Croker 
that he had "sent for their Lordship's Information Two Dispatches in 
Cypher from the French Consul in Carolina to the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs at Paris. The Cypher may be Discovered at the Office in Downing 
Street by my old friend Broughton, or some of the Gentlemen in that 
Department."(123)
While writing from his flagship "off New York", Warren had 
clearly decided, in advance of any formal orders to do so, to add that port to 
those to be blockaded. Earlier in January 1813, he had ordered Byron in 
Belvidera, with Spartan and Tartarus "forthwith to proceed off Montaug 
Point, long Island (sic) & Cruise for the Destruction of the Enemys 
Commerce & Ships and protection of the Trade of His Maj. Subjects 
between the East Side of Long Island & Block Island, & from thence 20 
Leagues to the Eastward for the Space of Nine Weeks.. .".(124) By 
February, Baltimore's Weekly Register reported that "They are blockading 
the Chesapeake and the Delaware, and are occasionally off New York."
(125)
Warren's letter of 25 January gives an insight into local tactical 
dispositions and to their underlying strategic purpose. "You are aware" he 
wrote, "that the Dragon 74 Statira 38 and Colibri Brig are with me: we 
have Taken and burnt since our being out 16 sail of Ships and Vessels.-1
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may probably produce some Deficit ere long in the Revenue of the United 
States: If all my other Divisions are equally active and successful:"(126) 
The same letter also revealed an anxiety. "I am anxious to Take or Destroy 
some of the Enemys Frigates as they are called but in reality they are small 
Two Decked Ships: I trust their Lordships will not be displeased with my 
having enclosed a Newspaper containing an Official Report of the 
Committee upon their Naval Affairs; and particularly the size Descripsion 
and Force of the American frigates:" Returning to the themes of earlier 
letters, Warren also added, "I wish you would send me some Razees of the 
Descripsion I have stated: and the Indefatigable as well as 8 Gun Brigs for 
New Brunswick the Gulph of St Lawrence; and another Ship or Two of the 
Line would render our Force here more useful and respectable."(127)
At this stage, the Royal Navy's commercial blockade of the United 
States was still beset with complications. The treatment of apparently 
neutral shipping remained a problem since some American vessels had re- 
registered in neutral countries, and neutral vessels, unless clearly carrying 
contraband, were still so far allowed access to such New England ports as 
Boston. The proportion of apparently foreign ships entering American 
harbours was rising steadily. Such vessels imported, for example, iron and 
glass from Swedish ports, and sugar, molasses and rum from the Swedish 
West Indies, returning with American flour, tobacco and timber.(128) Both 
these export markets, and the materials bought, with the tonnage and import 
duties payable on them, were useful to the enemy, and so long as neutral 
vessels were allowed the use of American ports, Britain's commercial 
blockade would remain only a partial success. Even as late as February
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1813, Warren sought Admiralty clarification since "it was impossible to 
Institute a Blockade of the Enemies Ports in the Face of Neutral Licences 
and Protections without Number."(129)
From the assumption of his united command, Warren had been 
subjected to the lobbying of the entrepreneurs of both Halifax and the West 
Indies. Few approaches however can have been as naively self-interested as 
that of the merchants of St John, New Brunswick, who demanded that the 
gypsum trade they conducted with American vessels should be allowed to 
continue, yet somehow "consistently with effectual Prosecution of the War 
against an enemy whose proceedings are by none held in greater Abhorence 
than these Memorialists."(130)
However, since long-term British interests, as in the Peninsula, 
were occasionally served by connivance with some short-term American 
benefit through continued trade, more was required of Warren than merely 
mechanistic application of his instructions. Therefore, when even some 
American merchants made similar requests, Warren needed a wider 
strategic understanding, more than of merely immediate tactical concerns. 
Warren received one such approach from a group of Boston merchants as 
early as December 1812, requesting that they should be allowed to use a 
licence purportedly acquired from the British Home Secretary Lord 
Sidmouth, to carry grain from Alexandria and Norfolk to Britain's army in 
Spain. On the back of the letter Warren pencilled and initialled, "No vessel, 
either with or without Licenses can go out of a Port under Blockade, the 
orders upon this subject are Strict and Decisive."(131) The letter then 
appears to have been filed unanswered. By the time Warren drew the
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attention of the Admiralty to this matter, exactly a year later, Wellington's 
progress in Spain had made such licences unnecessary, and Warren's 
approach to American grain exports could be unambiguous. Implementation 
of blockade on the North American station was seldom uncomplicated.
Kicks and Ha'pence: Criticisms and Reinforcements.
Warren's persistent requests for reinforcements, such as those of 
early November and late December 1812, met with varied responses. In 
mid-November, Croker had insisted that "their Lordships have already 
placed under your orders.. .3 sail of the line exclusive of the Africa", 
twenty-one large and small frigates, twenty-nine sloops and fifteen smaller 
vessels, with even more promised.(132) In a private letter of 3 December 
1812, Melville informed Warren that he would then have "in the number of 
pendants under your orders.. .about one seventh of all the Sea-going Vessels 
in the British Navy", with the apparent implication that the Admiralty was 
expecting better results.(133)
Official correspondence from London also brought implied 
criticism and news of an appointment likely to lighten Warren's 
administrative burden. On 9 January 1813, Croker first re-iterated 
Admiralty dissatisfaction. "My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty had 
hoped that the great force placed at your disposal, as stated in my letter of 
18th November, would have enabled you to obtain the most decided 
advantages over the Enemy, and to blockade their Ships of War in their
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Ports, or to intercept them at Sea if they should escape the vigilance of your 
blockading Squadrons".(134)
Even the promise of help was not without, at least, irritation. Now 
that reinforcements, once arrived, would give Warren a force including "ten 
sail of the Line, my Lords have thought fit to appoint a Captain of the Fleet 
to serve with your Flag". Customarily, Warren could expect to be consulted 
on such an appointment, but Croker continued, "as they were not aware of 
any individual among the senior Captains of the Navy to whom the 
appointment must be limitted, who would be more acceptable to you, they 
have appointed Captain Henry Hotham to that Situation".(135)
A possible indication that Warren might have preferred an 
alternative, having met and disliked Hotham, is perhaps evident in a letter 
Melville had written to Hotham earlier. "There can be no question that 
whatever may be the habits of private intercourse on which you may have 
hitherto been with him, he will be glad to avail himself of your professional 
assistance." Hotham had previously received commendations from very 
senior officers, and was highly regarded.(136) In the months that followed, 
Hotham would send regular instalments of a Journal to the Admiralty via 
Second Secretary John Barrow, always openly acknowledged in a letter 
from him to Hotham in Bermuda, noting that it would be "laid before their 
Lordships".(137) Warren's staff, including his Secretary George Hulbert, 
would surely see these acknowledgements, weakening the suggestion that 
Hotham had been "carefully chosen" to report secretly on Warren's 
performance.( 13 8)
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Originally intended to leave on 5 January 1813 with La Hogue and 
Valiant, Hotham left on 8 January, to take up his appointment in March, 
raising a broad pendant. Another of Croker's letters followed, also dated 9 
January 1813. It noted that the Admiralty "understood that several Captains 
and Commodores, officers of His Majesty's Ships...have been in the habit 
of taking their Wives and other Females to Sea, and disapproving as they 
most strongly do of this irregularity", called upon Hotham to "prevent in 
every instance the recurrence of a practice which must be extremely 
injurious to His Majesty's Service".(139) A professional approach to 
maritime blockade and economic warfare was to be required.
The reinforcements reaching Warren early in 1813 were, however, 
a disappointment. "[T]he wretched State of the Ships that joined me singly 
rendered it impossible to make use of them without Refitment."(140) 
Moreover, the fulfilment of Croker's promise on behalf of the Board that 
"Such an addition will also be made to your force in frigates and Sloops as 
will place 30 of the former and 50 of the latter at your disposal", was clearly 
improbable given Britain's continuing war with France, and the Royal 
Navy's current world-wide commitments.(141)
Warren had certainly inferred Admiralty criticism even if none 
were intended. He replied to Melville "I have felt much hurt that the Board 
Should Suppose that any Exertions on my part should be wanting; were the 
means in my power of Distressing the Enemy ."(142) Perhaps as partial 
proof of his exertions, Warren enclosed in a letter to Croker at the 
Admiralty dated 28 March 1813, a table entitled "Coast of America - 
Proposed Division of Ships & their Stations".(143) Although as he wrote
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Warren knew that most of these 'proposals' had already been carried into 
effect, they serve to show exactly how Warren saw the Royal Navy's role at 
this stage of Britain's economic and naval war with the United States.
Warren's Dispositions: 'Coast of America - Ships and their Stations'.
Warren's proposals reveal a pattern of at least one 74, and up to 
five other vessels on each of the three major stations. Of Warren's 
dispositions, the first station was for the blockade of the Chesapeake, 
performed by Marlborough and Victorious both 74's, frigates Maidstone 
and Junon, and the sixth rate Laurestinus, 26, Fantome, 18, and an eight 
gunned tender. Their purpose was "To intercept the Enemies' Trade and 
Cruizers from Washington & Baltimore & to prevent the produce of 
Virginia from going to market." The squadron was not only "To destroy 
their Revenue" but also their "Resources, there being the greatest No. of 
Privateers from those Ports upon the whole Coast of America." The second 
station was for the blockade of the Delaware, where Poictiers, 74 
Narcissus, 32, and Paz, 10, were to perform an identical function.
The third station, kept by Dragon 74, and one other unnamed 
vessel, was "Off New York", to perform the same roles as the first two 
squadrons. Warren further speculated that "This Port may be Blockaded by 
taking possession of Sandy Hook with Troops & anchoring some Ships 
within it, & by another Squadron off Mont[a]uk Point to anchor, Water and 
Refit in Gardiner's Bay E. end of Long Island where 18 Sail of the Line 
under Adml. Abuthnot in the old American War used to lay." The other,
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fourth, squadron Warren referred to, "Off Nantucket Shoal, Block Island" 
and "Montuk Point", was composed ofBelvidera, 36, andAcasta, here 
described as having 40 guns.
Five smaller vessels, the largest with only eighteen guns, were all 
that were available for the Bay of Fundy and "To protect the Coast of New 
Brunswick from Invasion." Nova Scotia was better provided for. Three 
thirty-eight gun frigates, Shannon, Tenedos and Nymphe were "To cruise 
upon St George's Bank, off the Gulf of St Lawrence & on the Banks of 
Newfoundland."
A seventh squadron was allocated to the southern coastline. 
Aeolus, 32 and Sophie, 18, were posted "Off Charleston, Beaufort, 
Ocracoke and Roanoke", in order "To intercept Trade, Privateers & to 
destroy the Revenue." Warren added that he was aware that "several 
additional Vessels must be added to distress this part of the Enemy's 
Coast." Only the 14 gun Viper was allocated to watch Savannah and St 
Augustine, despite their having "The most implacable & virulent people in 
the whole Union."(144) It was through this area however that clandestine 
cargoes of American raw-cotton began their voyages to Britain, having 
been transferred in exchange for British manufactures, to the neutral 
Spanish Amelia Island through a commercial blockade at this point 
deliberately left porous.(145)
Meanwhile, Warren's flagship, the San Domingo, in company with 
Ramillies, also a 74, Statira, 38, and Orpheus 32, together with Colibri 18, 
and a tender, were held in reserve "To unite to meet an Enemy, or to Cruize 
occasionally whenever an additional No. of Frigates or Sloops arrive so as
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to afford relief upon the several Stations." He hoped for an additional "two 
Frigates & two Sloops of War to allocate to "any given point wanting Force 
or in search of any of the Enemy's Ships."
Despite its already being the end of March before the schedule was 
dispatched to London, Warren went on "In the month of March it will be 
necessary to add a new Squadron to attend to Boston & Rhode Isld., as the 
weather will then be sufficiently mild to admit of Ships keeping that 
Station." He also wrote of then being able to add to the responsibilities of 
the three frigates currently off Newfoundland^ 146) Warren's proposed 
dispositions emphasise just how thinly spread his resources had to be to 
meet the Cabinet's intentions and the Admiralty's instructions, over 
enormous distances, and facing navigational hazards and frequently foul 
weather.
To add to Warren's discomfort, Croker had relayed in a letter dated 
10 February 1813, that the Admiralty found his reports on the number of 
active American privateers "in a great degree exaggerated". Further, that
they cannot suppose that you have left the principal Ports of the American Coast 
so unguarded as to permit such multitudes of Privateers to escape in and out 
unmolested; and their Lordships are quite sure that by preventing our Merchant 
Ships from running [away from convoy protection] and by carefully blockading 
the Principal Ports the trade of privateering will be made so hazardous and 
expensive that its objects will be in most instances frustrated. (147)
But it was not just a question of America's 'principal ports'. On an indented 
coastline of prodigious length, the number of small inlets and harbours able
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and willing to support privateers was one of many factors inadequately 
allowed for in the Admiralty's assessment of Warren's performance to date. 
Whatever the Royal Navy's other commitments, a shortage of suitable 
resources would always be a limiting factor in conducting efficient 
blockades, and in dealing with privateers. For both tasks, sufficient 
substantial vessels, capable of penetrating estuaries and inlets, would be 
essential.
On 3 March 1813, Warren made an attempt to nullify the efforts 
not only of several American public warships but also of the privateers 
based around Boston, as well as those Bostonians engaged in overseas 
trade. He ordered Broke to "use every exertion in your power to intercept 
the Enemys Frigates coming out or going into the Port of Boston as well as 
the Privateers Prizes & Trade returning to the Northern Ports".(148) Boston 
at this time however, was still open to neutral merchant vessels. Warren's 
initiative seems likely to have coincided with a discussion of the need for it 
in London.
In a very long letter dated 20 March, Warren was to receive further 
Admiralty evaluation of his progress as expressed by Croker, who initially 
conceded that "With regard to the watching Boston .. .my Lords are aware 
that this Port cannot be effectually blockaded from November to March" 
but nonetheless recorded Admiralty disappointment that Rodger's squadron 
had escaped in October, as if the weather conditions permitting it complied 
to a precise timetable. The Admiralty also deplored the escape of 
Bainbridge in December and,
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Tho it was not possible perhaps to have maintained a permanent watch on that 
Port yet having.. .precise information that Commodore Bainbridge was to sail at a 
given time, My Lords regret that it was not deemed practicable to proceed off that 
Port (at a reasonable distance from the land) and to have taken the chance at least 
of intercepting the Enemy if the weather should not have permitted you to 
blockade him. (149)
Croker continued, "With regard to your future operations and the 
disposal you propose to make of your force, I have to express to you their 
Lordships approbation of the general arrangement", although Warren was 
reminded that four more ships of the line had been allocated to him, two of 
which should apparently have reached him by 20 March.(150) "My Lords 
are glad", Croker went on, "to think you will consider the amount offeree 
now under your orders as most ample - It exceeds very much what a mere 
comparison with the means of your Enemy would appear to make 
necessary". This comment however takes into account only the naval 
blockade Warren was expected to conduct, and the relatively few American 
'public' warships he faced; but not the numerous American privateers, nor 
the American and neutral merchant vessels which Warren's forces were 
expected to intercept and detain as part of the Royal Navy's commercial 
blockade.
Warren's references to the French in demanding reinforcements 
were deemed "by no means just" since, so far in this war, no French fleets 
had been deployed in Caribbean or American waters. Should the French 
Navy escape its Royal Naval blockade, Croker asserted, Warren would be 
proportionately reinforced. Finally, Croker added, "My Lords...recommend
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to you the most active and vigorous prosecution of the War during the 
Season when the whole of the American Coast is accessible by your 
Squadron, and which will admit of your placing all the Enemy's Ports in a 
state of close and permanent Blockade".(151)
Some news from London had been more encouraging. In the letter 
of 10 February, Croker had referred to Warren's proposal of razees, adding 
that "their Lordships have already turned their attention to this point; and 
had ordered four 74 Gun ships to be cut down and fitted in the manner you 
recommend, with a view to their being employed on the American Station 
in lieu of Line of Battle Ships."(152) By 23 March 1813, Melville could be 
more specific and assured Warren in a private letter that "when Majestic 
and Goliath are completed as razees we propose sending them to you." 
(153)
Melville continued, "We wish also to give you not less than 30 
Frigates for the whole of your command, besides a due proportion of 
smaller vessels amounting altogether perhaps, with the Line of Battle Ships 
and Frigates to 120 pendants, and we calculate that this will allow for your 
various blockading convoy and cruising services, and also a full third in 
port refitting and repairing".(154) Whether this part of Melville's promise 
could be fully kept seems doubtful, although the cause of this apparent 
largesse was about to become clear.
As he outlined his current dispositions for the Admiralty in March 
1813, Warren was unaware that in London, both the Admiralty in formal 
orders and Melville in a private letter, were framing instructions for the 
blockade of the United States to be extended. In his letter of 26 March
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1813, Melville informed Warren that he should expect an Admiralty order 
"for blockading all the principal Ports in the United States to the southward 
of Rhode Island & including the Mississippi," and added, "we calculate that 
your force is amply sufficient to enable you to execute this service 
effectually." Intending that Warren should comply as far as possible with 
the British perception of the "Law of Nations", Melville went on "We do 
not intend this as a mere paper blockade, but as a complete stop to all trade 
and intercourse by Sea with those Ports, as far as the wind & weather, and 
the continual presence of a sufficient armed Force will permit and ensure." 
More practically, Melville added, "If you find that this cannot be done 
without abandoning for a time the interruption which you appear to be 
giving to the internal navigation of the Chesapeake, the latter object must be 
given up, & you must be content with blockading its entrance & sending in 
occasionally your cruisers for the purpose of harrassing & annoyance."
(155)
Warren's Admiralty orders, bearing the same date, required him to 
"institute a strict and rigorous Blockade of the Ports and Harbours of New 
York, Charleston, Port Royal, Savannah and of the River Mississippi."
(156) He had already been blockading the northern approaches to New 
York, these orders sanctioned his blockading the more difficult southerly 
approach, and legitimised what he had been doing in the north. This 
extension of the blockades passed into British law with an Order in Council 
dated 30 March 1813, and the London Gazette duly published its usual 
warning to neutral shipping.(157)
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To an extent, Warren's Admiralty orders followed events, 
sanctioning what was in fact already happening. A letter from the port 
authorities in Charleston, to American Secretary of the Navy Jones, dated 1 
March 1813, pre-dating Warren's new orders, reported that "The Frigate 
Eolus [Aeolus] and Brig Sophie with the two Small Privateers are still off 
our bar," although "by information received from the Fishing Smacks, they 
have made no Captures of Consequence, five schooners and Several Ships 
Sailed on Saturday for france, unobserved by the blockading Squadron." 
Nevertheless, the writer found it necessary to add ".. .it appears that Lord 
Townsend", Aeolus' commander, "is perfectly acquainted, with the State of 
this harbor, and also the destination of every vessel in it, with the politics of 
their owners &c.. .1 regret that I am not authorized to prevent the fishing 
smacks from going out while the Enemy remains off the bar; no doubt but 
that all the information goes out through that channel, altho rigidly searched 
at the Guard vessel."(158)
Nonetheless, the British blockade of Charleston was, at this stage, 
clearly under-strength and Warren's repeated calls for reinforcements were 
understandable. Warren's appreciation of his crucial need for all the means 
the Admiralty could spare to implement effective commercial blockade, is 
expressed in his letter to Melville on 29 March 1813. If American overseas 
trade, especially imports, could be sufficiently reduced,
It is possible that the everlasting Demand for Cash & Consequently Taxes may 
occasion Convulsion & Disorder among the Several States, which may urge the 
President to more explicit & acceptable Terms, of which, should such an event 
arise, your Lordship will receive the Earliest information. (159)
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The British however were not alone in experiencing shortages. 
American resistance to British blockade seems to have been hampered in 
places by a shortage of suitable manpower, as at Norfolk, Virginia. By 
April 1813, Secretary of the Navy Jones had to admit".. .our efforts to 
recruit for the Gun Boats have failed at Baltimore, and progress very slowly 
at Philadelphia, even for the small force ordered for the defence of the 
Delaware, now as effectually blockaded and annoyed as the Chesapeak." 
The range as well as the psychological impact of the British blockades is 
revealed by Jones' further comment that "The presence of a powerful 
hostile squadron is naturally calculated to excite alarm; thus we have urgent 
calls from Maine to Georgia, each conceiving itself the particular object of 
attack".(160)
The Chesapeake certainly was being "blockaded and annoyed". 
During April and May 1813, Warren exploited his almost complete 
command of Chesapeake Bay, with Cockburn leading an expedition up the 
Bay, and landing at this stage without much effective opposition. An 
interim convoy of 40 prizes was dispatched to Bermuda on 17 May; a 
useful measure of success to date. In June however, an amphibious assault 
on Craney Island, at the western entrance to the Elizabeth River, and vital to 
an attack on Norfolk, was repulsed. (161) Amphibious forces later briefly 
occupied Hampton near Newport News, where French auxiliaries fighting 
for the British, behaved with barbarity, contributing to Cockburn's not 
wholly deserved reputation for brutality. Many soundings were taken and 
much useful intelligence was gathered, to be used with great effect the 
following year.(162)
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The impact of the British commercial blockade was also being 
increased by a change in the type of vessel detained. From April 1813, it 
appears that the Royal Navy sought to intercept not only the ocean-going 
ships and large schooners of often-wealthy owners, but also smaller coastal 
vessels, often the only physical capital of modest entrepreneurs, sometimes 
undertaking the journey themselves. When maintained from one year to the 
next, this would disrupt the coastal trade on which many local economies 
relied, eventually with serious consequences for the American government. 
By May 1813, a Captain Dent complained from Charleston that "our port 
continues Blockaded by a sloop of war and two brigs" in company with a 
privateer, making "a number of captures, principally coasters".(163) By the 
end of April 1813, no less a commander than Captain Sir Thomas Hardy in 
Ramillies, led a squadron off Block Island, north-east of Long Island Sound, 
attacking the coastal trade seeking to approach New York. His squadron 
also sought to deny access to privateers and those with letters of marque, 
and used boats such as those of the frigate Orpheus for pursuit into inlets 
andestuaries.(164)
On 26 May 1813, Warren issued from Bermuda a local 
proclamation of the commercial blockade of New York so that vessels 
attempting to leave the port could not claim ignorance. Additionally, on 2 
July 1813, Thomas Barclay, the former British consul, still in residence as 
agent for British prisoners of war, wrote a letter to the Russian vice-consul 
in New York, specifying the blockade's significance to neutrals.(165) This 
letter was published there on 6 July. So far, the commercial activities of the 
ports and harbours on Long Island itself were excluded.
179
Although on 28 March 1813, Warren had proposed stationing 
Aeolus and Sophie off Charleston, North Carolina, to blockade Beaufort, 
Ocracoke and Roanoke, south-west of Cape Hatteras, it was not until 
September that he named such places in a proclamation. Since in the 
meantime, American vessels used the innumerable local inlets, Warren 
authorised an attack on Ocracoke, made by Cockburn with marines and 
other troops on 12 July. British boats captured the privateering brig 
Anaconda, and the schooner Atlas, with letters of marque. Those landing 
"purchased Cattle &c" from cooperative local inhabitants.(166)
The following week Cockburn explained at length how the 
"Blockade of the Chesapeake is very materially, if not entirely frustrated by 
the Port of Beaufort and the Ocracoke Inlet not having been hitherto 
declared to be also in a state of Blockade" linked as they were by "an easy 
inland navigation from Norfolk and Elizabeth Town". "Flour and other 
Produce of the neighbourhood of the Chesapeake, which can no longer be 
sent by the Capes of Virginia is now sent in numerous small Craft to the 
Neutrals & other large vessels safely laying at Ocracoke and Beaufort". 
They should be blockaded "as well as the Chesapeake of which in fact they 
now form a part owing to their immediate water Communication with it". 
They were "a Depot likewise for whatever is to be important to it". 
Estimating the cargo of the Atlas alone to be worth "600,000 Dollars", such 
vessels were, Cockburn wrote, "kept in constant activity from the immense 
Quantity of Goods.. .sent from and received at the various Towns situated 
on the Shores of the Chesapeake".(167)
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Perhaps partly as a result, when on 1 September Warren sent to a 
Crown Commissioner a copy of his current proclamation of the blockade of 
New York, Charleston, Port Royal, Savannah and the River Mississippi, 
dated 26 May 1813, he took the opportunity to announce an extension and 
explain the reason for it. "From the first of September 1813, all outlets from 
the Albermarle & Pamlico Sounds, connected by inland navigation with the 
port of Norfolk, the ports of Beaufort and Ocracocke, (sic) North Carolina, 
Cape Fear river & Georgetown, South Carolina, and Sunbury and Darien in 
Georgia, [were] in a state of strict and rigorous blockade".(168)
Although barely begun by 1812, the network of canals so far 
completed potentially gave better access to blockaded ports, from further 
along the coast, than was immediately obvious. The Dismal Swamp Canal, 
opened in April 1812, offered escape from Norfolk in Chesapeake Bay, 
south into Albermarle Sound and out into the Atlantic.(169) Although often 
so narrow as to accommodate only twenty or even ten-ton vessels, these 
canal entrances could, if unwatched, significantly reduce the efficiency of a 
coastal blockade. Waterways provided New York with "ample channels of 
communication with the interior by water", making it a "centre of domestic 
distribution... the whole range of coast from the Connecticut to the 
Shrewsbury River, and remotely inland - can be reached in perfect safety 
from this city in a sloop of 20 tons."(170) An efficiently applied close 
blockade of the coast would drive internal traffic onto such inland 
waterways, with their connections to the sea. In the absence of cost- 
effective road transport, canals would do much to gather exports and
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maintain local distributive trade and communication, therefore, as far as 
possible, access to them would have to be closed.
Furthermore, by naming specific ports and the vessels allocated to 
blockade them in a proclamation, Warren complied with what was then 
generally understood to be legally necessary for a maritime blockade. 
Aware that the named squadron had to be an apparently adequate force for 
the blockade to be complete and uninterrupted, Warren had carefully added 
to his proposal in March that "several additional Vessels must be added ". 
Extension of the blockade to hinder the American's use of inland 
waterways was therefore not only expedient, but also legally respectable. 
(171)
By September 1813, a more objective appraisal of British progress 
with the blockade of the United States than Cockburn's attempt in March, 
was possible. Throughout the spring and summer of 1813, the Royal Navy's 
commercial blockade had gathered pace. Between 30 March and 22 July 
1813, Warren's squadrons made 138 captures of which all but two were 
merchant vessels. The exceptions were the American heavy frigate 
Chesapeake taken by the Shannon on 1 June, and the US revenue schooner 
Surveyor taken by Narcissus* boats on 12 June 1813. After a succession of 
keenly felt defeats, these captures were seen in Britain as vital progress in 
the war with the United States, although in the long-run less important than 
the impact made on the American economy by the cumulative effect of the 
seizure of American merchant vessels. Continued commercial blockade was 
made practicable by the Royal Navy's successful blockade, capture or
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destruction, by the beginning of December 1813, of the fifteen, named 
American warships shown in Appendix A as Table 2 (a).(172)
Of the 136 trading vessels taken during those sixteen weeks, 110 
were American, of varying sizes and with a range of cargoes. Of the 26 
non-American vessels, most were Spanish, Portuguese or Swedish although 
four were "English" recaptures, with other British vessels detained for 
"illicit trading".(173) Twenty-four of these prizes were sent under prize 
crews into Halifax, twenty-two to Bermuda, eight into Nassau on New 
Providence Island, and seven to Jamaica for adjudication by their respective 
Vice Admiralty Courts, and one into Porta Corbello. Twenty-six were burnt 
or destroyed, and two simply "set adrift". Eight of the faster prizes were 
pressed into service as tenders for larger British ships, while one, captured 
by Warren's San Domingo, was "fitted as a watering vessel".(174) Despite 
its being illegal, one American ship, the Montesquieu, "laden with tea, 
nankeen, silk, copper and cassia, from Canton, bound for Philadelphia, 
captured by the Paz March 27 1813", was "ransomed for 180,000 dollars." 
(175)
Whereas earlier in the year, the voyage of the 409 ton American 
ship Star carrying grain from Alexandria to Lisbon would have been 
licensed and condoned, Wellington's recent progress in the Peninsula now 
rendered such shipments less necessary. Marlborough 's capture of the Star 
on 14 June 1813 could now strike at American grain exports without 
hindering Britain's efforts against Napoleon's armies in Spain. Only four 
days later, Marlborough also took the 292 ton ship Protectress, also laden 
with American flour, together a significant success for Cockburn's
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"Chesapeake Squadron", and a powerful disincentive to American farmers, 
processors and shippers.(176)
While the schooner Ploughboy, sent by Ramillies into Halifax on 
16 April 1813 carried 288 bales of cotton, other cargoes were more varied. 
The 150 ton American brig Valador, flying Portuguese colours when 
captured by Statira, Spartan and Martin on 1 June, carried silk, ribbon, 
window glass and some specie".(177) The 35 ton American sloop Butler 
taken by Narcissus' boats on 9 June 1813 had carried merely "corn meal 
and fish", but was nevertheless sent into Bermuda for adjudication. Other 
mundane cargoes included groundnuts, potash, potatoes, barrel staves, roof 
shingles and sundries, while others included valuable mahogany, indigo, 
tea, sugar, wine and skins.(178)
Often both vessel and cargo must have represented a considerable 
investment, such as the 457 ton ship Volante laden with "Brandy, Wine, 
Silks, Dry Goods, Iron &c", captured en route from Bayonne to Boston by 
La Hogue, Valiant and Curlew on 26 March 1813, and listed as 
"condemned". So was the brig Diomede of 293 tons, captured on 10 May 
by La Hogue and Nymphe, exporting "Redwood, Indigo, Sugar, Tea, Oil & 
Ships Blocks" from Salem to Manilla.(179) Later, on 3 September 1813, the 
750 ton ship Jerusalem, importing "2,000 boxes of Sugar, Coffee, Copper, 
and Hides", from "Havannah to Boston" was captured by Majestic and 
"taken into Halifax".(180)
These three losses alone must have had an adverse effect on the 
preparedness of all those involved to continue with American international 
trade. Both exports and imports were also disrupted in the timber trade. On
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14 March 1813, the 120 ton American brig Commerce, "with lumber from 
Rhode Island bound for Havannah", was captured by Colibri and burned, 
while on 31 March, the American ship Franklin, "of 171 tons and ten men", 
importing timber from Cayenne to New York, was captured and sent by 
Ramillies into Halifax.( 181)
Internal American trade in a range of commodities, including 
cotton, was also being disrupted by such captures as that of the American 
schooner Rising Sun of "100 tons and 8 men laden with cotton from 
Charleston to New York", captured by Atalante on 31 March 1813, and sent 
into Halifax. Similarly, the American brig Cornelia laden with cotton from 
Savannah, bound for Boston's growing textile industry, was taken by 
Ramillies on 26 April 1813, and sent to Bermuda.(182) Conversely, the 
recapture by HMS Opossum on 2 February 1813, of the 250 ton British brig 
Bowes laden with a cargo of cotton, being imported from Pernambuco in 
Brazil to Liverpool, must have brought relief to owners and insurers alike, if 
not its prize crew.(183)
Taken together, these lists suggest that by September 1813, most 
sections of the American economy were being affected, rather than as 
earlier, the profits of just a minority of shipowners and wealthy merchants. 
Although neutrals were not unaffected, of a list of 77 of Warren's captures 
taken up to 19 July 1813, all but 15 were American. Eight were "English" 
recaptures. Forty-four were definitely 'condemned', and 13 more looked 
likely to be. Only ten were 'restored' of which 7 had produced licences, one 
was 'part condemned' and another one 'cleared'.(184)
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Warren's pencilled note, added to the list of captures and 
detentions ending on 26 September 1813, testifies to the slowness of the 
Vice Admiralty Court's adjudication system by recording that "121 sail at 
Halifax, 113 at Bermuda, 68 at Leeward Islands, 70 at Jamaica" were still 
"unaccounted for, total 372".(185)
Warren reported to Croker, as tardily as 11 November 1813, that 
between 20 April and 20 September that year, his squadrons had sent a total 
of 115 vessels into Halifax alone, for adjudication in its Vice Admiralty 
Court. At the time Warren wrote, the outcome of just 68 of these cases was 
fully recorded. Twenty- nine vessels, almost 43% of the cases decided, were 
'condemned', together with the cargoes of two more. Fifteen vessels, 22% 
of those decided on, were found to be recaptured British vessels, and 
twenty-two vessels, almost 32%, were 'restored' by the laboriously 
thorough court proceedings. The ultimate fate of the remaining forty-seven 
vessels was unrecorded. This list of vessels sent into Halifax does not refer 
to those sunk, burned or unofficially ransomed at sea.(186) By December 
1813, Warren's squadrons had sent no less than 231 prizes into Bermuda 
alone, 54 up to the end of 1812, and a further 177 during 1813, of which 
only 5 appear to have been restored, and one recapture placed "under 
Admiralty Orders".( 187)
To complement these successes in the Royal Navy's commercial 
blockade, some progress was made with a British naval blockade. On 1 
June 1813, initial American plans for Decatur to attack the British squadron 
blockading Charleston - later amended to molesting British trade in the 
West Indies - were frustrated at the outset. His heavy frigate United States,
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together with the now American Macedonian and the sloop Hornet, were 
intercepted by the Valiant 74, and Acasta 44, although Decatur later 
reported that as many as seven British vessels had blockaded the eastern 
exit of Long Island Sound.(188) The American vessels took refuge in the 
port of New London, north of Long Island, outside which a reinforced 
British blockading squadron became permanent. Only the Hornet was to 
escape, in November 1814, to take any further part in the war. Captain 
Oliver of the Valiant reported to Warren that he took "great consolation in 
having prevented their getting to sea from both ends of Long Island [Sound] 
and from knowing that they are now in a situation where perhaps they can 
be more easily watched than in most others".(189)
This degree of progress with British commercial and naval 
blockades had been made despite daunting practical problems with often 
adverse weather and navigational conditions, and frequent shortage of 
provisions, even of fresh water. Winter weather conditions on the United 
States' north-eastern seaboard often made watching a harbour like Boston 
or New York so difficult as to make failure in blockading them all too 
likely, while making depreciation of both ships and crews both unavoidable 
and difficult to rectify. In February 1813, Warren had reminded the 
Admiralty that blizzards often rendered blockading Boston and Rhode 
Island extremely difficult between November and March.(190) Meanwhile, 
between Boston and Halifax, Broke encountered strong north-easterly gales. 
The Shannon's crew needed heavy worsted garments beneath their outer 
clothing, together with mittens, while handling frozen sails and 
rigging.(191)
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Weather conditions created problems for British blockading 
squadrons even in summer, while prevailing westerly winds assisted 
attempts by determined American masters and commanders to evade patrols 
which, however diligent, could not be everywhere at once, and which spent 
much time and effort beating back towards the American coast. Despite 
having kept a 74 and three frigates outside Boston, Warren had had to admit 
in a letter dated 1 June 1813 that "in a fog which is prevalent at this 
Season.. .Commodore Rogers with the President and the Congress had got 
out:".(192)
Warren's letter would in fact have crossed on its journey to 
London with a letter to him from Melville and the Admiralty, dated 4 June 
1813, which seems somewhat critical in its tone.
We hope soon to have further accounts from you & to learn that your most 
important object, the blockading [of] the Enemy's Ships of War in their Ports has 
been attained, as also the other objects of putting a total stop to their trade and the 
annoyance of the Coastline". (193)
This order of priority obviously reflects the possibility that major American 
warships if unblockaded could attack and disrupt, if not potentially remove, 
the British squadrons conducting the commercial blockades making a 
progressively less ignorable impact on American trade and Customs 
revenues.
Melville was also "very solicitous that the Ports of New York and 
Boston should be watched by a force fully equal to encounter the Enemy in 
the event of their putting to Sea", and that any escaping should be pursued.
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Further, that Warren's "Squadrons off New York and Boston will be on 
their guard against being caught between two fires by the junction of the 
Enemy from those Ports". Melville then combined good news with bad. 
"Some of our Fir Frigates have been launched; and others are coming 
forward. The whole will probably be completed in the course of this year, 
but we have great Difficulty in procuring men for them." He continued, 
"We are building these Ships of the same size and force as the large 
American's & shall probably build a third".(194)
By June 1813,Warren felt the need to postpone his return to 
Halifax until the autumn, "if the Service will admit for a few weeks for the 
benefit of my health and Refitment of the Ships." On 22 July, he said he 
would return to Halifax in September, but meanwhile intended "to attend a 
little to my health, which has suffered by so long a period at Sea".(195) By 
September however, serious sickness amongst British crews in Halifax was 
"prevailing", although temporary.(196) Further, in September and into 
October, the Caribbean and more southerly American states could expect 
hurricanes.
Throughout 1813, British commanders at all levels spent much time 
concerned with shortages. In March 1813, Warren had been ordered to 
"make Bermuda your permanent Station, it is the most centrical Spot 
within the Limit of your Station."(197) But, although Bermuda offered 
refuge from the biting winter cold and persistent fogs of more northerly 
waters between November and March, like Halifax, it suffered serious 
shortages. Warren had complained to Croker in February 1813 that "There 
is not any Rope.. .left in the Stores of the Royal Yard nor any to be had in
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the Islands, the ships are in great want, and the Stores in Halifax being 
likewise drained I apprehend the highest inconvenience in refitting my 
squadron."(198)
Periodic shortages of naval stores in both Halifax and Bermuda and 
the more permanent lack of such dockyard facilities as dry docks, and of 
such skilled workers as shipwrights, did nothing to ease Warren's anxiety 
over fulfilling the Admiralty's escalating demands. Although costly both to 
build and defend, "Had a dry dock been built at Halifax, it would have 
changed the strategic balance, not only in the North Atlantic, but also in the 
Westlndies."(199)
Although for Warren provisioning was a permanent concern, his 
commanders also made local arrangements. On 1 May 1813, Hardy in 
Ramillies stationed off Block Island, got "plenty of water and stock from it 
and we also get our linen washed there. The inhabitants are very much 
alarmed... but as long as they supply us we shall be very civil to them." 
(200) On 1 June 1813, Warren had returned to Bermuda "with Ships being 
reduced in the article of Provisions to one week".(201) Meanwhile, Capt 
Oliver of Valiant, responsible for keeping Decatur's squadron blockaded in 
New London, "anchored off Gardiner's Island, from whence we could see 
the Enemy Ships in New London River &c... sent the Acasta to Fort- 
pondbay where she got wood and water with great ease also a few Cattle". 
(202) By July, Warren was anxious that the Americans might "fortify Old 
Point Comfort and prevent the Ships employed upon the Blockade watering 
or laying so High up in Lynhaven Bay as may be necessary for their 
protection in December and January".(203)
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Occasionally, provisions for the British blockading squadrons 
came from captured cargoes, but others were supplied by Americans at a 
profit. This "palpable and criminal intercourse" became sufficiently 
widespread for American Secretary of the Navy Jones to "call for the 
vigilant interposition of all the Naval Officers of the United States" in an 
order dated 29 July 1813. Jones complained that,
This intercourse is not only carried on by foreigners, under the specious gard (sic) 
of friendly flags, who convey provisions water and succours of all kinds 
(ostensibly destined for friendly ports, in the face too of a declared and rigourous 
blockade,) direct to the fleets and stations of the enemy with great subtlety and 
treachery by profligate citizens who under cover of night or other circumstances 
favouring their turpitude find means to convey succours or intelligence to the 
enemy. (204)
Provisions were indeed supplemented by "constant intelligence of 
our naval and military force and preparation."(205) From later accounts, 
American attempts to restrict, much less eradicate these transactions, were 
largely ineffective. Meanwhile, the clandestine showing of "blue lights" at 
night continued to alert British blockading vessels outside New London to 
American intentions to leave harbour, and to infuriate pro-government 
sections of the American press.(206)
Warren was still so short of reinforcements that the relief of vessels 
on blockade duty was often delayed, with a corresponding reduction in 
efficiency. On 22 July, Warren had written to Melville from the "River 
Potomac 40 miles below Washington", that he was,
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pleased that some Razees are likely at last to come here: & when these additions arrive I 
shall place a strong Division as has already been the case off Boston & New London, this 
place & the Delaware - but it requires many ships to afford a relief to the several 
Divisions: added to which our supply of provisions at Bermuda has failed us much & must 
be remedied. (207)
These complaints contrast strangely with the Admiralty's version of the 
vessels at Warren's disposal. In comparison with the 83 vessels on the 
North America and West Indies stations in July 1812, only 79 of which are 
recorded by Warren's flag secretary by 7 August of that year, by 1 July 
1813, the Admiralty listed no fewer than 129 vessels allocated to Warren's 
United Command.(208) The North America station at Halifax was listed as 
having 60 vessels of various sizes, including a prison ship, while the 
Leeward Islands station had 39. The Jamaica station had 17 and 
Newfoundland 13, including its prison ship, but excluding numerous 
troopships.
The North America station was listed as having ten 74's, and one 
razee described as having 58 guns, two large frigates, Acasta with 44 guns 
and the Loire with 40, and seven 38-gun frigates. Seven further frigates 
carried between 36 and 32 guns, while two 6th rates carried either 24 or 20 
guns. Twenty-eight vessels with less than 20 guns were listed, together with 
three unarmed vessels. The Leeward Islands station was given as having 
two 74's and a 50-gun 4th rate, three 38-gun frigates together with four 
smaller ones, and three 6th rates with 20 guns. A further twenty-six smaller 
vessels, with less than 20 guns were also listed. Similarly, Jamaica was 
given as having two 74's and a 44-gun 5th rate, all the rest, excluding the
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unarmed receiving ship, were described as 6th rates with less than 22 guns. 
The list gave Newfoundland one 74, one 5th rate with 40 guns, one with 38 
and two with 36. Seven 6th rates with 20 or fewer guns, and an unarmed 
prison ship completed the United Command's allocation, approximately 
one fifth of the 624 vessels given by the General Abstract as the Royal 
Navy's strength on 1 July 1813.(209)
By July 1813, Rear Admiral Griffith had been appointed as Flag 
Officer to lighten the administrative load at Halifax. He was, Warren said, 
"already known to me", and "will be of infinite Service; as I can then 
Depend upon the Ships being sent out to their several stations after re- 
equiptment; (sic) and also the unreasonable Demands & Alarm of the 
Merchants answered and attended to in Time ."(210)
Nevertheless, despite all of Warren's often-valid complaints, the 
British naval blockade was achieving a measure of success. By July 1813, 
the Royal Navy had blockaded or captured eight named American warships, 
and destroyed or captured numerous smaller 'public' vessels.(211) The best 
of the smaller craft left afloat were often used as tenders by the British 
blockading squadrons. Warren was later to inform Croker of his purchase of 
nine such vessels, two brigs and seven schooners, all captured American 
letters of marque and "particularly fine Vessels of their Class and extremely 
fastSailers."(212)
Warren's private letter to Melville on 6 September 1813 revealed 
his misgivings at apparent machinations in London. He wrote,
I am sorry to Observe in the Orders received from the Board; that Directions have 
been given to Rear Admiral Griffith to Direct the Blockading Squadrons without
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their going through me as the Senior and Commanding Officer; which is not a 
pleasant circumstance: (213)
Clearly deciding just to get on with the job, Warren continued, as if 
reminding London of his function, "I shall however endeavour to arrange 
the System of Blockading Boston and the Eastern ports with Rr Admiral 
Griffith as well as selecting a certain number of Ships for that Service & 
Directing the Rear Admiral to See them relieved by fresh Ships 
occasionally throughout the Winter".(214) With hindsight, perhaps Warren 
should have complained more loudly.
By 27 September 1813, Warren wrote from Halifax of his intention 
to "proceed to Bermuda" and direct Cockburn to "Employ the Flying Corps 
in Harrassing the Southern Coast of America and attacking such places as 
may be most Vulnerable and Destroying the Enemies Ships & Commerce" 
whilst leaving in Halifax "a strong Division of Ships with Rear Admiral 
Griffith for the Services of the Blockade of this Quarter of my United 
Station - so as to ensure their being regularly relieved". Then, despite his 
usual plea that "some fresh ships may soon arrive upon this Station", he 
wished that "Orders were given to include the Port of New Haven & 
perhaps also New London.. .within the Blockade of New York, or it will be 
impossible to prevent the Trade and Vessels entering the latter port by 
passage of the Sound".(215) If granted, this second wish would 
significantly increase the demands on his resources.
Indeed, the cumulative wear on such British ships as Nymphe, 
Orpheus and Statira, long employed on both naval and commercial
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blockades, was to contribute to another embarrassing failure of the British 
blockades. While Nymphe was in Halifax, withdrawn from her station for a 
routine refit, Orpheus sprung her mainmast, and was obliged to join her 
there. Statira meanwhile was "so very bad in her topsides, knees &c", that 
Warren proposed sending her temporarily to join the New London 
blockade, then to the West Indies, to return to Britain with a convoy. On 16 
October, Warren had to admit in a letter to Croker that Rodger's President 
had again evaded the British blockading squadrons, and had re-entered 
Newport harbour from a five-month North Atlantic cruise.(216)
Despite this obvious reversal, by October 1813, after the tentative 
start complicated by belated diplomatic overtures, shortage of resources and 
undeniable shortcomings, the beginnings of naval success must have 
seemed within reach. Warren's disposition of available ships and personnel 
seem to reflect much of what the British Government had in mind at the 
outset. On 26 October, Warren informed Melville that he had "directed 
Rear Admiral Griffith to superintend and direct the Blockade of Boston and 
the Bay of Fundy & the Convoys from thence in addition to the Port Duty". 
He also proposed "having Rear Admiral Cockburn with the Ships off New 
York & moving myself occasionally towards Chesapeake & along the line 
of Coast". He could not, however, avoid adding that he "should hope that 
all the Razees may be sent direct to me and an additional number of the new 
large frigates as I have not by 30th last so many as proposed in your 
Lordships former letter, and with the numerous blockades all of which 
require a relief of ships to preserve them."(217)
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The weather then sought to compound Warren's problems as a 
wayward and unseasonal 'hurricane' struck as far north as Halifax on 12 
November 1813, causing unpredictable devastation. The following day, 
Warren reported that, although lasting only 90 minutes,
the direful effects of it are beyond belief, and the damages sustained by the Men of 
war and Shipping are extremely great, between fifty and Sixty Sail of Ships were 
driven ashore, many of them bilged, and others carried so far above the high 
Water mark, as to prevent their being again got off.. .The San Domingo, La 
Hague, Maidstone, Epervier, Fantome, Manly, Nemessis, Morgiana, Canso were 
parted from their Anchors and put ashore, the whole are afloat except Epervier & 
Manly, & have not received material injury [although] Maidstone & Fantome 
must be hove down before they can leave the Port. (218)
Nymphe was among those seriously damaged having "lost her 
Bowsprit Foremast and Topmasts, [and] had the Starboard Quarter stove 
in". Warren concluded that "His Majestys Ships are materially crippled by 
this event" but that he would "use every possible endeavour to have them 
repaired with every dispatch which the Strength of this Yard & their own 
means admit of .(219) This meteorological setback was particularly 
unwelcome at this time since Warren had in hand an extension of the 
British commercial blockade.
Although Oliver's reports to Warren, and the American warships 
trapped in New London harbour both show that the British naval blockade 
of New York was in place by the summer of 1813, neutral merchant ships 
continued to enter and leave New York harbour as well as Boston. While 
the decision still stood to allow Boston to continue its trade with neutrals, in
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the hope of widening to the point of secession the political gap between the 
Republican administration and the increasingly prosperous, and largely 
Federalist New England, any such hopes concerning New York were 
unrealistic. An opportunity for inflicting further economic damage on the 
United States clearly existed, the continued arrival and departure of neutral 
merchant vessels in New York still allowed its dealers their stock in trade, 
and resulted in continued Customs contributions to the American Treasury. 
Furthermore, by November 1813, the Royal Navy's slowly increasing 
resources on the American north-eastern seaboard probably meant that this 
trade could be curtailed.
Warren's proclamation on 16 November 1813, legally extended the 
commercial blockade everywhere south of Narragansett Bay, importantly 
noting that "the Ministers of Neutral Powers" had "been duly notified", and 
"that all the Measures authorized by the Law of Nations would be adopted 
and exercised with Respect to all Vessels which may attempt to violate the 
said Blockade." Equally essential legally, was his declaration that he had 
"stationed on the Sea Coasts, Bays, Rivers and Harbours of the said several 
States, a Naval Force adequate and sufficient to enforce and maintain the 
Blockade thereof, in the most strict and vigorous Manner."(220) Warren's 
letter to Croker of 20 November enclosed a copy of the proclamation 
detailing the additional blockade, which included Long Island Sound and 
"the line of Coast from the entrance by the Sound into New York to the 
Southern Ports & River Mississippi," and which would seek to end neutral 
trade with New York.(221)
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Ostensibly, the extension was due to the Americans "establishing 
at the Port of New-London a Naval Station to cover the Trade to and from 
the Port of New York." and having "through the Medium of Inland Carriage 
established a Commercial Intercourse between the said Blockaded Ports", 
weakening "to a certain degree" the existing blockade.(222) Warren's 
proclamation however sought to legitimise what he had already been doing, 
both in Long Island Sound, and between Charleston and St Mary's, 
Georgia, and off the Mississippi estuaries since 1 September. By December, 
Americans in Baltimore and beyond could read an announcement of 
Warren's extended blockade in Niles' Weekly Register, and would soon be 
able to measure its adverse economic effects.(223)
When extended on 16 November 1813, the commercial blockade 
of New York was to include all the "ports and places" on Long Island itself, 
especially on its northern and eastern coasts. An American writer later 
conceded however, that, "the inhabitants were not molested in peaceful 
pursuits".(224) On 2 December 1813, Captain Oliver of the Valiant, the 
Senior Officer in Long Island Sound, wrote to the Spanish consul in New 
York that, "after 6 December, no vessel whatever will be permitted to sail 
from any port in Long Island Sound", and asked him to "communicate this 
intelligence to the neutral consuls in your district."(225)
Towards the end of 1813, perhaps not surprisingly after 15 months 
of effort sometimes under difficult conditions, Warren's health and temper 
began to fail. His letter of 26 October had been written with "the assistance 
of his confidential friend owing to a cold in my eyes", and had contained 
the sort of pessimistic "reflections" later to be expressed more strongly. In
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early November 1813, Warren's letter to Melville again referred to the 
"gale of wind & fog which so frequently occurs on this coast". He went on 
to "Earnestly request that some Reinforcement of Ships be sent to preserve 
the Blockades", adding with a touch of asperity "as well as to keep the 
Gentlemen of Jamaica in good humour."(226) On 30 November, he 
complained in another letter to Melville that he found it increasingly 
difficult to maintain and relieve blockades, guard the West Indies, and meet 
the constant demand for convoy escorts. Apparently anxious to continue the 
commercial blockade he concluded that, "I shall if possible be in Bermuda 
in about three weeks & send Rear Admiral Wimburne to attend to the Duty 
off New York & the Albermarle".(227)
By 30 December 1813, Warren had reached a low point. He was 
obliged to write to Croker that "Several large Clipper Schooners of from 
two to three hundred Tons, strongly manned and armed have run thro' the 
Blockade in the Chesapeak, in spite of every endeavour and the most 
vigilant attention of our Ships to prevent their getting out, nor can anything 
stop these Vessels escaping to Sea in dark Nights & Strong Winds". He also 
referred to Capt. Barrie's enclosed report which described "an instance of 
Several of these Schooners passing out in a Squadron, & outsailing every 
Ship in Chace".(228)
"I am sorry to say" wrote Warren in a less guarded letter to 
Melville, "that the American Small Vessels, notwithstanding the Vigilance 
of the Blockading Squadron; from the severity of the weather and in the 
Dark Snowy nights Do get out, & it is almost impossible to prevent it". 
Furthermore, "The Assembly at Jamaica are caballing & demonstrating
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about Ships; I have sent all in my power."(229) The incessant lobbying of 
the influential West Indies merchants had again touched a nerve.
He added, "I really am left so base to keep in check the Enemies 
Cruisers & new Ships which must be soon expected out, and that I am in no 
serviceable State but trust you will soon reinforce this Squadron with some 
of the new large Frigates: the Endymion is an Excellent ship & also the 
Goliath & Majestic''1 Warren then wrote resignedly that earlier 
reinforcements had never been enough.(230) In fact, in December 1813, 
Warren appears to have had 38 warships in Jamaica and the Leeward 
Islands, and in Halifax, Newfoundland and Bermuda combined, "a dozen 
ships of the line & 56 cruisers", apparently a total of 106 ships, although not 
including all the smaller vessels in his United Command.(231)
With this force, by the beginning of December 1813, the Royal 
Navy had blockaded, captured or caused to be destroyed, a total of fifteen 
named American naval vessels, ten of which were major ships of more than 
twenty guns.(232) Warren's health had however suffered in ways unlikely 
to improve either his temper or optimism. His letter to Melville of 30 
December complained that "Cruising on the Edge of Nantucket Shoal & off 
Rhode Island: the cold has occasioned a Rheumatic Illness from which 1 am 
but just recovering".(233)
As long before as 26 February 1813, as Mahan notes, Warren had 
himself suggested to the Admiralty that his United Command should be re- 
divided, and that the Jamaica and Leeward Island stations should be given 
local autonomy, keeping his right to direct all North American and 
Caribbean stations only as exceptional circumstances demanded. However,
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on 30 March 1813, the Admiralty had disagreed; the war required his 
unified command to remain unaltered. (234) Now however, the West Indies 
station was to feature once more in correspondence with London, in a 
reversal of the Admiralty Board's decision.
Warren had almost certainly not yet received, while writing to 
Melville on 30 December, either an Admiralty letter of 4 November, or one 
from Melville dated 24 November, notifying him of an essentially unjust 
Admiralty decision. The injustice lies not so much in the decision to re- 
separate the unified commands, but in the reasons given for it. Melville 
wrote, "You will receive by the present opportunity, the Official intimation 
of the measure we have been compelled to adopt of again placing the 
Leeward Island and Jamaica stations on their former footing of chief 
commands, the former under Rear Admiral Durham who succeeds Sir 
F[rancis] Laforey & the latter under Rear Admiral Brown."(235) However, 
Melville's letter continues, "This arrangement became unavoidable (though 
much against my inclination) by the repeated and well founded complaints 
from Jamaica of the almost total want of protection on that station."(236)
Only on 30 December had Warren once more attempted to draw 
the Admiralty's attention to this precise problem. He had again asked for a 
force more appropriate to the length of the American eastern seaboard, and 
for the three roles his force was expected to perform on it, as well as the 
British American coasts and the Caribbean. He had specifically requested 
Croker,
to acquaint my Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty that having sent the 
Barrossa to Jamaica to carry home specie, and every other Ship that could be
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spared without raising the Blockaded ports of America, I lament to find that both 
the Leeward Islands and Jamaica are very deficient of a Force adequate to 
their protection, or to perform the various extensive Convoy Service required to be 
done in those places -. (237)
Warren was as aware as any naval officer of the Royal Navy's 
limited means in relation to its world-wide commitments, therefore to be 
held responsible for these particular consequences of the shortage, and the 
Admiralty's apparent failure to comprehend his requirements in dismissing 
his closely reasoned and often repeated requests for reinforcements, seems 
harsh.
Melville moreover continued,
This evil was also liable to be increased by the order which Admiral Brown had 
received from you to send away to join your flag any Vessel whose commanders 
might happen to die, in order that the vacancy might be filled up after such 
situation instead of an acting Captain being put in immediately. Under all those 
circumstances it became necessary to attach a certain number of Ships to each 
Admiral [and] to make him responsible for their being properly disposed of, 
according to the Wants of his station. (238)
Warren had presumably made these promotions from Bermuda in order to 
retain control, without preferment being decided by Admirals subject to 
local lobbying. The 'wants' of the West Indies stations appear to have been 
given preference, without proper recognition of all of Warren's other 
responsibilities, which the Admiralty, if not the local administration and 
sugar plantation owners, should have been in a position to appreciate.
202
Furthermore, although now less critically short of specie, the 
British government was still anxious to safeguard shipments of money from 
the Caribbean; it would therefore be expedient to attend to the views of its 
providers. Melville was careful to continue,
As the sole reason for the appointment of an Officer senior to Vice Admirals 
Stirling & Sawyer was the Union of the three commands, I do not think it fair 
either to you or to the latter officers to expect or direct that with your work in the 
Service you could continue merely as the successor of Admiral Sawyer on the 
Halifax Station. No person has yet been selected for that command, which if the 
latter had remained there would actually have reverted to him: but it will probably 
be either Sir Alexr. Cochrane or Sir Richard Keats. (239)
Being too senior to command any one part of a re-divided 
command, Warren would have to be recalled, probably to be replaced by 
the newly promoted Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, with whom he 
had had his differences some years before. In his reply, dated 3 February 
1814, Warren professed himself "extremely surprised in being recalled at 
this moment" having "zealously and faithfully served my Sovereign and 
Country, under so many Disadvantages".(240) He was also surprised at the 
decision, "having undertaken the Command in the Situation in which I was 
placed at the Time", an apparent reference to his additional diplomatic 
responsibilities at the outset. Disappointingly however, Warren resolves to 
"forbear saying any further upon the Subject untill my arrival in Great 
Britain."(241)
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Warren had also received on 28 January Croker's letter of 4 
November 1813, officially notifying him of his replacement on the re- 
separation of the North American and West Indies stations, and the 
necessary reallocation of vessels. Warren should "return in San Domingo or 
other convenient vessel needing urgent return, leaving at Halifax 10 line of 
Battle Ships or razees, 20 frigates, 25 twenty-gun ships or Sloops, and all 
smaller vessels on station."(242)
Moreover, while the Admiralty's letter to Warren was being 
delivered, his naval critics currently in Britain were quick to capitalise. 
Captain David Milne of HMS Bulwark, then in Portsmouth, gossipped on 2 
January 1814 that, "Sir John Warren is coming home. I believe he has not at 
all given satisfaction; but the Prince is his friend."(243) Warren had 
however, done little to help his current reputation. During Cockburn's 
attack on Havre de Grace, Maryland, in early May 1813, John Rodgers' 
home there had been partly burned in his absence, and valuable possessions 
looted. Part of a British effort to bring the war home to the Americans, not 
themselves blameless in Canada, it nevertheless gave detractors like Milne 
the opportunity to add, "Commodore Rodgers' house has been plundered; 
his pianoforte is in Sir John's house at Bermuda, and he was riding in his, 
the Commodore's, carriage in Halifax. What do you think of a British 
Admiral and Commander in Chief? This is not the way to conquer 
America." In addition to the old accusations of indecisiveness, Warren had 
renewed his reputation for acquisitiveness, perhaps even adding one for 
impropriety.(244)
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Vice-Admiral Cochrane's orders to succeed Warren were dated 25 
January 1814, and he arrived at Bermuda in HMS Tonnant on 6 March. 
Warren delayed the actual handover of command until 1 April, and finally 
sailed for England on 8 April, never afterwards to hold an active naval 
command, or to receive much public recognition.
By November 1813, the whole American coast except New 
England had been, as far as his resources permitted, under both commercial 
and naval blockade. The British government had not apparently ordered 
Warren to abandon the exemption of largely Federalist New England in the 
hope of separating it from the more strongly Republican remainder of the 
United States. Until Warren's recall, the ports of New England had 
continued to supply British needs in Canada and the West Indies, as the 
government had intended.
In the twenty months since Warren's appointment, up to 1 April, 
both American international and internal trade had been significantly 
reduced. According to Warren's own pencilled calculations, his squadrons 
had accounted for 971 prizes, 300 of which had been "burnt or sunk". He 
records 210 "prizes sent into Halifax", 263 into Bermuda, 138 to the 
Leeward Islands, and 60 to Jamaica, and to them added "Burnt or Sunk in 
the Chesapeake, Long Island Sound, Delaware, Boston Bay - Large Vessels 
& Small Craft - 300 Sail", making his total of 971.(245)
Warren however seems to have gained little contemporary credit, 
either for his diplomatic efforts with the Americans on the British 
government's behalf, or for his naval and commercial blockades. Warren's 
obituary in the Annual Register for 1822 makes no reference to his services
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between 1812-14.(246) The entry for Cochrane in a series of naval 
biographies, published almost immediately after Warren's death, gives 
Cochrane sole credit for having "not only put a stop to the trade of that 
country but kept the whole line of sea coast in a continual state of alarm", 
with no mention of Warren's initial contribution to either.(247) A more 
objective evaluation of Warren's efforts is probably best attempted after a 
review of Cochrane's time in command.
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Chapter 5.
Implementation 2: The United States Blockaded 1814-15.
The North America Command of Sir Alexander Cochrane.
"Admiral Warren also told Levitt Harris...that he was sorry to say that the instructions given 
to his successor on the American station were very different from those under which he had 
acted and that he apprehended that a very serious injury would be afflicted on America" 
Gallatin to Monroe, 13 June 1814.(1)
Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane wrote a formal acceptance 
of command from the Asia at Bermuda on 1 April 1814.(2) Much was 
expected of Warren's successor, although some of his earlier senior officers 
had found him difficult. Ten years earlier Lord Keith had called him "a 
crackheaded, unsafe man.. .one with others who endeavoured to stir up 
dissensions in the fleet".(3) Conversely, Robert Dundas, Lord Melville, First 
Lord of the Admiralty, was a fellow Scot, and since their two families had 
been friends for generations, Cochrane was not without 'interest'.(4) 
His record was nevertheless impressive. He was known to have 
commanded successfully the now re-separated Leeward Island station in 
1805, and to have fought well under Duckworth at the Battle of San Domingo 
in February 1806. He had led the capture of the French island of Martinique 
in 1809, and of Guadaloupe in 1810, of which he had since been Governor.(5) 
He had been promoted to Vice-Admiral of the Red on 4 November 1813, the 
very day on which Croker had written to Warren, to notify him of his recall. 
Not yet 56 years old, Cochrane was expected to remain energetic. He was 
also reputed to feel a more than professional antagonism towards Americans.
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His elder brother had been killed by the rebellious Colonists more than thirty 
years before, and this probably coloured his views.(6)
As his newly-printed letter-heads showed, his responsibilities 
covered a vast geographical area. He commanded "Ships and Vessels 
employed & to be employed in the River St Lawrence, and along the Coast of 
Nova Scotia, the Islands of Anticosti, Madelaine, St John & Cape Breton, the 
Bay of Fundy", and the entire North American eastern seaboard, as far as "at 
and about Bermuda or Somer's Island, the Bahama Islands, & the Gulph of 
Mexico to the Tropic of Cancer &c, &c".(7) Containing an energetic enemy 
over such a wide variety of theatres, with limited resources, was part of a 
great range of responsibilities.
Throughout April, Cochrane was much concerned with victualling 
since, "the Crews of His Majesty's Ships in this Port have not had a Day's 
fresh Provisions since my arrival here".(8) Beyond this implied criticism of 
his predecessor's arrangements however, Cochrane was turning his mind to 
more important matters. As yet unknown to Cochrane, Napoleon's abdication 
on 11 April 1814, had reduced the need for a British blockade of France. 
This, however, was not to mean an immediate increase in either ships or 
manpower at Cochrane's disposal. Although the Tonnant, intended as 
Cochrane's flagship, was delayed, the Superb, Bulwark and Saturn had left 
Portsmouth for Bermuda with a small convoy in January 1814. The Saturn 
was "a cut-down 74, of course a match for any American frigate."(9)
Morale on the North America station seems to have been varied. 
Captain Milne of Bulwark was depressed by reports of the imminent launch 
of heavily armed American warships, including a 74, and felt it "a disgrace to
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the British nation to have such ships as we have. There is none of our new 
two-decked ships that can carry her lower deck guns out if there is the least 
wind, and hardly one of them that does not need a thorough repair in less than 
two years after she is launched." American ships, he felt, were better built 
than either British or French, and would "give both nations a lesson."(10) 
Milne also saw manning as a problem; "we are not near as we ought to be 
either in number or quality of the men; and as for the marines they hardly 
deserve the name of men." With other priorities met, those marines allocated 
to ships were "bad enough...this ship is really not manned as she ought to be; 
yet there are few in the service better." Such pessimism was either not 
universal, or remained unexpressed. Milne was "ordered to sail in a few days 
to cruize in Boston Bay".(l 1)
Rear-Admiral Cockburn had been retained as second-in-command on 
the North America station, and the Admiralty left him conducting operations 
in Chesapeake Bay where the blockades had continued uninterrupted even 
throughout the winter months. Captain Robert Barrie's letters home from the 
Dragon in Chesapeake Bay testify to the Royal Navy's endurance in adverse 
weather, its unrelenting persistence with the blockades, and the professional 
aggression of its onshore raids. Barrie had written in February 1814 that, 
despite being "so severely cold", his crews had "destroyed and taken upwards 
of eighty-nine of the Enemies Vessels, besides frequently annoying them on 
shore".(12) In March he wrote, "we have a squadron of Frigates & there is 
another squadron cruising within the Capes so that the Chesapeak is 
completely blockaded.. .we have turned back at least fifty vessels so the trade 
within the Chessapeak is done up while we remain here".(13)
209
The British naval blockade of the Chesapeake was so remorseless 
during March that its efficiency had been admitted by the American 
Commodore Barry to Secretary of the Navy Jones. "[A]ny attempt", by the 
American ship sloop Erie trapped at Annopolis, "to get out would be 
imprudent, the season is past and the enemy concentrated near the entrance of 
the Bay in such a manner as to defeat all prospects of escaping".(14)
Routine for the blockading squadrons continued. Returns began to be 
made at Bermuda of blockading progress made under Cochrane's command. 
One return detailed 25 vessels "captured, recaptured, detained or destroyed" 
in a nine week period between 1 April to 22 May 1814, totalling no less than 
1,778 tons.(15) Less routine for a force of 136 seamen and marines from the 
squadron blockading New London, was a raid up the Connecticut River on 
Pautopang Point, on the night of 7/8 April. They "destroyed all the vessels 
afloat or on the stocks", including 3 large privateers and 24 other vessels, 
totalling over 5,000 tons, and worth $140,000.(16) That clandestine American 
support for the blockading squadrons continued, despite this sort of exercise 
of British sea power, is shown by Cochrane's reports to Croker of his having 
authorised British vessels to obtain cattle and vegetables for cash, more 
successfully than as originally suggested, by offering Americans British bills.
(17)
Warren had earlier decided to facilitate British blockading and 
raiding operations in Chesapeake Bay by the occupation of Tangier Island. As 
shown on Map 2, it was almost centrally placed, and only intermittently 
inhabited. Warren had been recalled before putting the plan into practice, but 
in early April 1814, it was implemented by Cockburn. The island would serve
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as a collecting point for British prizes and captured goods, and although 
relatively infertile, "Excellent water" was "to be obtained in any quantity". 
Moreover, boats could "Land with perfect facility at all Times and in all 
Weather", while Tangier Bay offered a convenient and safe anchorage for 
larger ships. A redoubt and guard-houses were built with timber and roof 
shingles from a captured American schooner.(lS) On 2 April 1814, Cochrane 
had issued a proclamation encouraging those wishing to "withdraw from the 
United States", specifically runaway slaves, to become "Free Settlers in 
British Colonies", or to join the British forces. Many joined the black 
Colonial Marines, later to use Tangier Island as their training base.(19)
It was from Tangier Bay that Cockburn assured Cochrane that he 
would "carry on the requisite offensive attacks at different and distant places 
across the Bay, by which in spite of every Effort of the Enemy, who cannot 
possibly guard every point, we manage at times to surprize his Vessels where 
he deems them to be most secure". He strove to "Keep him continually on the 
Fret, much harass his Militia and Oblige them to always under Alarms". He 
aimed to be "a most serious Inconvenience and Annoyance to the Country in 
general". He also informed Cochrane of intelligence that, "the United States, 
Macedonian and Hornet are secured as high as possible above New London 
and dismantled", with their crews redistributed. He would convoy recent 
prizes to Bermuda, while continuing to "Service the Chesapeake Blockade" 
with "Two Frigates - a Line of Battle ship &c, all to be used "stretching 
across in a Line" in Lynnhaven Bay, although he could "offer full and useful 
service to twice the number".(20)
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Meanwhile in Washington, on 30 March the United States 
government had abandoned its final attempt to coerce Britain by the use of 
economic sanctions as Madison recognised the failure of the widely evaded 
American export embargo. Lacking the Senate's support for the idea, 
Madison had imposed his embargo by executive decree on 29 July 1813.(21) 
Reluctantly ratified by Congress only on 17 December 1813, it was 
suspended on 31 March, and finally repealed on 14 April 1814.(22) In 
recommending this course of action, President Madison had called on the 
House Foreign Relations Committee to forecast such a repeal's financial 
consequences, and a copy of their report, dated 4 April 1814, was soon in 
Cochrane's hands. Cochrane claimed to be "in possession of private 
information" of the Embargo's repeal, and "from the same Channel received 
a Copy of the report of the Secret Committee".(23) The most far-reaching 
decisions implementing the British commercial blockade of the United States 
continued to be intelligence led.
Consequently, Cochrane was concerned by the report's predictions 
of increased neutral imports into the ports of New England, and the resultant 
augmented customs revenue financing new American warship building. He 
was disturbed at "obtaining a knowledge of the Enemy having received his 
Supplies for the equipment of his Navy.. .by Neutral Trade carried on with 
the Northern States".(24) He was similarly concerned that "the executive 
Government having in great measure failed in obtaining supplies for carrying 
on the War" was now "principally depending on Revenues collected on 
Cargoes of Neutrals trading with the Eastern Ports".(25)
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Cochrane therefore informed Croker that he "judged it of national 
importance to extend the Blockade to all the other Ports to the Eastward of 
Long Island not hitherto under blockade, which I shall take care to enforce de 
facto by placing a sufficient number of Ships before these Ports."(26) In 
anticipation of Cochrane's arrival, Warren had prepared in March a 
"Schedule of Orders in Council, Circular Orders, Letters etc" to inform him 
of the complex situation existing as command was transferred on 1 April.(27) 
Amongst these documents, Cochrane had almost undoubtedly seen Croker's 
'Secret' letter to Warren of 28 April 1813, giving him Admiralty authority for 
'de facto' blockades, those not specifically announced in the London Gazette, 
or by local British proclamations, and was presumably confident of Admiralty 
approval for blockade without the legal niceties.(28)
Nevertheless, despite the Admiralty's willingness to condone 
undeclared blockades, as soon as 25 April 1814, Cochrane issued a local 
proclamation which further extended the British naval and commercial 
blockades to the whole American coast "from Black Point", eight miles west 
of New London, "to the Northern and Eastern boundaries of the United 
States" with British New Brunswick. (29) The British blockades now 
included neutral trade into New England.
Also, on this occasion, Earl Bathurst's notification to the "ministers 
of friendly powers" of the proclamation of 25 April, by "the commander in 
chief of His Majesty's naval forces off the coasts of the United States of 
North America", appeared in the London Gazette of Tuesday 31 May. It 
followed the usual formula of "declaring all the ports, harbours, bays, creeks, 
rivers, inlets, outlets, islands, and sea-coasts of the said United States... to be
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in a state of strict and rigorous blockade". European neutrals should be aware 
that "All the measures authorised by the Law of Nations will be adopted and 
executed with respect to all vessels attempting to violate the said 
blockade".(30) This time, it was more likely to be true, since, as the Naval 
Chronicle noted, "A late Gazette contained an Order in Council releasing 
from the restrictions of blockade, all such ports and places in France as now 
are, or may be, placed in the military occupation or under the protection of 
His Majesty."(31)
In Europe, Paris had fallen to the Allies on 30 March, and 
Napoleon's war had also, for the time being, come to an end with his first 
abdication on 11 April. With a welcome interruption to the war in Europe, 
Britain could divert ships and men to the American war. On 30 April, the 
Admiralty recorded its intention of withdrawing ships from Europe although 
the "unjust and unprovoked aggression of the American Government" did not 
"permit them to reduce the Fleet at once to a Peace establishment." For the 
Board, the vital question remained the "Maintenance of Maritime 
Rights."(32) For Madison, any remaining hope of French diplomatic or 
financial help, was now gone.
Publicity for the extended blockade was also widespread in Britain, 
and the Naval Chronicle's reprinting of the Foreign Office's announcement, 
under 'State Papers', included the confident assertion that, "All the measures 
authorised by the Law of Nations will be adopted & executed with respect to 
all vessels attempting to violate the said blockade."(33) To comply with what 
the British government maintained were the requirements of international 
law, the force deployed for such a blockade was carefully described as
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"adequate".(34) While seeking to end American trade with neutrals, as well 
as both their coastal and ocean-going trade, this force should also prevent 
American warships from getting to sea, or from making any attempt to lift the 
commercial blockade.
"All America Blockaded": Lt. Napier in HMS Nymph, 22 May 1814.(34)
The British government's notification of the extension to neutrals, 
completed the British naval and commercial blockades of the entire Atlantic 
coast of the United States, from Maine's border with the British province of 
New Brunswick, to Georgia's frontier with Spain's East Florida at the St 
Mary's River, and to West Florida and the Mississippi estuaries. This now 
included Newport, Boston "and the Eastern Ports", and so finally interdicted 
all American seaborne trade, including that with neutrals. New England had 
prospered from neutral trade during its exemption from British commercial 
blockade, but no longer. This would at last affect American economic 
isolation, with profound fiscal, financial and political consequences. For the 
American war effort, this was the beginning of the end.
Cochrane promptly ensured that the extended blockade was to be 
strictly enforced. On 26 May, Cochrane gave an unambiguous answer to a 
query from Cockburn. "With respect to the Ship Emilie - as the whole of the 
Ports of the United States are now declared in a state of blockade you will be 
pleased to withdraw the permission you have given for her proceeding from 
Newport with a Cargo: she can only be allowed to sail in Ballast."(36)
The number and quality of vessels eventually available to perform 
the naval and commercial blockades of the North American eastern seaboard
215
and the Gulf of Mexico is revealed in a table enclosed in the same letter to 
Cockburn. Two Line of Battle Ships, Bulwark and Ramillies, with four 
frigates, eleven sloops and a schooner were to blockade out of Halifax, to 
include Boston Bay. Two frigates patrolled Nantucket Shoals from the south- 
east. Two 74's were stationed off New London and Rhode Island, together 
with one frigate and two sloops. Two frigates, the Nieman and Narcissus 
were responsible for the Delaware. The Chesapeake, under Cockburn, was 
allocated two 74's, two frigates, a sloop and a schooner. The razee Majestic 
and three sloops patrolled between Cape Hatteras and St Mary's River, while 
just one frigate, two sloops and two schooners covered the Gulf of Mexico to 
the Tropic of Cancer. Altogether, the list includes 6 Line of Battle Ships, 2 
razees, 13 frigates, 19 sloops, 4 schooners and a gun-brig. A total of 45 
vessels are named, far fewer than the number of familiar names appearing on 
blockade service would seem to suggest, clearly explained by the postscript; 
"The same force or as near as possible will be kept on those Stations altho' 
the Ships will be occasionally changed", by both wear and tear and convoy 
duty.(37)
On 31 May, the Board of Admiralty drew conclusions on the 
feasibility of maintaining a year round blockade of the whole American 
eastern seaboard. It had consulted Warren, just returned to Britain, Rear 
Admiral Sir John Beresford, and Captain Philip Broke, "late of the Shannon". 
They advised that it was not possible to maintain "a strict blockade north of 
Cape Cod." While for eight months of the year blockade was "possible to the 
extent as to render all vessels attempting to sail out as in extreme risk of 
capture", during the winter months, only between a third and a half of such
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ships would be taken.(38) On 5 July, Cochrane ordered Captain William 
Percy of the Hermes to take command of the small British squadron in the 
Gulf of Mexico and maintain a blockade of the Mississippi estuaries, 
therefore, for the whole American coast, from Maine to Louisiana, a long 
summer and autumn of both commercial and naval blockade was considered 
practicable by those who had had first hand experience.(39) 
Consequently, Cochrane's proclamation meant that the New England 
coast, so far almost untouched, began to experience both blockade and raids. 
By July, Niles' Weekly Register reported that now "The eastern coast of the 
United States is much vexed by the enemy" who "seem determined to enter 
the little outports and villages, and burn everything that tloats."(40) 
Madison's last Embargo had included a ban on American coastal 
traffic, and its eventual repeal on 14 April might have led to a revival of such 
trade by small vessels but for the almost relentless application of the British 
commercial blockade after 25 April, except where conducted to mutual 
advantage. Some trade continued between Americans seeking outlets for food 
and information, both with British offshore squadrons, and with British forces 
in Canada, but at sea, the strangulation of the American economy and tax 
base continued. Generally untroubled by the prospect of American naval 
intervention, the British blockading squadrons took what appeared to be 
available. For the Americans, escape from harbour and evasion of British 
blockade was proving easier in smaller vessels. As the larger ships and brigs 
became scarcer, the faster and handier schooners and sloops began to replace 
them as prizes.( 41 ) 
217 
Such smaller prizes feature in the journal of Lieutenant Henry Napier 
who arrived in the frigate Nymphe, in company with the Ramillies, off Boston 
Bay on 6 May 1814, for three months of blockade duty. Their blockade was 
to be hampered even in May by "heavy rain and fogs, thunder and lightning", 
in July by a dangerous three day gale, and in August by the start of the 
hurricane season.(42) This blockade was usually conducted with propriety, 
sometimes even generosity, although occasionally with impropriety and 
harshness. On 25 May Nymphe captured "four sloops and a schooner" but 
"took cargoes out and restored the vessels".(43) Whilst loss of the cargoes, 
often by now uneconomic to insure, would have damaged incomes and the 
local, and cumulatively national, economies, restoration of the vessels might 
have retained some goodwill amongst Americans.
This might have been seen as necessary since Nymphe intended to 
"oblige the Yankees to supply us with stock and vegetables at the market 
price. This is very reasonable; we leave all fishermen unmolested."(44) 
Although this last assertion proved unfounded, Nymphe was brought "green 
peas and fruit, with stock of all kinds, books and newspapers wet from the 
press, by our friends here".(45) Despite helping to prevent the scurvy suffered 
by both British and American seamen, this trade prompted Napier to make 
accusations of American "venality".(46)
On 5 June, Nymphe was "laying in wait for coasters" off Halibut 
Point in Ipswich Bay, and "took an empty sloop of 100 tons", which was 
released, and the schooner Maria, laden with potatoes, later "distributed 
between the two ship's companies". More importantly, they took the 
American schooner Welcome Return "a good prize worth $4,000",
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prosaically, "loaded with notions" - vegetables.(47) High values of this sort 
led to the unofficial transactions practised by both sides which discredited the 
operation of maritime commercial blockade. Captured merchant vessels were 
occasionally ransomed to evade the often-lengthy process of condemning 
prizes, and the legal fees involved. Following cash payments to captors, 
journeys were resumed, cargoes delivered, and the vessels themselves 
remained available for continued use. The real possibility of merchants and 
shippers having to add ransom payments to the costs of a voyage might 
discourage some American maritime trade, usefully reducing tax revenues 
and shipper's preparedness to lend to the government, increasing British 
pressure on the American economy, but the ransoming of prizes was illegal. 
The practice had become sufficiently widespread for both British and 
American governments to forbid it. Nonetheless, between May and July 1814, 
Lieutenant Napier recorded the ransoming of at least ten American vessels, 
presumably unreported.(48) Napier's conscience was occasionally troubled. 
Nymphe's taking $200 from a Cape Cod fisherman, demonstrably unable to 
afford it, prompted Napier to write, "This is an ungenerous war against the 
poor, & unworthy of Englishmen. I am ashamed of Captain Epworth's 
conduct."(49)
Nevertheless, on 6 June, the Maria, now apparently Nymphe's tender, 
and the ships' boats, took two sloops laden with timber, which, "having 
supplied the ships", were burned. They also "set fire to a schooner of 100 tons 
with wood, sails anchors &c." The next day they "burned two fine sloops 
with wood", to which a now unrepentant Napier added, "much better to have
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ransomed them". On 9 June a "flag of truce came out" to negotiate for the 
Welcome Return, later ransomed for $3,500, shared with Junon.(5Q)
The alternative threat of destruction was very real. On 11 June 
Napier wrote, "the boats returned after having been amazingly successful in 
capturing and destroying about 800 tons of shipping.. .Destroyed all the 
vessels in Scituate Harbour but one."(51) Men as well as vessels were 
ransomed by the blockading squadrons. That same day, the Nymphe ran "the 
Concord loaded with iron, on shore and detained the skipper as a hostage for 
the ransom of $1000."(52) The virtual British exclusion of neutral shipping 
from the harbours of New England continued. On 12 June, Napier recorded 
that Nymphe, "Weighed and chased a Swede, whom we warned off the 
coast".(53)
By late July 1814, as shown in Appendix A Table 4, Cochrane had a 
total 80 vessels on his North American Station, comprised of 9 seventy-fours, 
4 razees, and 24 frigates of either forty, thirty-eight or thirty-six guns. 
Particularly useful for reaching into estuaries and harbours were 37 smaller 
craft including two fast schooners, three bomb-vessels, and a rocket vessel. 
While 4 seventy-fours, 3 thirty-eight gun frigates and 7 smaller vessels 
remained "with the flag", two 74's, two frigates and five smaller craft were 
allocated to Chesapeake Bay. Rear-Admiral Griffith's northern division of 
Bulwark and Spencer, both seventy-fours, 2 razees, 5 frigates and 16 vessels 
of less than twenty guns blockaded the area from Halifax to Nantucket. 
Meanwhile, the Superb, 74, a fifty-gun razee, 6 frigates and 4 smaller vessels, 
closed the sealanes between Nantucket and the Delaware.(54)
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The British offshore patrols imposing the naval and commercial 
blockades had long isolated islands like Nantucket, 35 miles from the 
Massachusetts mainland. Nantucket was particularly unfortunate since it was 
passed both by Griffith and Captain Sir Edward Troubridge, specifically 
ordered to patrol south of the island.(55) Few American vessels around 
Nantucket escaped the Royal Navy's attentions, its deep-sea whaling fleet of 
forty-six vessels in 1812 had been halved by 1814. Those inhabitants not 
engaged in distant whaling had long been dependent on local offshore fishing 
and imported food and fuel from the mainland. Despite having survived one 
wartime winter, by 21 July 1814, the largely Republican citizens were ready 
to approach Cochrane.(56)
On 28 July 1814, Cochrane wrote to Commodore Henry Hotham "I 
send you herewith Copies of Petitions received by Capt Barrie of His 
Majesty's Ship the Dragon from Selectmen of the Island Nantucket 
representing the Inhabitants of that Island to be in a state of Starvation" .(5 7) 
Cochrane sought to drive a hard bargain writing,
The request they make to be permitted to carry on their Fishery cannot be complied 
with, but if they actually are in the distressed state they represent, permission may be 
granted them to import from the Continent supplies of Food provided they will 
declare themselves Neutral and deliver up all such Artillery, Guns & Ammunition as 
may be on the Island and submit to His Majesty's Ships getting from them whatever 
refreshments the Islands will afford... cause inquiry to be made into the truth of the 
enclosed statements and act as you deem circumstances to require. (58)
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An enclosed petition described Nantucket as "in a distressed] 
situation for Provisions and Fuel", asking that the "sloop Earl Jacob Barney" 
be allowed "to pass.. .to bring Corn and Bread stuff for the relief of this 
Island.. .as there is from six to seven thousand Inhabitants which have got the 
most of their subsistence out of the Seas, by the Whale fishery s (sic) which", 
they argued, "precludes us from any concerns of War."(59) On the islander's 
agreement both to stop paying Federal taxes, and to water passing British 
warships, Cochrane would agree to their resumption of fishing, and trading 
for food and fuel with the mainland.(60) Accordingly, on 28 August, Hotham 
off Gardener's Island in Superb, had ordered that an unarmed Nantucket 
sloop be allowed to cross Buzzard's Bay, between the Massachusetts 
mainland and the island, with fuel and without interference.(61) The Surprise 
was to allow Nantucket vessels to pass for as long as no evidence was found 
of any tax being paid, if it was, permission was to be revoked.(62) Nantucket 
vessels, trapped by the British blockade of coastal traffic, were to be allowed 
as neutrals to regain their homeport. Cochrane also undertook to facilitate the 
release of Nantucket's prisoners of war, but this arrangement was to be 
overtaken by eventual peace.(63) Nantucket was not alone in its predicament; 
other American communities such as that on Block Island agreed to supply 
British blockading vessels in return for exemption from raids or 
bombardment.
Cochrane's application of British commercial blockade seems, as 
Warren's had been, more than a merely mechanistic execution of a precisely 
pre-defmed duty, but the thoughtful implementation of an essential part of a 
thoroughly understood strategy of economic warfare. Therefore, when Sir
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John Sherbroke, Governor of Nova Scotia, passed on to Cochrane the 
requests of the Halifax merchants to be allowed to conduct a licenced trade 
with blockaded American ports, he denied them. Cochrane's reply to 
Sherbroke emphasised that the American government had not long repealed 
its latest embargo on "trade with the enemy" precisely because of its 
increasing difficulties with tax revenues and loans, and that any trade with 
American ports would help the American administration rather than the long- 
term interests of the Halifax merchants.(64)
Throughout the remainder of 1814, the British exerted further 
pressure on the American economy and administration, in a way more likely 
to produce political stability and long-term wealth for Nova Scotian 
merchants than rejected requests for licences to trade with American ports. 
This began with the British government's order to Sherbroke in June 1814, to 
occupy the eastern parts of the American border province of Maine, which 
stood between Nova Scotia and Lower Canada and seemed a potential threat 
to both. Sherbroke was to occupy "that part of the District of Maine which at 
present intercepts the communication between Halifax and Quebec".(65) On 
11 July, Rear-Admiral Griffith's command of the northern American 
coastline, including Penobscot Bay, made possible the occupation of Eastport 
on Moose Island, and by 2 September the seizure of the port of Castine. On 3 
September, an almost unopposed British advance up the Penobscot River 
resulted in the Americans burning their 26-gun corvette Adams blockaded at 
Hampden, and the capture or destruction of American merchantships at 
Bangor. The later occupation, until the war's end, of the coastal town of 
Machias, almost 90 miles north-west of Castine, strengthened the Royal
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Navy's control of the Bay of Fundy between Nova Scotia and Maine. By 27 
September, Griffith was able to report to the Admiralty that all of Maine 
between Passamaquoddy Bay and the Penobscot River was under British 
control.(66) It was to remain so for the remainder of the war.
Castine was well placed to trade with both the British provinces of 
New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. This offered those of the population who 
accepted occupation a chance to prosper when Sir George Prevost, Governor- 
General of British North America and Governor of Lower Canada, and 
Griffith, jointly issued a proclamation giving local inhabitants the option of 
pledging allegiance to the British Crown, or leaving the area.(67) Those 
taking the oath gained protection and the right to trade with neighbouring 
British provinces. British manufactured goods and re-exports were imported 
into Castine and then smuggled into the United States through, amongst other 
places, Hampden. The lost tax revenue from unpaid customs duties 
contributed to a major problem for the American administration, which both 
ambiguous legislation, and half-hearted enforcement, failed to alleviate 
signiflcantly.(68) Many in Castine therefore embraced a situation, which, in 
any case, the United States administration lacked the funds, or sufficient 
unblockaded warships, to alter.
Similarly, Cockburn's increasingly complete command of the 
Chesapeake was allowing him to make often ineffectually opposed attacks on 
military and economic targets in the Bay. Cochrane told Bathurst on 14 July 
that he had, "sent about Nine Hundred Marines to the Chesapeake to act 
under Admiral Cockburn - who has been Annoying the Americans a good 
deal of late - with this force making partial Attacks and Shifting from place
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to place I trust to be Able to find the enemy foil employment for all his troops 
in Virginia, Maryland and Pensylvania - without detaching to the Canada 
Frontier".(69)
Three days later in a letter to Melville, Cochrane had gone into 
detail. He pointed out that "Philadelphia can be Approached within fifteen 
miles by a Ship of 64 Guns - to attack it part of the Army may be Landed at 
N[ew]castle upon the Delaware - Six miles from which thier Principal 
Powder and Corn Mills are situated.. .those of course will be destroyd".(70) 
Beyond the immediate tactical advantage of limiting the number of American 
troops sent north, the repair or replacement of mills, foundries, factories, 
stores and warehouses destroyed by Cockburn's landing parties would be a 
drain on the American administration's increasingly strained financial 
arrangements.
Like Cochrane, Cockburn seems to have sought tacit agreements 
with local inhabitants that, if not attacked, his forces on land would respect 
their lives and private property, and that goods supplied to them would be 
paid for in specie, "at the time, to the uttermost farthing", in preference to 
paper assets difficult for Americans to dispose of without their neighbour's 
opprobrium, or heavy discounts.(71) Despite some serious lapses, often duly 
punished, this policy was followed such that the Captain of the Fleet 
responsible for provisioning established a table of prices to be paid to 
American civilians "with a view to prevent imposition".(72)
Cochrane's letter to Bathurst of 14 July revealed more of his views 
on Americans, and future British conduct of the war. "I have it much at heart 
to give them a complete drubbing before Peace is made - when I trust their
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Northern limits will be circumscribed and the Command of the Mississippi 
wrested from them".(73) His thoughts were to turn again later to New Orleans 
and the Mississippi, but for the present, taking Washington seemed attractive. 
"If Troops Arrive soon and the point of Attack is directed towards Baltimore I 
have every prospect of Success and Washington Will be equally Accessible. 
They may be either destroyed or laid under Contribution, as the Occasion 
may require.. .".(74)
Three days later Cochrane reminded Melville that all "the principal 
Towns in America" were "Situated upon navigable Rivers - but none of 
Them Accessible to a direct attack from Shipping only, although open to a 
combined one with a land Force."(75) The successful delivery of sufficient 
British troops, to either Baltimore or the American capital clearly required 
Royal Naval command of Chesapeake Bay and its rivers, including the 
Patuxent River on its eastern side, to avoid any interference with British troop 
carriers in confined waters, but by this time, fourteen named warships of the 
United States Navy, listed in Appendix A, Table 2(b), were either blockaded, 
taken or destroyed, and in no position to intervene.(76) Secretary of the Navy 
Jones' report to Madison on American naval forces in the Chesapeake in June 
1814 had listed 2 gunboats, 13 barges, a five gun cutter, a schooner and a 
pilot boat, clearly a potential threat. This situation was to change.(77)
The British in Washington.
The extent of British command in North American waters paid 
remarkable dividends in August 1814. The containment or elimination of
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American fighting vessels in Chesapeake Bay, especially after the self- 
destruction at Pig Point of Commodore Barney's flotilla of a large sloop and 
gunboats, gave British land forces unhindered access to the Patuxent river, as 
shown on Map 2.(78) After a short running battle at Bladensburg, this 
allowed a successful British attack on Washington on 24 and 25 August. 
During a deliberately brief military occupation until 26 August, much of 
Washington was burnt. The proximity of British forces led the Americans to 
burn Washington Navy Yard with its valuable timber stores and ropewalks. 
(79) American losses also included two almost completed warships, the heavy 
frigate Columbia and the sloop Argus.(%Q) In Madison's absence, the British 
Army briefly occupied and burned the White House and other large 
government buildings, the 13th Congress met in Washington's Post and Patent 
Office, the only adequate venue remaining. Important financial results 
followed; the British action caused a major run on Washington, Baltimore 
and Philadelphia banks where many deposits were withdrawn, mostly as 
specie. Especially following the earlier export of $3.8m of specie to Canada 
largely used to buy British Government securities, this contributed to the 
American administration's critical shortage of coin, soon to have far-reaching 
fiscal, financial and political consequences.(Sl)
The degree of British control in Chesapeake Bay also gave access to 
the Potomac river, allowing the port of Alexandria to be attacked on 28 
August, and occupied until 2 September. Twenty-one American merchant- 
ships with cargoes of tobacco, sugar and wine were either captured or 
destroyed, as well as weapons and "public stores". The British force made an 
opposed but successful withdrawal down the Potomac river.(82)
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The British "Essay on Baltimore". (83)
After success at Washington and Alexandria, the next logical step 
was the proposed British attack on Baltimore, the largest port at the head of 
Chesapeake Bay, which Cochrane believed was "the richest in the 
Country".(84) Before the British commercial blockade of the Chesapeake, 
Baltimore's exports of grain and flour, and its imported luxuries had made a 
significant contribution to American overseas and internal trade. These were 
now heavily curtailed, but the port remained populous, important and 
accessible. Furthermore, despite the British naval blockade, it still remained a 
base for persistent American privateers. There had been anti-Federalist riots 
when news of Madison's declaration of war first reached Baltimore, and even 
after damage to livelihoods by blockades, its largely Republican population 
remained fiercely anti-British. "[TJhis Town" Cochrane was convinced, 
"ought to be laid in Ashes."(85)
However, precautions against a British attack had begun early in 
1813, when Samuel Smith, a Senator and militia major-general, had begun 
earthworks and the recruitment of volunteers. Around 4,500 British troops 
landing under Major-General Ross on 12 September were heavily 
outnumbered by regular American troops and militia, and Ross was killed by 
an American sniper during a pyrrhic British victory at North Point. The 
absence of close naval support contributed to a decision to abandon further 
frontal attack on 13 September. Cochrane's failure to capture Fort McHenry 
overnight on 13-14 September, and a barrier of scuttled American ships, 
meant that even the lightest British warships could not reach Baltimore 
harbour to fire on the American lines. Since Cochrane also failed to silence
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the American guns on Lazaretto Point, and an attempt to attack Baltimore 
with 1,500 men in barges from the Patapsco River was defeated by fire from 
the shore, the whole raid was abandoned.
While off Baltimore, Cochrane had written to Cockburn ashore, "It is 
impossible for the Ships to render you any assistance - the Town is so far 
retired within the Forts. It is for Colonel Brook to consider under such 
circumstances whether he has Force sufficient to defeat so large a number as 
it [is] said the Enemy has collected".(86) As a result, Brook called a Council 
of War which concluded that "from the situation I was placd in they advised I 
should Retire".(87) Cochrane later wrote to Croker that high tides produced 
in Chesapeake Bay by a concurrence of a new moon with the equinox had 
made leaving the Bay "unsafe", and had led him to decide on a 
"demonstration upon" Baltimore. Cochrane then asserted that since "the 
primary object" - the relief of pressure on the British Army in Canada - had 
"been already fully accomplished... it was mutually agreed we Should 
withdraw".(88)
The same day, in a letter to Melville, Cochrane wrote "Your 
Lordship will see by my Public letter that we have made an Essay on 
Baltimore, an attempt Contrary to my Opinion, but extremely urged by the 
General, to which I reluctantly consented, but to preserve Unanimity between 
the two services; I have not stated my Objections to the measure in My letter 
to the Admiralty -1 now exceedingly regret My deviation from my Original 
plan".(89) As late as 3 September, Cochrane had expressed a preference for 
leaving Chesapeake Bay and sailing northward to refresh troops and ships at 
Rhode Island and had told Melville that "About the close of October we will
229
move to the Southward" and "if the reinforcements arrive I propose an attack 
upon Baltimore".(90)
Although New York had always conducted more trade, Cochrane 
had perhaps missed a significant opportunity in economic warfare in failing to 
occupy or destroy Baltimore. But, tight commercial and naval blockades 
preventing movement in or out of Baltimore without British agreement would 
have been effective without giving the Americans the propaganda value of a 
repulsed attack. However, War Office instructions clearly gave Cochrane the 
right to select objectives, and his name remains associated with failure at 
Baltimore.(91) News of British failure at Baltimore had reached both the 
British negotiators and American Peace Commissioners at Ghent by October. 
Even then, there was time to give further thought to the British decision to 
attack New Orleans.
Long before the British attack on Baltimore, Cochrane had written in 
June to Croker that 3,000 regular troops, the Creek Indians and the local 
French and Spanish populations "would drive the Americans entirely out of 
Louisiana and the Floridas".(92) In July he wrote to Bathurst that "Two 
Thousand Men would give to Gt.Britain the Command of That Country and 
New Orleans."(93) In early September Cochrane still felt able to write 
"hitherto what I promised has been effected & if Peace makers will only stay 
their procedings until Jonathan is brought to the feet of Gt. Britain, future 
Wars will be prevented." To that end, and to avenge what Prevost had 
reported as American barbarities in Canada, Cochrane suggested that, "As the 
Season advances I propose going to the Carolinas Georgia &ca. and ending at
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N Orleans which I have not a doubt of being able to Subdue & thereby hold 
the Key of the Mississippi. "(94)
On 17 September 1814, the same day that he had written to Croker 
about the abortive attack on Baltimore, Cochrane received a secret letter from 
Melville, dated 29 July, sanctioning an attack on New Orleans.(95) Despite 
the enthusiasm with which Cochrane had written of such an attack on 3 
September, his letter to Melville was still at sea, and would be for at least 
another two weeks, but his earlier letters recommending an attack on New 
Orleans seem to have agreed with current thinking in London. Melville's 
letter giving permission to attack New Orleans therefore long predated 
London's receipt of news of the defeat at Baltimore, but could still have been 
re-considered when it arrived. The net cost of defeat at Baltimore could have 
been reduced by taking from it useful lessons in evaluating Cochrane's long 
held aspirations for an attack on New Orleans.
Cochrane immediately left the Chesapeake for Halifax on 17 
September.(96) Cockburn also left on 26 September to refit in Bermuda, 
leaving Rear-Admiral Malcolm in the Chesapeake until relieved by Barrie, 
refitting in Halifax, so that the blockades and attacks on the shore should 
continue uninterrupted.(97) On 1 October, Cochrane ordered Cockburn to 
attack Cumberland Island off southern Georgia partly to disguise his own 
preparations for the attack on New Orleans.(98)
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The British Commercial Blockade Continued.
Captain Barrie in the Dragon returned to the Chesapeake late in 
September, and by November could write, "There is no trade going on in the 
Chesapeak", with only "meagre pickings" coming from ashore.(99) 
Nevertheless, in December 1814, Cockburn ordered Captain John Clavell in 
the frigate Orlando "to use every Effort and Exertion to maintain in the most 
strict and rigid manner possible the Blockade of the Chesapeake". He was 
also "to interrupt and prevent.. .the Communications by Water which the 
Enemy by small Vessels occasionally endeavors to renew and keep up 
between different Towns and Places in the Upper Parts of the said Bay".(100)
Meanwhile, Rear-Admiral Hotham's blockading squadron off the 
River Delaware had reported to him that between 6 August and 9 October 
1814, a total of 83 vessels had been "captured, burnt, and destroyed", in only 
two months.(lOl) Significantly, all were American. Such a list the year 
before would have included neutral vessels, which had evidently been 
deterred by the Royal Navy's commercial blockade from attempting further 
use of American ports. Of these, only two, less than 2.5% of the total, were 
described as "ships", both captured by the British frigate Narcissus. The 
remaining 81 were smaller, either sloops, schooners or brigs, while 5 were 
listed as "schooner boats". Despite the list's unambiguous title, five of the 
vessels appear to have been taken more than once by the blockading 
squadron, including the sloop Sally, apparently captured twice by the British 
gun-brig Nimrod early in the period covered, and later, for a third time by the 
British frigate Pomone. Similarly, the American sloop Two Friends, taken by
the Pomone twice towards the end of the list, is apparently the same vessel. 
This strongly suggests, as in Lieutenant Napier's earlier experience aboard 
Nymphe, that, despite being illegal, some prizes were being ransomed and 
released, to be taken again.
While the rig of prizes had generally changed, to the faster sloops 
and schooners rather than the American ships taken so frequently the year 
before, Hotham's nine blockading vessels included such powerfiil warships as 
the Superb, 74, the razee Saturn, 55, the new fir-built 4th rate Forth, 50, and 
four frigates, including Niemen and Loire, 40, and two brig-sloops.(102) One 
of the smallest, the 18 gunned brig-sloop Nimrod, accounted for no fewer 
than 38 of the 83 prizes named, more than 45%, while the other brig- sloop, 
Dispatch took only one. The Pomone took 19, the Loire and Niemen 7 each, 
the Forth, 6, and Narcissus and Saturn, 2 each. Even the heavier Superb is 
credited with one prize. The Niemen''s capture of the American schooner 
privateer Daedalus on 18 September, and the capture by the boats of 
Narcissus and Dispatch of the American revenue schooner Eagle, are listed 
separately.(103)
The Royal Navy's domination of the American coastline was 
everywhere becoming total, and the economic effects of the commercial 
blockade, a stranglehold from which neither American population nor 
administration could realistically expect to escape. In the six months between 
12 May to 14 November 1814, 109 vessels "captured, detained or destroyed" 
were recorded at Bermuda alone. Among these was one ship of 400 tons, but 
83 others, more than 76%, were either schooners or sloops.(104) The size of 
enemy vessels available as prizes was definitely decreasing. New vessels built
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to replace those lost to the Royal Navy's commercial blockade, show an 
evident demand for smaller, handier and perhaps faster vessels. In 1813, 371 
American vessels of all types had been built, totalling 32,583 gross tons, an 
average of 87.4 gross tons. By 1814, 490 vessels, totalling 29,751 gross tons 
were built across the country, an average of only 60.7 gross tons. Carrying 
capacity was apparently being sacrificed in an attempt to escape the British 
commercial blockade.(105)
The British Attack on New Orleans
By November 1814, although with fewer troops than he had 
expected in July, Cochrane had planned an attack on New Orleans, 100 miles 
up the Mississippi estuary, and, with a population of 25,000, the largest city 
west of the Appalachians. Successful occupation of New Orleans by a British 
force of 6,000 men would deny Louisiana access to the sea, and make a 
useful bargaining point in peace negotiations. Cochrane's preliminary 
occupation of Pensacola, a Spanish harbour on the Gulf coast potentially 
useful in attacking New Orleans, was initially successful, but the American, 
General Andrew Jackson, with overwhelming numbers, re-occupied it on 7 
November, despite risk of an American war with Spain.(106)
Cochrane's gathering of troops and ships in Negril Bay, Jamaica, 
implied for the Americans an attack either on Mobile or New Orleans, 
especially since any more northerly British objective than Cumberland Island, 
off the coast of Georgia, was unlikely in winter.(107) On 17 September 
however, a British force including the sloops Hermes and Carron had 
attacked Fort Bowyer, commanding Mobile Bay, but the Hermes had run
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aground in range of American guns, and had been burned by her crew to 
prevent her capture.(lOS) The British force had withdrawn, focussing 
attention on New Orleans. The British forces left Jamaica on 26 November, 
not reaching Ship Island, still 70 miles from New Orleans, until 8 
December.(109) American preparations had begun slowly until energetically 
directed by Andrew Jackson, who had arrived in New Orleans on 2 
December.
Having dealt successfully on 14 December with a potentially 
dangerous flotilla of American gunboats, ideally suited to relatively sheltered 
waters of Lake Borgne, Cochrane faced a shortage of suitable landing boats, 
despite having written to Melville as early as 17 July, that "Mobile and New 
Orleans are equally [accessible] but the necessary Craft are wanting", his 
having "only Three Flat Bottomed boats in the Country."(110) Eventually the 
British troops were ferried ashore in less suitable boats. The British army 
commander, Major-General Sir Edward Pakenham, who had not arrived until 
25 December, was killed on 8 January 1815, as the Americans defended 
prepared positions, which Jackson successfully resisted British attempts to 
outflank.(l 11) The Carolina, 14, an American naval vessel firing from the 
river, was belatedly destroyed on 27 December, but quickly replaced by the 
Louisiana, better positioned to avoid British gunfire.(l 12)
By 18 January, it was obvious that further costly frontal attacks were 
unlikely to succeed, and British forces withdrew, capturing Fort Bowyer off 
Mobile in their retreat, a new attack on Mobile being forestalled only by news 
of peace. An Anglo-American Peace treaty had been signed at Ghent on 24 
December, although not yet ratified by Congress or President. News of
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Cochrane's second failure in attacking an American land target might have 
encouraged either Congress or President to withhold their ratification but for 
the United States' by now untenable fiscal and financial position, increasingly 
obvious since August 1814, and known to the American Peace 
Commissioners. One of them, had himself been until his effective resignation 
in March 1813, Secretary of the United States Treasury, and was well aware 
of its predicament.( 113)
With a letter of recall dated 30 December 1814, Cochrane sailed for 
the Chesapeake on 15 February 1815.(114) Perhaps partly out of loyalty, on 
14 March, Warren's former secretary and still prize agent, George Hulbert, 
commented on the debacle at New Orleans to James Fraser, his 'substitute' at 
Halifax. "It has made a sad finish of the war", he wrote, "but it has shown the 
World who [were] dissatisfied with the small achievements of the former C in 
C how much less his successor has achieved with the most powerful 
means".(115)
Meanwhile, the Admiralty had ordered that British operations should 
not stop until definite news of American ratification had been received. 
Therefore, the Royal Navy's naval and commercial blockades of the United 
States continued until the Ghent Treaty was passed unanimously by the 
Senate, signed by President Madison on 16 February 1815, and exchanged 
with Anthony Baker, the British envoy, the following day.(l 16) Together, the 
blockades had brought about decisive commercial, fiscal and financial 
consequences, and their conclusive political results.
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Chapter 6.
The Impact of the British Blockades under Admiral Warren:
August 1812 - April 1814.
"For war is quite changed from what it was in the time of our forefathers; when.. .the 
matter was decided by courage; but now the whole art of war is in a manner reduced to 
money;" Charles Davenant An Essay Upon the Ways and Means of Supplying 
War, 1695. (1)
Both at the time and since, events seem to have conspired to disguise 
the impact of the British commercial and naval blockades of the United 
States, implemented after its declaration of war on Britain in June 1812. Yet 
in thirty-two months of war, a British naval blockade was to contain most of 
the American navy such that it was unable to prevent a British maritime 
commercial blockade. This, in turn, bankrupted a United States government 
heavily dependent on customs revenue and credit, and led to the abandonment 
of its original war aims in peace negotiations.
When news of Madison's declaration of war was finally confirmed 
in London on 30 July 1812, the British Cabinet's priority was to use the 
occasion of Warren's arrival in North America towards finding a diplomatic 
solution to this additional problem. It was posed by an American refusal to 
accept the restraints on neutral trade made necessary by Britain's need to 
blockade France, which some Americans had seen as a trading opportunity. 
The Royal Navy's efforts to recover apparently British seamen from neutral 
vessels had exacerbated the problem. Should Warren's diplomatic efforts fail, 
naval and commercial blockades of the United States would be added to the 
worldwide commitments of a hugely expensive and already overstretched 
Royal Navy, now in the ninth year of its renewed war with Napoleon.
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The lack of conclusive naval action against American naval vessels 
and privateers during the unavoidably long wait for replies to Warren's 
diplomatic overtures can readily be represented as a lack of British 
incisiveness.(2) This lack of application is said to be equally evident in the 
British implementation of economic warfare against the United States. On 23 
June, Britain had revoked its Orders in Council interdicting neutral trade with 
France as far as American vessels were concerned, and still waited for a 
reaction to what might be seen as a conciliatory gesture.(3) Although by 16 
November 1812, Warren had received Monroe's rejection of British armistice 
proposals, it had not reached London. There, Warren's wait for an American 
reply was misrepresented as prevarication, perhaps most importantly by 
Castlereagh's opponent Canning, in the House of Commons. "The arm which 
should have launched the thunderbolt was occupied in guiding the pen".(4) In 
a long speech Canning argued that" the best way to carry on any war is the 
way that will lead soonest to peace; it is by vigour, not by forbearance and 
hesitation; it is by exertions calculated to make an enemy feel a dread of our 
power".(5) "It never entered into my mind", he continued "that we should 
send a fleet to take rest and shelter in our own ports in North America, and 
that we should attack the American ports with a flag of truce."(6) Delay, he 
argued, had handicapped American opponents of the war, and reduced the 
proponents' "notion of the mischiefs which we could inflict upon the coasts 
and navy of the United States. How they must now laugh at their own 
apprehensions."(7)
Nevertheless, investigation of the possibilities of a diplomatic 
settlement was considered worthwhile on economic as well as humanitarian
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grounds. Continued trade was thought preferable to expensive warfare. 
Moreover, aggressive action during negotiations might be counter-productive, 
and expected to harden American resolve. Furthermore, money spent fighting 
a war which the British government avowedly sought to avoid, could be seen 
by its taxpayers and domestic political opponents as money wasted, as well as 
apparent evidence of hypocrisy. Nonetheless, the delay in Warren's 
implementation of British naval and commercial blockades, damaged his 
reputation both then and since.
The range of Warren's diplomatic and naval responsibilities, 
including convoy protection, and the safeguarding of influential West Indian 
interests with relatively limited resources, meant that progress in any one 
direction was to be constrained. Warren's scope for initiative was further 
limited by his knowledge that failure in any one objective could seriously 
damage Britain's prospects of eventual success, and his own professional 
reputation. Among the policies so handicapped was British maritime 
commercial blockade. In June 1812, potential British blockading forces 
outside several major American ports were diverted by Sawyer's unsuccessful 
search for Commodore Rodger's American forces, which the British 
government had feared would attack valuable British convoys. By early 
November 1812, the number of American merchantmen reaching their 
homeports safely, approached peacetime levels.(8)
Lord Bathurst, Secretary of State for War, had also been, until 
September 1812, President of the Board of Trade. His letter to the Prime 
Minister, Lord Liverpool, therefore clearly shows that the British Government 
was well aware of American vulnerability to war on its economy. At the same
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time, letters to Liverpool from British cotton manufacturers, assuring him of 
their ability to survive American non-export legislation, meant that it could 
feel free to act on its perception, while the Royal Navy provided it with the 
means to do so. Attack on the American's trade, tax base and financial 
position, and thereby the American government's credit, would ultimately 
erode their ability and political preparedness to continue the war they had 
themselves declared.(9)
On 31 July 1812, the Privy Council issued a General Embargo on 
American merchant shipping found anywhere in the British Empire. This was 
to prove immediately effective, and demonstrates the potential economic 
consequences of British commercial blockade. The forty-six American 
vessels quickly seized by the Royal Navy and brought into Halifax, Nova 
Scotia, before 17 September 1812, represented more than half of the full- 
rigged ships, and more than a quarter of the brigs detained and brought there, 
during the entire war.(10) Even the temporary loss of such valuable vessels 
and cargoes, often made permanent in due course by the Halifax Vice- 
Admiralty Court, sobered even prosperous American owners, shippers and 
merchants, as well as their insurers and bankers. This served to reinforce their 
already considerable opposition to the war they had so long predicted and 
tried to prevent.(l 1) This warning to the Republican administration brought 
little constructive response.
Even before the British General Embargo was implemented in 
earnest, Thomas Ives, a rich and influential American merchant complained 
in November 1812 that "the course that our public affairs have taken seems to 
paralize all business & if the War with England is to be continued, this part of
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the Country must suffer great inconvenience".(12) By mid-January 1813, as 
the number of American vessels taken into Halifax as prizes by the Royal 
Navy grew to 125, the psychological and financial impact of the British 
strategy increased.(13) Ives now felt that "the value in this Country of most 
foreign merchandize must in a great measure depend upon the continuance of 
the War in which we are foolishly engaged". Funds had become difficult to 
"remit - the risk of Specie by water being too great".(14) The pressure of 
British commercial blockade is clearly felt even in Rhode Island, the smallest 
of the New England states, so far deliberately excluded from the imminent 
British commercial blockade of the Delaware and Chesapeake in the hope of 
separating them from the Union.
As shown earlier, the level of American imports, on which 
government revenue so heavily depended, was extremely vulnerable to trade 
restrictions, whether self or enemy imposed. The speed and direction of 
changes in import levels, as well as the duties on them, will reflect the 
significance of these restraints of trade, whether American embargo, British 
commercial blockade, or occasionally both acting together. The American's 
reliance on trade with Britain, and fiscal dependence on customs revenues, 
made import levels of crucial importance to the attainment of Madison's 
ambitions while at war with a former major trading partner. Although 
American consumers had long been prepared to pay duties to obtain imports, 
and so add to American Treasury funds, they were to be prevented from 
doing so, such that the American government was forced to borrow in an 
increasingly disrupted economy, and to attempt belated, and only ever 
partially successful, fiscal reform.
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For much of the war, it is difficult to determine to what extent the 
marked reduction in the level of American imports was caused by the British 
commercial blockade, facilitated by the Royal Navy's restraint of an 
American Navy potentially capable of lifting it, or by the American 
legislative restrictive system, occasionally concurrent, but widely evaded. 
However, it will be shown that, unsupplemented by American embargoes for 
the last ten months of the war, the British commercial blockade and its 
consequences contributed hugely to the American government's insolvency, 
and, by making the original American war aims clearly unattainable, hastened 
a negotiated peace. Falling import levels and therefore customs revenue, 
forced upon Madison fiscal, financial, economic and political realities which 
induced him to end the war from a weakened position. In making significant 
reductions in American imports, successful British commercial blockade 
would cause the American government at the very least, temporary financial 
embarrassment, and at worst, a need for peace at almost any price.
Therefore, the availability of reliable American import statistics 
between 1800 -1820, is crucial in measuring the effectiveness and relative 
importance of American embargoes and the Royal Navy's commercial 
blockade of the United States. However, as shown by Appendix B Table 2, 
total import figures were not recorded in the United States before 1821, 
incomplete figures being supplemented by later estimates.(15) But, by using 
the United States import figures for 1800-1815 compiled and adjusted by 
North in 1960, as given in Appendix B Table 1, the size, pace and direction of 
the changes are shown, revealing the impact of successive American 
legislative trade restrictions and the British maritime commercial blockade.
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From a record figure of $144,740,342 in 1807, American imports fell 
by almost 60% to $58,101,023 in 1808, measuring the effect of Jefferson's 
Non-Importation Act of 1806, implemented on 14 December 1807, banning 
most British imports.(16) This was followed by the Embargo Act of 22 
December 1807, prohibiting exports, and American ships, from leaving port, 
together theoretically curtailing almost all American overseas trade.(17) Both 
measures were widely evaded. Because of this evasion, and despite the 
embargo's reportedly serious economic effects, the initial decrease in imports 
was followed by a recovery to $61,029,726 in 1809, and to $89,366,069 by 
1810, an increase of 53.8% on the figure for 1808. The extent of evasion 
resulted in the Congressional Act for Better Enforcement of the Embargo of 9 
January 1809, and its replacement on 1 March that year by the Non- 
Intercourse Act, allowing repeal of the original embargo a fortnight later. 
Macon's No 2 Bill of 1 May 1810, re-opened trade with Britain and France, 
but would then withhold it from whichever European belligerent failed to 
remove its restrictions on neutral American trade. In August 1810, Cadore, 
Napoleon's Foreign Minister, implied that France intended to end its 
depredations on American shipping, provided that the United States resisted 
British trade restrictions^ 18) Either from credulity or for convenience, 
Madison accepted this apparent change of policy at its face value. 
Accordingly, from 2 February 1811, the Non-Importation Act was applied 
solely to Britain. American imports of $57,887,952 in 1811, only about a 
third less than 1810's, suggest that evasion of the restrictive system remained 
widespread.(19) It was against this background that Madison and much of 
Congress saw increased imports and customs revenue in 1812 as vindicating
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their hopes of financing war with Britain without the need for fundamental 
tax reform, leading to fiscal difficulties, financial failure, and eventual 
bankruptcy.
Customs duties were usually recorded with other duties reflecting the 
level of imports, such as tonnage and lighthouse dues, but nothing illustrates 
with greater clarity the impact of even the threat of British maritime 
commercial blockade on American government income, than the raw data of 
the United States net customs revenue. This was gross customs duties, less 
the expenses of collection and "drawbacks", i.e. the rebate of duty on some 
re-exports, as shown in Appendix B, Table 4.(20)
Therefore, an increase in American imports, and consequently of the 
United States' net customs duty revenue, would seem to imply that Britain's 
first attempt at economic warfare in this war had proved an abject failure. 
Seyburt's figures for Net Customs Revenue were actually over 20% higher in 
1812 than in 1811.(21) Indeed, the perceived threat of British commercial 
blockade had apparently proved counter productive. However, increased 
imports were not to last beyond the scramble to bring back to America those 
imports often already paid for by exports to Britain before the war. In 1812, 
anticipation of a British commercial blockade had produced consequences 
which seem to have lulled American fiscal decision makers into a false sense 
of security. American fear of economic isolation - the psychological impact 
of British commercial blockade - had had the initial effect of increasing 
American government revenue from import duties, appearing to justify the 
position of those in Congress who had argued that no fundamental changes in
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American revenue collection were necessary, certainly not in their view 
before war had been declared.
The potential effectiveness of Britain's limited blockade policy of 
the first six months of the war had been disguised by a backlog of $ 18m 
worth of British manufactures which their American owners sought to 
dispatch to the United States. The American declaration of war had found 
some of the goods already loaded onto American vessels in British ports; 
other American merchants sought exemption from restrictive legislation to 
fetch their property from Canada or the West Indies.(22)
The importers had been anxious to avoid the anticipated tightening 
of the British commercial blockade once war began in earnest. They had been 
convinced by the advice of Jonathan Russell, the American charges d'affaires 
in London that, after 1 August, the recent revocation of the British Orders in 
Council affecting American vessels, would allow them to return fully laden 
from Britain to the United States. They also knew that Madison's first 90-day 
embargo on American foreign trade had ended on 3 July. Given Gallatin's 
prediction, in November 1811, of a $2m budget deficit for an 1812 at peace, 
both President and Treasury were understandably keen to collect the normal 
import duties, despite the merchant's and shipper's view that leniency was 
appropriate in these unusual circumstances.(23) By November 1812, Madison 
noted that "a considerable number" of previously stranded vessels had arrived 
in the United States. Despite Madison's announcement that the matter would 
be resolved by Congress, the owners, he said, had been "under the erroneous 
impression that the Non-Importation Act would immediately cease to 
operate", and resisted compromise.(24)
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On 4 November 1812, Madison felt able to tell Congress, somewhat 
disingenuously, that, "The duties on the late unexpected importation of 
British manufactures will render the revenue of the ensuing year more 
productive than could have been anticipated". While conceding that America 
was "not without its difficulties", Madison added that, "the view here 
presented of our pecuniary resources" was an, "animating consideration". 
(25) This situation was not to last; Madison was living in a fiscal fool's 
paradise. Within days, letters were to be written to the American Secretary of 
the Navy complaining of a British blockade of southern American ports, 
while in London, letters left Downing Street formalising British blockades of 
Chesapeake Bay and the Delaware.(26)
The threat of British commercial blockade, even when barely started, 
and certainly before being fully implemented, had had a measurable effect on 
the level of American imports, then a sensitive barometer of the United 
States' fiscal and financial climate. As shown in Appendix B Table 1, the 
prospect of British commercial blockade had had the effect of raising total 
American imports from 1811's $57.9m, to 1812's $78.8m, an increase of 
more than 36%. Madison's use of the then current, uncorrected estimated 
figures, probably led him to suggest a bigger increase to Congress, one of 
over 43%.(27) This appears to have induced Congressional, even Presidential, 
complacency. Madison was apparently encouraged by these figures to believe 
that increased rates of customs revenue, supported by loans, could produce 
sufficient funds to support the war, and would continue to do so long enough 
for the British to concede what Madison now asserted to be America's major 
grievance, Britain's alleged right to stop and search neutral vessels at sea,
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followed as necessary by the impressment of apparently renegade British 
seamen. Those Americans whose incomes had up to this time been 
maintained, or even increased, by this temporary artificial boost to the United 
States' imports, may have contributed to the first partially successful loan of 
$11m to the American government authorised on 14 March 1812. Later calls 
for loans were to be less successful, once British maritime blockades became 
tighter and wider. (2 8)
Nor can Madison have been unaware that the deceptively 
encouraging total customs revenue, accrued in 1812 and available for 
government expenditure during 1813, was in part due to American customs 
revenue figures having been inflated since 1 July 1812 by the Congressional 
decision to double all rates of import duty once war had been declared.(29) 
This had allowed Congress to postpone the necessity of re-introducing 
internal excise duties and what they called 'direct' taxes. Allowance for the 
increased rate of customs duties for the second half of 1812, reduces the net 
customs duties accrued for that year by 25%, from the $13,331,467, to an 
adjusted $9,998,600.(30) Even so, this adjusted figure for 1812 shows an 
increase in the real level of accrued net customs duty at original rates, of 
approximately 21.6%. This reflected the increased level of imports from 
$57.9m in 1811 to $78.8m in 1812, and served to hide the fiscal impact of 
Madison's 90 day Embargo and of the limited British commercial blockade to 
date. It may even have diverted some attention from the number of unmade 
commercial sea voyages cancelled under such American legislative 
restrictions as the Non-Importation Act, as well as the threat of wider and 
stricter British commercial sanctions. It will later be possible to allow for the
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increased rates of import duties during 1813-14, to permit more accurate use 
of net customs revenue as a partial measure of the effectiveness of British 
commercial blockade, using as data the decreasing accrued totals for each of 
the waryears.(31)
The customs revenue figure for 1812 enabled Madison to dismiss 
temporarily the criticism levelled at the consequences of his 90-day Embargo 
on foreign trade, which had operated from 4 April to 3 July 1812. This 
banned first imports and then American exports to Britain, but was in 
operation for only two weeks of the war.(32) However, although Madison's 
export embargo ended on 3 July, imports remained prohibited by the Non- 
Importation Act of 1811, an earlier part of his 'restrictive system' designed to 
gain concessions on British Orders in Council and impressments by 
withholding trade. Many Congressmen, notably John Calhoun, thought that 
the 1811 act should be modified or suspended to allow duties on imports from 
Britain to add to government revenue; leaving it in force, Calhoun thought, 
would "debilitate the springs of war".(33) Others, including the House of 
Representatives Speaker, Henry Clay, successfully argued that restrictions on 
Anglo-American trade would be as effective as war in obtaining concessions, 
and bills to allow the resumption of British imports were narrowly defeated. 
(34) Thereby, the United States continued to place itself at a fiscal and 
financial disadvantage.
The restrictive system, including Madison's short-lived second 
embargo of 1813, further complicates the use of American net customs 
revenue as a measure of the effectiveness of the Royal Navy's wartime 
commercial blockade up to April 1814. However, the intermittent nature and
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relative brevity of the embargoes, and the widespread evasion and uneven 
enforcement of the Non-Importation Act, all limit the validity of the criticism, 
reducing the usefulness of American restrictive legislation as an alternative 
explanation to British commercial blockade for a debilitating decline in net 
customs revenue. Later, when neither of Madison's embargoes nor any 
legislative restrictions were in force, the reduction in American overseas trade 
may be safely attributed to the British commercial blockade alone. It was by 
then largely protected from American naval interference by the British naval 
blockade which progressively contained American warships as the war 
continued.(35)
Memories of the severe unemployment and other adverse economic 
effects of Jefferson's earlier embargo increased the determination with which 
Madison's first embargo was evaded. Merchant's efforts to "palsy the arm of 
government" were duly reported by contemporary American commentators. 
Niles' Weekly Register for 12 April 1812, asserted that in a frantic five days 
before the embargo came into force, goods worth $15m, including 200,000 
barrels of flour, left American ports in defiance of the export ban.(36)
Despite such resistance and evasion, the effects of Madison's 90-day 
embargo operating alone, would have been the temporary reduction of both 
American overseas trade and tax revenues. Many inward and outward sea 
voyages were reportedly embargoed, with American vessels left idle, but the 
value of American foreign trade lost is difficult to quantify beyond its 
apparent effects on employment and prices. The embargo's ending on 3 July, 
the Congressional doubling of import tax rates after 1 July, and the American 
merchants' attempts to retrieve their stranded goods, each increased 1812's
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imports and customs duties revenue - effectively offsetting much of the 
embargo's impact. As a result, according to Madison's account to Congress, 
the total net customs revenue accrued in 1812 had been inflated to 
$13,331,467 by the "unexpected" increase in the arrival of imports, 
apparently serving to disguise from him, as well as from later observers, the 
effectiveness of the threat implied by early British efforts to impose a 
commercial blockade on the United States.
Madison, however, made no apparent attempt to adjust the net 
customs revenue to under $ 10m to allow for the doubled rate of duties in July. 
Had he chosen to emphasise the impact of doubled customs duty rates since 1 
July, and the temporary nature of the fiscal windfall from the merchants' 
scramble to repatriate their profits as imports, Congress might have been less 
compliant, and a more urgent attempt at major tax reform made, before the 
limited success of government borrowing became all too apparent.
Since even the adjusted net customs revenue figure for 1812 exceeds 
that of 1811, its value as a measure of the effectiveness of the British 
maritime commercial blockade at the beginning of the war is limited, except 
perhaps as a starting point. Until Madison's second brief embargo and the 
Non-Importation Act were repealed in April 1814, the responsibility for any 
economic changes in America have to be shared between a range of factors 
including both British maritime commercial blockade and self-imposed 
American handicaps. However, despite these complications, adjusted net 
customs revenue can later be used as a measure of the effectiveness of the 
Royal Navy's commercial blockade of the United States, when the relatively
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brief and intermittent embargoes, and the equally evaded Non-Importation 
Act, are all repealed.
By December 1812, after six months of war with Britain, the 
American budget deficit was more than predicted. Seyburt gives net customs 
revenue of $8,223,715, collected in 1811, to form the bulk of the United 
States government receipts for 1812.(37) Dewey raises that to $8, 900,000 
when including other import related taxes such as Registered and Enrolled 
tonnage duties, lighthouse dues and revenue from passports, and by adding 
miscellaneous income of $800,000, reaches a total available for 1812 of 
$9,700,000.(38) However, Total Expenditure for 1812 appears to have been 
$20,280,000, creating a shortfall of $10,580,000, summarised in Appendix B 
as Table 6.(39) Authority to raise a loan of $11m at 6%, gained on 14 March 
1812, had clearly been necessary, but was not unopposed.
Critics doubted whether loanable funds existed for so large a 
demand, without the imposition of internal excise revenues to create 
confidence that interest would be paid, and the principal eventually redeemed. 
However, after a slow start, the call produced $6,118, 900 at par in only two 
days, then however, the supply of funds faltered, such that by 24 June 1812, 
only $6,500,000 had been collected.(40) The prices of existing government 
stock fell by between 2 and 3% while the 1812 loan was available, and 
Gallatin suggested re-negotiating its terms, and should perhaps have made the 
introduction of new taxes to meet interest payments, the price of his 
remaining in office. While the banks were willing to lend the government 
another $2,150,000 in short-term loans, only $8,180,000 of the $llm sought
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for this first war loan was ever eventually raised, resolving conclusively the 
subsequent, protracted discussion of its relative success.(41)
From the outset therefore, even before the end of 1812, the 
unpopularity of the war, the restrictive legislation, and the so far limited 
British commercial blockade, had evidently damaged the preparedness of 
some wealthy American citizens, particularly prosperous New England 
merchants and bankers, to lend to a government they had outspokenly 
criticised as having already damaged their interests by embargo, restrictive 
legislation, and the prospect of wartime commercial blockade.
Therefore, on 30 June 1812, the American government had resorted 
for the first time, to an issue of $5m worth of Treasury notes, in 
denominations of $100 or more. These were short-term loan certificates 
bearing 5.4% annual interest, redeemable by the Treasury a year after each 
issue. To create wide acceptability, and to stimulate their circulation, they 
could, despite not being intended as legal tender, be used to pay duties and 
taxes, or buy public lands. They enabled the government to receive money in 
anticipation of future tax revenues and long-term loans. Gallatin and others 
had insisted that, not backed by precious metal, their success depended on 
internal excise duties to meet the interest, and on issues being limited to avoid 
the notes being discounted during transactions, and to retain public 
confidence in government credit.(42) In ignoring this advice, the American 
government was to embark on an ultimately disastrous monetary policy.
The American government relied less for its revenue on the taxation 
of exports, so much so, that tax initially paid by importers on goods they 
intended to re-export, could be reclaimed by them as 'drawback'. These tax
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rebates, on such products as coffee, cocoa, sugar and pepper, fell from 
$2,227,245 in 1811 to $1,542,623 in 1812, reflecting a 30% decrease in the 
re-export of products subject to rebate.(43) Most other goods paid ad valorem 
tax if re-exported; such goods were valued at $8,815,291 inl 811, but only 
$3,591,755 in 1812.(44)
Even by the end of 1812 therefore, the fall in the level of American 
exports was significant. As apparent from Appendix B Table 16, American 
total exports fell from $61.3m in 1811 to $3 8.5m in 1812, a fall of more than 
37%.(45) Notwithstanding Madison's 90-day embargo on American overseas 
trade, in force between 4 April and 3 July 1812, this decline remains 
remarkable, since American and neutral ships with British licences continued 
to carry grain and flour from such American ports as Baltimore and 
Alexandria to British and allied armies in the Peninsula. Furthermore, in 
December 1812, the ports of New England were to remain exempt from 
British commercial blockade for almost another sixteen months. Exports of 
grain and flour from each, reduced the fall in American exports.
The decline in the level of American re-exports was even more 
marked. From over $ 16m in 1811 to $8.5m in 1812, a fall of almost 47%, 
although how much of this decline is due to Madison's three month Embargo, 
and how much to the Royal Navy's embryonic commercial blockade remains 
problematic.(46) Traditionally an important component of the United States 
total exports, re-exports comprised 26% of American exports in 1811, but 
only 22% in 1812, before beginning a catastrophic decline until after 
1815.(47) Later, greatly reduced re-export figures during wartime periods 
without American legislative trade restrictions, will serve to measure the
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effectiveness of the British commercial blockade. These falls in American 
exports and re-exports would reduce the incomes of growers, merchants and 
shippers, and consequently their spending, and the employment of others. 
This would therefore reduce the general ability to pay taxes, and the 
preparedness of many to lend to the government held responsible for the 
decline in American overseas trade.
However, as late as October 1812, the level of wages and 
employment in the maritime sector of the American economy seemed 
buoyant. While attempting to refit and man his command, the American 
frigate Constitution, Isaac Hull complained on 29 October 1812, that 
competition for seamen and dockside workers from the American merchant 
service, and those fitting out privateers, had raised wages and created 
maintenance and manning difficulties for him, and the United States Navy. 
(48)
But, fiscal, financial and economic conditions for the American 
administration were about to worsen. Anticipating that Warren's diplomatic 
efforts would fail, the British Privy Council had, on 13 October 1812, issued 
General Reprisals against American ships, vessels and property where-ever 
found, a de facto declaration of war. On 16 November, Warren had received 
the expected rejection of his armistice proposals, together with unacceptable 
American counter proposals.(49) On 21 November Earl Bathurst, British 
Secretary of State for War, ordered the blockade of Chesapeake Bay and the 
Delaware river, and on 25 November the Admiralty relayed this order to 
Warren.(50) By 26 December, the London Gazette made the customary 
formal notification of the blockade to neutrals.(51) On 6 February 1813,
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Warren made a local declaration that Chesapeake Bay and the Delaware were 
under blockade.(52) On 19 February, Warren assured the First Lord of the 
Admiralty that the blockade was in place.(53) He also announced that 
American vessels, apparently with British licences, would no longer be 
allowed to enter or leave the Chesapeake. His earlier demands for 
reinforcements, and clarification from London of the issues raised by the 
proliferation of British licences to trade, had been partly resolved.
Since its arrival there in 1808, the British Army in the Iberian 
peninsula had depended on American grain and flour, accounting for over 
60% of American grain exports in 1811, including those to Britain.(54) 
However, on 3 February 1813, the British Foreign Secretary informed 
Anthony Baker that American grain and flour would no longer be needed by 
the Army in the Peninsula. (5 5) By May, Wellington had authorised the 
purchase of grain from Egypt and Brazil, despite which, American deliveries 
to the Peninsula continued throughout the remainder of 1813 until largely 
replaced by restored supplies from the Baltic.(56) The American vessels 
engaged, officially intended to return in ballast, in fact returned to the United 
States with British specie and such valuable cargoes as salt; activities 
incompatible with any form of economic warfare. Madison too, had long 
regarded such trade as inconsistent with the American restrictive system, and 
in May 1813 had finally succeeded in persuading Congress to ban the 
American use of British licences.
Significantly, from the summer of 1813, the possession by American 
merchantmen of an apparently British licence to trade, would become a 
progressively less effective protection against detention by a British
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blockading squadron, and the possible confiscation by a Vice Admiralty 
Court of both cargo and vessel. The over-supply of grain and flour formerly 
exported from Baltimore, appears to have depressed its price by two dollars a 
barrel, a quantifiable link between American legislation, British blockade and 
domestic American prices, to become increasingly important as the 
commercial blockade was extended.(57)
The first British blockade, planned for Chesapeake Bay and the 
Delaware, had been supplemented in early November 1812 by a squadron 
stationed off Savannah, intended to intercept American shipments of timber 
and raw cotton. Increasingly important strategically, the interruption of 
southern timber supplies to the north caused American anxiety over repairs 
and maintenance of both the United States Navy and its merchant fleet.(58) 
By January 1813, Warren had felt able to assert that that he "may probably 
produce some Deficit ere long in the Revenue of the United States: If all my 
other Divisions are equally active and successful."(59)
Warren had in fact extended the commercial blockade in anticipation 
of written Admiralty orders.(60) By February 1813, Niles' Weekly Register 
reported from Baltimore that British vessels were "blockading the 
Chesapeake and the Delaware and are occasionally off New York".(61) On 
26 March, the commercial blockade of New York was officially sanctioned, 
in both personal correspondence and official orders. Privately, Warren was 
told to expect "an order for blockading all the principal Ports in the United 
States to the southward of Rhode Island & including the Mississippi", to put a 
"complete stop to all trade & intercourse by Sea".(62) Officially, the 
Admiralty ordered him to "institute a strict and rigorous Blockade of the Ports
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and Harbours of New York, Charleston, Port Royal, Savannah, and of the 
River Mississippi."(63) Quoting the Order in Council of 30 March 1813, the 
London Gazette gave the usual notification to neutrals, and on 26 May, 
Warren issued from Bermuda a copy of his orders as a local proclamation. 
(64)
Throughout the spring, summer and autumn of 1813, a series of local 
proclamations spelled out precisely which coasts, ports and estuaries were 
blockaded by Warren's squadrons, while Niles catalogued American 
complaints.(65) Improving weather conditions in the spring allowed British 
blockading squadrons closer inshore. As early as April 1813, agents' reports 
suggested that the commercial blockades were proving effective, and 
American coastal trade curtailed.
By 5 April 1813, Thomas Ives, a prominent Rhode Island shipper 
and businessman, well aware of the commercial significance of developments 
at sea, complained that,
British Cruisers are actually in the Sound and have taken one of the New York 
Packets, Capt. Walden, also a number of Coasting and other Vessels... as the 
communication by water with New York is of great importance to the trade 
carried on by New England with the Middle States, Govt. ought immediately to send 
a force sufficient into the Sound to give it ample protection - part of our naval force 
could not otherwise be so well employed". (66)
This demanding attitude, in view of New England's relative prosperity, and 
its frequently outspoken opposition to the war, and general failure to 
contribute proportionately to the Government's call for loans, was precisely
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the sort of view which drew hostility towards New England, both during and 
especially after the war, when the records of New England's contributions 
became better known.
By 15 June, Ives was being forced to admit that "the British force off 
N[ew] London is vigilant & employs a number of small vessels in all 
directions so that we consider the coasting trade between this [i.e. Providence 
R.I.] & New York thro' the Sound at an end for the present". His Boston 
agent replied the same afternoon that the price of "soft flour" was even 
"advancing in consequence" of "the probable rigorous blockade of the 
Sound".(67) The American coasting trade was economically important in 
gathering exports and distributing imports. The interruption of both was 
evidently reflected in producers, shipper's and merchant's incomes, and in 
consumer prices.
Warren gained invaluable secret intelligence, presumably gathered at 
considerable personal risk, from agents ashore. In April, a British agent 
reported that,
Rigidly cutting off all trade between towns in the bays, particularly Baltimore, 
disrupts the neighbourhood very much. Wood and several other articles from the 
Eastern coast are now very scarce, and commanding exceeding high prices. This 
plan.. .if persevered in, would injure them more than in any other way; great 
complaints are already made of the War. (68)
Another, apparently American "Federalist" agent, significantly noted 
in April that, "A very high traffic was carried on between Baltimore and 
Philadelphia by water before the Squadron [arrived], but.. .this trade is now
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stopped.. .as it cannot be carried by land."(69) Nevertheless, efforts were 
made to replace blockaded coastal traffic with land transport. One 
commentator writing in 1819 noted that, "Before the war, there were but two 
wagons that plied between Boston and the town of Providence, and soon after 
its commencement, the number increased to two hundred."(70)
The extent to which American coastal trade could be replaced by 
land transport was by all accounts very limited. The quantity of goods that 
could be carried by either wagon trains or packhorses was restricted, and the 
rates expensive. Canals were often unavailable as a finished alternative, and 
where present were often short, shallow and discontinuous; in any case, 
transhipment added greatly to costs. After the war, Seyburt attributed the 
dislocation to the British coastal blockade adding that,
The inhabitants... in the immediate vicinity were not alone affected by the enemy; 
his operations extended their influence to our great towns and cities on the Atlantic 
coast. Domestic intercourse and internal commerce were interrupted, whilst that with 
foreign nations was in some instances entirely suspended, everything had to be 
conveyed by land carriage; our communication with the ocean was cut off. (71)
"Our roads, he wrote earlier "became almost impassable in 
consequence of the heavy loads".(72) Since "a wagon trade between points as 
widely separated as Savannah and Boston" would take 115 days in peacetime, 
only serious inflation in the price of American-produced cotton goods would 
make such land transport of raw-cotton from the Southern states to New 
England remotely feasible in wartime.(73) Generally, "turnpikes were unable 
to offer cheap transport for long distances. To haul a ton from Philadelphia to
259
Pittsburgh...cost $125. To move a bushel of salt 300 miles by any road cost 
$2.50...to transport goods, wares or merchandise cost $10 per ton per 
hundred miles."(74) Hauling a ton from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh had cost 
$90 in peacetime, and now cost almost 40% more, making the land haulage of 
even moderately heavy goods, such as grain and flour, uneconomic over more 
than 150miles.(75)
In April 1813, the same "Federalist" agent reported to Warren the 
impact of British blockade and substituted land carriage on American prices. 
"Wood is 10 and 12 Dollars per load at Baltimore - Indian Corn cannot be 
got, with grain for Horses, Fish is very dear, and every other Eatable is high 
except flour which is 6 and a half and 7 Dollars per Barrel."(76) Seyburt later 
saw the impact of British commercial blockade as being "not only deprived of 
revenue." "The expenses of the government, as well as of individuals, were 
very much augmented for every species of transportation."(77)
From 1 September, American access to inland waterways in 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia was to be curtailed.(78) 
By 16 November 1813, Warren's proclamation extending the blockade to 
Long Island Sound and southward of Narragansett Bay down to the border 
with Florida, interdicted neutral trade with New York.(79) By 2 December 
1813, a local proclamation by the squadron blockading New London 
announced the closure of the northern approaches to New York.(80) Only the 
neutral trade of the ports of New England remained excluded, as Britain 
sought to widen their political differences with the rest of the Union.
By April 1813, the economic effectiveness of the British commercial 
blockade was being recognised by those directly affected. Vincent Nolte, a
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New Orleans cotton merchant complained to Alexander Baring, a London 
merchant banker, that interrupted trade with the Atlantic states was causing " 
very heavy sacrifices on our part and bears so hard on all classes of citizens". 
Only two foreign vessels had arrived at New Orleans in the past nine months. 
He suggested that Baring should charter neutral Swedish vessels in England 
and send them to him in ballast, to export raw-cotton to the Peninsula or 
Gothenburg, before returning to Britain under licence.(Sl)
Similarly, in May 1813, an unnamed Baltimore merchant wrote to a 
Nova Scotian newspaper that, "Our situation is more distressing than pride or 
obstinacy will permit most to allow". The condition of Baltimore was " 
exactly that of a besieged city". "All business" was "at a stand," with 
"nothing talked of but the enemy and the war. What an enormous tax upon us 
is the war! The price of every thing almost doubled, and our supplies by water 
totally cut off!" Unemployment in Baltimore was evidently becoming serious. 
"If no change takes place in a few months the middling classes of society 
must leave the place, and go where they can get employ and support their 
families."(82) Holding, and being prepared to express such opinions, once 
prosperous merchants would be unlikely to pay tax increases willingly, or to 
lend to the administration responsible for the war. For the American 
government, this created increasingly serious difficulties in meeting wartime
expenditure.
In addition to their damage to trade and shipping and the fiscal 
consequences, Warren's blockades of the Chesapeake and Delaware provided 
access for British amphibious forces raiding strategic targets in Virginia, 
Maryland and Delaware. On 3 May 1813, for example, Cockburn reached
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Havre de Grace, at the head of Chesapeake Bay. There he "gained 
Intelligence" of the Cecil cannon foundry at Principio, three miles further 
north, and "one of the most valuable Works of the Kind in America". He 
caused "its destruction, and that of the Guns and other Material we found 
there" with "several Buildings & much complicated heavy Machinery". As 
Cockburn reported to Warren, his "small Division" had "been on Shore in the 
Centre of the Enemy's Country and on his high Road between Baltimore and 
Philadelphia." Other boats had penetrated the Susquehanna river, "destroying 
five Vessels in it and a large Store of Flour". With only one officer wounded, 
they had destroyed 51 guns and "130 Stand of Small Arms".(83)
Actions of this sort created financial as much as practical problems 
for the Americans. The import-substitution made possible by the capacity of 
more than two hundred powder mills, of firms like the Dupont Company of 
Delaware, had long since solved the gunpowder shortages of the 
Revolutionary War.(84)The United States was virtually self-sufficient in 
powder and no longer so dependent on imported weapons, but commercial 
organisations still needed paying, while British attacks on trade and tax 
revenue had eroded both the administration's ready cash and credit. In the 
long term therefore, it was not the damage to strategic targets that proved 
most effective, but the damage to the American economy and government 
creditworthiness that most reduced the administration's preparedness to 
continue the war. However, the raids do appear to have forewarned the 
Americans of the probability of a British attempt to capture Baltimore, and 
gave those like Senator Samuel Smith time to prepare its effective defence. 
(85)
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Any successful British commercial blockade of the United States 
would have to include New York, a port of enormous commercial and 
therefore fiscal importance. On average between 1803-12, its registered 
tonnage employed in foreign trade was 122,603, and the net revenue derived 
from customs $3,687,075.(86) With a population in 1808 of 83,530, it was 
the most populous as well as the most productive of customs revenue, its 
population having grown almost 40% since 1801, and more than three and a 
half tunes since 1786.(87) As well as being "the centre of local distribution", 
it was also "the leading place in the foreign trade of North America." As a 
result, John Lambert, an Englishman travelling in America before the war, 
could write that, "the moneys collected in New York for the national treasury, 
on the imports and tonnage have for several years amounted to one fourth of 
the public revenue."(88)
On 5 May 1813, the Philadelphian merchant John Maybin wrote that 
"the Report of the Day is that New York is Blockaded - Should that be the 
case, the Middle States will then be completely Shut in". By 13 May his 
correspondent feared that, "our coasting trade is nearly destroyed & it is 
found extremely difficult to supply the Town & Country with Corn, which 
has become very scarce as well as dear."(89) In June, he found "the passage 
thro' the sound is at present completely shut up - by the British force 
stationed off New London watching commodore Decaturs Squadron".(90) As 
soon as 21 June, Maybin wrote "I fear the blockade of the Sound Will Prove 
an Injury to the Eastern States as they will Not be Able to get a Supply of 
Bread Stuffs - this wicked and unnecessary War is Ruining our Country - 
and it do not appear that Congress is doing anything to put a stop to it".
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By 14 September, "The British have moved their Squadrons in the Sound 
down towards New York so that it is impossible for Coasters to pass." Four 
days later, Maybin assessed the consequences, "It is a lamentable thing that 
this Country is deprived of its regular Traid (sic) and Imports in General have 
got so high", [i.e. in price] "- which operates both ways against the 
Citizens."(91)
Consequently, while in December 1812, New York's registered 
merchant tonnage was 162,885, by 31 December 1813, it had fallen 
to!46,512.(92) By 27 September 1813, "the number of ships and brigs laid up 
and dismantled in New York City was 122", together with 18 sloops and 
schooners. In the same month, the privateer Governor Tompkins was sold at 
auction in New York for $14,000; her cost the year before had been $20,000." 
(93)
In the House, in June 1813, Jonathan Fisk of New York had declined 
to argue that his electorate was "more exposed and less efficiently defended" 
than elsewhere. "It would be sufficient" he said "to state that three fourths of 
our seacoast had been declared in a state of blockade; that our waters were 
infested, and coast lined with the armed boats and barges of the enemy, which 
were engaged in marauding and destroying the property of our citizens, with 
an impunity that was deeply to be regretted." He asked whether gunboats, or 
"any means could be devised to defend our coast from a warfare so 
distressing and vexatious."(94)
By the end of 1813, the interruption of American imports, caused at 
this stage, by both British commercial blockade, and American legislative 
restrictions, was having a measurable effect on customs duties payable in
264
New York. In 1810, New York State had contributed $4, 419,060 to net 
customs revenue, almost 35% of the national total. Raised in 1812 by New 
York's share of the "unexpected" British imports, to $2,885,102, net customs 
revenue had fallen in 1813 to $1,368, 618, a decrease of almost 53 %.(95) 
When allowance is made for Congress having doubled the rates of customs 
duties from 1 July 1812, the real decrease in net customs revenue collected in 
New York State between 1812 and 1813, is over 68 %.(96)
Shortages of previously imported commodities contributed to 
quantifiable inflation. An all-commodity index of New York wholesale prices 
standing at 127 in June 1812 when America declared war, rises to 160 by 
June 1813, by which time Warren's initial blockade of New York was 
officially sanctioned. By December 1813, with all approaches to New York 
strictly blockaded, this index rises to 189.(97) How far the lives of ordinary 
people were adversely affected is measured by changes in the basic 
commodity index of New York's wholesale prices between the declaration of 
war, and December 1813. This index, for June 1812, is 128, by June 1813, it 
is 163, and by December 1813, reaches 198.(98) Although far worse was to 
come, the end of 1813 saw the beginning of a marked decline in New York's 
standard of living, its shipping and tonnage duties, its overseas trade and 
customs revenue, even the city's population.(99)
New York was not alone. Throughout the summer of 1813, operation 
of the British commercial blockade of the Chesapeake had proved effective. 
By September, its commander, Captain Robert Barrie, wrote that "as Nathan 
has not had any trade whatever during the summer", he wondered whether the 
Americans would "venture to run any of their French traders during the
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winter" and hoped that they "will dash a little now the bad weather is coming 
on."(100) Perhaps more trustworthy than Barrie's enthusiasm, is the more 
quantitative list showing that in less than three months, between 6 September 
and 25 December 1813 alone, his squadron went on to capture or destroy 72 
American merchant vessels, and in addition to those "libelled" in Halifax, 
over the twenty-week period from 6 September 1813 to 12 January 1814, 81 
vessels totalling more than 4,000 tons were registered in Bermuda as 
"captured burnt or destroyed" in Chesapeake Bay.(lOl)
With the British commercial blockade of the Delaware River and 
Bay also strictly enforced, the State of Pennsylvania, including Philadelphia, 
was similarly affected. Even by the end of April 1813, the unemployment of 
seamen along the Delaware was being attributed to the British blockading 
squadron and "the depredations committed by these Vessels". Despite this 
however, "the people who from the interruption of the Navigation are at 
present without employment", remained disinclined "to enter on board the 
Gun Boats" which might have provided some defence.(102)
Occasionally, the psychological effect of British maritime blockade 
becomes evident. The usually pragmatic Maybin wrote from Philadelphia on 
5 May,
Messers Myers wrote to me from Norfolk that the Squadrons are close in with their 
Capes & make many Captures, I hope you are safe - should the Fleet visit Newport 
which is very much Exposed - in case the War is continued any length of time, I fear 
the British will act with more vigour along the coast the next Summer than they did
the last. (103)
266
Even rumours of British commercial blockade were thought likely to have an 
impact on prices. On 16 June 1813, Ives described price changes "probably 
owing to the expectation of an immediate rigorous Blockade & the Stoppage 
in a great measure of the Coasting trade -".(104)
By late July 1813, Maybin records just how severe the impact of the 
British blockade was becoming. "[A]t present" he wrote, "prices are merely 
Nominal as No Sales are making - Coffee Sugar and Pepper are articles also 
Expected to advance in prices as they are getting Scarce in our Markets. 
Indeed goods Generally are getting Scarce and if we do Not get an additional 
Supply soon, prices will be very high for Articles of Necessity".(105)
An index of Philadelphia wholesale import prices standing at 155 in 
1812, reaches 185 by 1813.(106) Although American agricultural wages had 
risen in 1813, rising prices and maritime unemployment would mean that 
demand for many goods, including imports would fall. (107) As a result, 
having contributed $2,439,018 to net customs revenue in 1810, and 
$2,090,298 in 1812, Philadelphia produced only $311,030 in 1813.(108) This 
represents a decrease in Philadelphia's contribution to net customs revenue 
between 1812 and 1813 of 85.1%. When allowance is made for the doubling 
of the rate of customs duties on 1 July 1812, the real decrease over the same 
period is a remarkable 90.1%.
Similarly, Maryland, which had collected $1,780,365 net customs 
revenue in 1812, paid in only $182,006 in 1813, an unadjusted decrease in its 
contribution to net customs revenue of 89.8%, and an adjusted decrease of no 
less than 93.2%.(109) With British commercial and naval blockades in place, 
even with the non-importation act as widely evaded as ever, according to
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Adams, "after the summer [of 1813], the total net revenue collected in every 
port of the United States outside New England did not exceed $150,000 a 
month", producing only $1,800,000 a year.(l 10) This did not bode well for 
meeting the inevitably high wartime expenditure of the following year.
The current fiscal situation was becoming critical. Given the 
disparity between the United States revenue in 1813, essentially the net 
customs revenue of $13.2m accrued in 1812, and the current level of 
expenditure in 1813 of $31.6m, as measured by Dewey, and shown in 
Appendix B as Table 6, virtual dependence on net customs revenue alone was 
clearly no longer adequate.(l 11) Especially following the shortfall of $ 10.6m 
in 1812, a deficit of no less than $ 17.3m in 1813, began to look serious.
By the end of 1812, the prospect of borrowing all of the $11m loan at 
par, began to look poor. Until now this had been the usual American practice 
for such government loans as that authorised in the Spring, but the outlook for 
the coming year was worsening. (112) The immediate shortfall had been met 
on 30 June 1812 with a $5m Treasury note issue, and a $5m windfall tax 
yield from the "unexpected" British imports, but despite Gallatin's views, 
Congress had later cancelled the merchant's tax debt, costing the Treasury 
$9m in revenue. (113)
By mid 1813, all this had contributed to the first serious American 
financial setback of the war. Faced by Madison with the irreconcilable tasks 
of financing the war by taxing shipping and imports, while at the same time 
expected to support the administration's increasingly draconian enforcement 
of the government's trade restrictions, Gallatin's continued success at the 
Treasury looked improbable. Gallatin had long held that any war with Britain
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could be financed by borrowing, but only with continued foreign trade and 
the resultant prosperity of farmers, bankers, merchants and shippers, all 
traditional lenders to the government. He agreed that proposed 'direct' taxes, 
internal duties, additional tonnage duties and "the diminution of drawbacks" 
could all be avoided, but only "in the event of the suspension of Non- 
Importation"^! 14) In this, he was again frustrated by Congress, although 
unemployment and hardship were reportedly increasing under the 
Republicans' legislative trade restrictions, and increasingly by British 
blockade. Already, preparedness to lend to the government was demonstrably 
less than required.
In January, Gallatin's revised estimate of outgoings for 1813 had 
been $36m, while expected income was only $17m, a shortfall of $ 19m. (115) 
On 8 February 1813, Congress authorised the call for a second, larger 
wartime loan, this time for $16m, initially at 7% interest. To complete this 
loan, it was necessary from the outset for the American government to accept 
bids below par, despite which, not all American banks considered themselves 
to be in a position to help. After Congressional failure to renew the charter of 
the first United States Bank in February 1811, state and local banks had 
proliferated, but their capital was often in credit rather than assets, making 
them wary of long term commitments. The American government had missed 
the chance of creating a major lender, and of launching a paper currency, 
thereby making itself dependent on private and state banks in which 
politicians often had a personal interest. On 5 March 1813, Gallatin had to 
inform Madison that, "We have hardly money enough to last to the end of the 
month."(116)
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Furthermore, the worsening shortage of British manufactures on the 
American market, caused by American restrictive legislation and British 
commercial blockade, was sheltering previously uncompetitive American 
manufacturing businesses from British competition. The prospect of abnormal 
profits attracted as financial capital those funds which might otherwise have 
been lent to the government.
On 25 February 1813, another $5m in Treasury notes were issued, 
paying little regard to Gallatin's advice for strict regulation of their number. 
Congress still made no provision for internal duties or 'direct' taxation to 
provide funds for the interest payments, and still refused to repeal the Non- 
Importation Act (117) The loan subscription books were opened to the public 
on 18 March, with less than $4m subscribed.(l 18) The government's 
financial difficulties could not be kept confidential. The perceptive 
Providence merchant Thomas Ives, had deduced by 19 March that, "The Loan 
Subscription must have fallen very short of the Sum proposed, & if money is 
found difficult to raise, it may tend to bring our Rulers to thinking seriously 
of their Ruinous War."(l 19)
The loan was filled only in April, after the books had been officially 
closed, when three foreign-born financiers were approached who between 
them produced almost two-thirds of the $16m needed. Even this was at a 12% 
discount, producing only $88 in specie and Treasury notes for every $100 in 
bonds. This stratagem was probably unrepeatable, having caused at least one 
lender financial embarrassment.(120)
Gallatin's frustration with continued Congressional obstruction, 
especially in the Senate, and disputes with John Armstrong, the Secretary of
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War, would end for the time being with the adjournment of the 12th Congress 
on 3 March 1813. But the arrival in Washington of the Russian government's 
offer of mediation on 8 March, had presented Gallatin with an alternative to 
accepting personal responsibility for increasingly likely American fiscal and 
financial collapse and its resultant military and political defeat. On 11 March 
1813, Madison had accepted the Russian offer. Gallatin at once offered 
himself as one of the team of American Peace Commissioners to be needed in 
Europe, which would necessitate his leaving both Treasury and Cabinet, 
although perhaps, not immediately.(121)
Extraordinarily, Madison agreed, persuading Gallatin to remain at 
least nominally at the Treasury, while someone was sought to deal with the 
Department's daily affairs, an arrangement never likely to succeed. 
Nevertheless, on 9 May 1813, before Congress reconvened, Gallatin left the 
Delaware for Europe.(122) Madison had lost his most experienced and 
financially best-qualified advisor. A special session of the 13th Congress 
began on 24 May 1813. On 3 June, Madison still insisted that the Treasury 
office was not vacant, but on 7 June, he declared William Jones, already 
Secretary of the Navy, as also Acting Secretary of the Treasury. (123)
Gallatin's wish to avoid supervising financial failure cost Madison 
much standing in Congress. Even after Gallatin had reached St Petersburg on 
21 July 1813, Congress still refused to endorse his appointment as Peace 
Commissioner. Although his ability was widely recognised, he had long been 
resented as foreign-born. Some Senators thought he would be better kept at 
the Treasury, for others the opportunity to defy and embarrass Madison 
proved irresistible. Gallatin was eventually "appointed in recess of the
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Senate", on 29 March 1814.(124) He may not have been, as Adams later 
asserted, "the most fully and perfectly equipped statesman", but in losing 
such an experienced Cabinet colleague this early in the war, Madison lost his 
best hope of financing it to a successful conclusion. (125)
The $16m loan of 8 February had been filled, but at the cost of the 
breach of a number of important principles. The first had been Gallatin's 
own; that any war could be funded by borrowing only so long as neither 
domestic embargo nor British maritime commercial blockade interrupted 
American overseas trade, which could be relied on to provide the necessary 
funds and co-operative attitude. Madison's initial 90-day embargo had ended 
on 3 July 1812, but continued neutral and collaborative trade with the British 
were leading him towards suggesting another.(126) Having seen previous 
embargoes erode government revenue, Gallatin would not welcome another. 
Gallatin had also called in past favours to affluent friends, who had made 
very large personal contributions at some risk.(127) Almost certainly, this 
could not be repeated.
Formerly, American stock had been issued at par; bids for this loan 
had been accepted at a discount from the outset. Conventionally, bids were 
made before subscription lists closed, now apparently they could be re- 
opened. The Treasury was becoming reliant on the routine issue of Treasury 
Notes to supplement loans, without repeal of the Non-Importation Act or the 
introduction of new taxes to guarantee that funds would be available to meet 
interest payments.(128) 1812's Treasury notes had been of $100 
denomination, deliberately too large for general circulation. Those of 25 
February 1813 were for $20, more likely to be commercially discounted for
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cash-in-hand, eroding their status, value, and future usefulness. Meanwhile, 
the government itself would have to accept them at face value in loans and 
taxes. Once relinquished, all these principles were unlikely to be successfully 
re-established. By preventing net customs revenue from meeting wartime 
expenditure, the British commercial blockade had forced the American 
government to borrow on increasingly vulnerable terms, and once established, 
the blockade was unlikely to be relaxed.
Meanwhile, British naval squadrons had continued their intelligence- 
gathering role. As early as March 1813, Warren's apparently well-informed 
contacts ashore clearly led him to believe that the Royal Navy's commercial 
blockade was proving effective. Prizes listed as carrying American grain and 
flour show that unlicensed exports of such commodities were becoming more 
difficult. On 9 March 1813, Warren wrote to Melville that he was, "happy to 
observe that the blockade established has already produced great Effect as the 
Farmers and others are under great apprehension of their produce not being 
sold: & the Distress it must occasion in the Eastern States". (129) The 
reduction of imports by the British commercial blockade was also 
contributing to increasingly evident fiscal and political problems for the 
American administration. Even while at sea, Warren was able to write to 
Melville on 29 March that "Madison is alarmed from not obtaining Cash...& 
the apprehension of the Discussion which must ensue in the Congress from 
the Necessity of Imposing Taxes to Pay the Interest of the Debt already 
created by the War".( 130)
Amongst other reports Warren forwarded to London on 5 June, was 
an agent's "letter out of Boston", dated 24 February 1813. It asserted that "the
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had to do, the writer suggested, was maintain its "vigourous plan of 
hostility".(133)
Throughout 1813, the crucial level of American imports had 
continued to fall. According to North's corrected figures, shown as Appendix 
B, Table 1, total imports had fallen by almost 72%, from $78,788,540 in 
1812, to only $22,177,812 (134) by 31 December 1813.This had a predictable 
effect on net customs revenue. Even without taking into account the doubling 
of customs duty rates in July 1812, by 31 December 1813, the unadjusted 
totals of net customs revenue, intended to provide the bulk of tax revenue for 
1814, had been almost halved between 1812-13, having fallen by more than 
48%.(135) When adjusted for the changed rates of duty, net customs revenue 
for 1813 had fallen by no less than 65%.(136) Recognition of the sharp 
decrease in the major source of tax revenue in wartime was to lead during the 
summer of 1813 to urgent Congressional debate on alternative ways of raising 
revenue.(137)
The size of discount evidently needed to fill the $16m loan 
apparently concerned even those Congressmen reluctant to offend their 
constituents by supporting legislation for higher taxes formerly used by 
Federalists. In July 1813, Congress belatedly ended its almost sole 
dependence for revenue on customs duties, by passing laws for a duty on 
imported salt, stamp duty on bank notes and bills of exchange, and internal 
excise duties on stills, sugar refining, carriages, and auctions, and for 
gathering $3m in 'direct' taxes on the ownership of land and slaves. Including 
an additional duty on foreign tonnage, these should produce net revenue of
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$5.6m.(138) Congress still contrived to drag its feet; these laws would not 
come into effect until 1 January 1814.(139)
By the summer of 1813, the impact of the British commercial blockade 
was discussed in Congress, in terms which reflected the warnings given, for 
example, by Ezekiel Bacon before the United States declared war. On 21 July
1813. the Senate heard a letter from the still "Acting Secretary of the 
Treasury" William Jones, which revealed that an "additional sum of about 
$2m" would be needed before the end of the year to avoid "delay and 
embarrassment". This was in addition to $5.5m needed for the first quarter of
1814. Significantly, Jones estimated that "custom-house duties" payable 
during the first three months of 1814 would provide only $1.5m. Another 
$250,000 might come from the sale of public lands, and the new "internal 
duties" due in operation on 1 January 1814. An additional $250,000 from the 
Treasury balance should make up the $2m.(140)
This however, left a shortfall of $5.5m in meeting the $7.5m total 
expenditure until the end of March 1814, including $6m for the War and 
Navy departments, $400,000 for miscellaneous and diplomatic expenses, and 
$l.lm "for public debt", exclusive of the Treasury notes falling due in the 
new year. Senators heard that, without a further loan, in addition to that of 
$16m agreed on 8 February 1813, "there would be, at that time, in circulation 
the sum of seven millions of dollars" in Treasury notes, "a sum greater, 
considering the limited state of our commerce,... than might perhaps be 
maintained in circulation without some difficulty or depreciation." Jones 
sought Congressional authority for a further loan, this time for $7.5m,
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allowing the issue of another two million dollars worth of Treasury notes to 
be postponed until after those issued in 1812 had been redeemed.(141)
This loan was sanctioned on 2 August, on condition that the stock 
was not sold at less than 88, a 12% discount.(142) It was completed at a lower 
discount of 11.5%, perhaps reflecting hopes of peace after the Russian offer 
of mediation. But, during 1813, the American government had sought to 
borrow a total of $28.5m in support of the war, and after this occasion, no 
further attempt to borrow would be more than partially successful. Even the 
success of this loan would later be questioned.(143) Furthermore, the 
administration's overuse of Treasury notes, and a developing shortage of 
specie to redeem them or pay their interest, contributed to their becoming an 
unpopular liability.
During October 1813, Warren seems to have feared that the 
effectiveness of the British commercial blockade had been undermined by the 
American government's ability to borrow the $7.5m sought on 2 August, 
albeit at a discount. Warren appears to have been convinced that the British 
banker Alexander Baring, who had acted since before the war for both 
American merchants and the American government in London and Europe, 
had contributed towards the $7.5m government loan. On 26 October, he 
wrote to Melville, evidently angered that "British money" had been lent 
towards "the vindictive war carried on against us".(144)
Not having received an answer on this specific point from Melville, 
on 16 November 1813, Warren wrote a private letter, in his own hand, to 
Prime Minister Lord Liverpool;
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I wrote to your Lordship some time ago from the Chesapeake and stated my opinion 
respecting the Embarrassment of the American Government from the pressure of the 
War: I am however sorry that the great Source of their Difficulties have been 
removed, in obtaining an additional Loan of seven Millions of Dollars, through the 
aid of Messers Parish of Philadelphia, & the Mr Baring who was settled belonging to 
that House in America; consequently British Money is now used in the vindictive 
War carried on against us: and from his supply it is supposed the Government party 
may be enabled to continue their operations: without levying Taxes for another 
Year. (145)
Although partly perhaps because of his American marriage and business 
connections, Baring was later prepared to lend the American government 
small sums of money to avoid immediate embarrassments, nothing suggests 
his ever having lent enough to make any real difference to the outcome of the 
war. Baring was not unpatriotic by contemporary standards, much less 
traitorous. He was forthright in his condemnation of American opposition to 
British impressment. Writing from London on 22 July 1813, as the American 
Peace Commissioner's bankers, to Gallatin in St Petersburg, Baring insisted
that,
highly as I value a state of peace and harmony with America, I am so sensible of 
the danger to our naval power from anything like an unrestricted admission of your 
principles, that I should consider an American as an inevitable concomitant of a 
French war, and to provide for it accordingly. It is useless to discuss the abstract 
question of right when it becomes one of necessity, and with us I sincerely believe
it to be so. (146)
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Baring even went so far as to continue,
If therefore, the disposition of your government be to adhere pertinaciously to the 
determination to give us no better security than the Act of Congress lately passed, I 
should certainly think your coming here or negotiating anywhere, useless for any 
good purpose. (147)
These opinions leave little room for doubt on Baring's support for 
Britain's position. Even if Baring had lent a significant sum to the American 
government at this stage, for which no evidence seems to exist, it would 
certainly not have allowed Madison's administration to meet an annual 
expenditure of $31.6m in!813 without further taxation. As shown in 
Appendix B, Table 3, the customs revenue of $13.2m for 1813 was added to 
by only $l.lm of miscellaneous receipts, making total receipts of $ 14.3m. 
This left a deficit of $ 17.3m. Even completely filled, the $7.5 loan would still 
have left $9.8m unfound. If all of the proceeds from the 25 February 1813 
issue of $5m of Treasury notes had remained unspent, this would still have 
left an annual deficit of $4.8m. In this sense, even in 1813, the American 
administration was already bankrupt.
Warren concluded his intemperate letter to the Prime Minister with 
the incautious hope that "the success of the Allied arms in Europe" might 
make possible "some decisive strokes against the Enemy either upon the 
Lakes.. .or by a vigorous attack to the Southward in taking Possession of New 
Orleans".(148) Furthermore, a private letter from a naval officer, written over 
Melville's head to the Prime Minister, is unlikely to have improved Warren's
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standing at the Admiralty, despite his earlier achievements and the clear 
effectiveness of his current commercial blockade.
Certainly, throughout 1813, the level of American exports had 
continued to decrease. According to Seyburt, total exports had fallen from 
$38.5m in 1812 to $27.9m in 1813, a further fall of almost 28%.(149) North's 
corrected statistics produce almost identical results.(150) The continuation 
into 1813, of licensed sales of American grain and flour, largely to the 
Peninsula, had so far slowed the rate of decline in domestic exports.(lSl) No 
such British needs protected the American re-export markets. Both the 
transoceanic import to America of exotic products like cocoa and pepper were 
vulnerable to British commercial blockade, as well as their re-export to 
Europe in American and neutral vessels. Traditionally, the British had an 
interest in the development of their own colonial re-export markets, 
increasingly threatened before 1812 by Americans.(152) Consequently, the 
fall in the American re-export trade was much more pronounced, from nearly 
$8.5m in 1812, to almost $2.9m in 1813, a decrease of 66.5%.(153) Although 
not as important to government revenue as falling imports, these figures 
meant unemployment at a time of rising prices, and falling incomes for 
merchants and shippers, good customers of the banks, potentially the 
administration's most reliable lenders.
Madison was apparently concerned, not so much by the level of 
American exports, but by their destinations. Foodstuffs especially were being 
sold to the vessels of the British blockading squadrons offshore and exported 
by American producers to British land forces in Canada, and to the West 
Indies. Despite American use of British licences having become illegal in
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May 1813, grain and flour was still being shipped from the United States to 
Spain in useful quantities until October. Furthermore, the ports of New 
England were still so far open to neutrals.(154) The British maritime 
commercial blockade was clearly being selectively applied.
After failing to obtain a Congressional ban on this "insidious 
discrimination", Madison made an Executive Order on 29 July 1813, making 
such trade illegal, to be implemented by the Secretary of the Navy and the 
War Department.( 155) Illicit trade nevertheless continued in both American 
exports and British imports, as well as in supplies and intelligence between 
the American shore and British blockading vessels.(156) Madison's final 
Embargo was eventually ratified by Congress on 17 December 1813, 
including its ban on coastal trade and the ransoming of ships and 
cargoes.(157) However, its enforcement by the limited means at the 
American's disposal, especially around New Orleans, Savannah and 
Charleston, was later described by Mahan as "manifestly impossible".(158) 
Smuggling methods included the ransoming of vessels and cargoes, mock 
'captures' by privateers, and unofficial clear passages given in exchange for 
services rendered, but most significantly, such smuggling, however achieved, 
added nothing to American government revenue.(159)
New York was not unique in experiencing price instability by 1813. 
By August 1813, something was having an effect on the prices producers 
received and consumers paid, throughout the United States. How far these 
changes were caused by the American's own restrictive system, or by British 
maritime commercial blockade, or by both in unquantifiable proportions, is of 
fundamental importance. Attribution remains as difficult now as it seemed
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then. Writing in the mid 1890's, and citing Niles' Weekly Register, Henry 
Adams appears to have had no reservations in asserting that, "the pressure of 
the blockades was immediately felt."(160)
The pressure included increasingly serious congestion of American 
ports by unused shipping. In early September 1813, Boston was reported to 
be holding 91 redundant square-rigged ships, usually employed in 
international trade, contributing to a total of 245 unemployed vessels, 
importantly excluding coasters.(161) By 25 September, the Columbian 
Centinel reported that the interruption of coastal traffic was widening the 
economic impact of British blockade and American legislation. "[T]he long 
stagnation of foreign and embarrassment of domestic trade, have extended the 
sad effects from the seaboard through the interior, where the scarcity of 
money is severely felt. There is not enough to pay the taxes."(162) By 
December 1813, 200 square-rigged vessels reportedly lay idle in Boston 
harbour.(163) Efforts were made to supplement reduced coastal traffic with 
overland transport. A Senate Committee discussed a Chesapeake and 
Delaware Canal, to cost $850,000, but postponed any decision until the next 
session of Congress.(164)
The difficulties agrarian producers experienced in reaching markets 
by overseas shipping, traditional coasting, inland waterways or overland 
transport, were evidently beginning to produce local gluts and distant 
shortages. The dislocation of international and local trade inevitably made an 
impact on prices. Niles recorded for August 1813, that superfine flour sold in 
the port of Baltimore for $6.00 a barrel. Nearer its source, in Richmond 
Virginia, it cost only $4.50, while in Boston, the same quantity cost $11.87.
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(165) Similarly, upland cotton sold at Charleston, South Carolina, for 9 cents 
per Ib, and in Boston for 20 cents a pound. In both Charleston and Savannah, 
Georgia, rice sold at $3.00 a hundredweight, but cost $12 in Philadelphia. A 
hundredweight of sugar, fetching $9 in New Orleans, cost $18.75 in Boston, 
between $21 and $22 in New York and Philadelphia, and $26.50 in 
Baltimore. Adams concludes that, "Already the American staples were 
unsalable at the place of their production. No rate of profit could cause cotton, 
rice or wheat to be brought by sea from Charleston or Norfolk to Boston."
(166) Land transport was prohibitively expensive over long distances, and 
inland waterways were narrow, discontinuous and difficult to approach; 
finding their entrances often needed detailed local knowledge.(167)
Adams notes that "soon speculation began", arguing that price 
inflation for imported commodities was due principally to scarcity created by 
British commercial blockade.(168) Certainly, by December 1813, price 
inflation in such commodities had become marked. A pound of coffee, which 
had sold for 21 cents in August 1813, cost 38 cents by the end of the year, an 
increase of almost 81% in five months.(169) The price of tea also rose by 
between 76 and 135% having risen from $1.70 a pound in August to between 
"three and four dollars in December", by which time, sugar had almost 
doubled in price.(170) However, what proportion of these changes was 
attributable to British commercial blockade alone, remains problematic. 
Contemporaries had similar difficulties in attributing changes to 
either British blockade or American trade restrictions. On 21 December 1813, 
John Sheldon wrote a report to Congressman William Lowndes to "assist in 
forming an opinion on the number of American seamen thrown out of employ
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by the war.. .or the embargo".(171) Without referring to their reduced wages 
or ability to pay, Sheldon reported that four-fifths of merchant seamen were 
unemployed by the end of 1813. This produced a sharp decline in revenue 
from a seaman's hospital tax, levied on wages decreased by competition for 
work, and increasing reluctance to pay such contributions amongst those still 
so far employed. The employers' use of casual labour at lower wage rates 
reduced the seamen's concern for their own future welfare, that of others, and 
hospital incomes.
The repeal of Madison's last Embargo within four months of 
Congressional approval, together with repeal of the Non-Importation Act, 
would resolve the problem of whether British maritime blockades or the 
American restrictive system had been more responsible for American 
economic difficulties. After these repeals, American economic problems may 
be attributed more safely to British maritime blockades, no longer at times 
coinciding with American restrictive legislation. Madison became prepared to 
consider these repeals largely as a result of important news from Europe, 
which served to sharpen perceptions of reality amongst those Americans 
hitherto reluctant to face unwelcome truths.
On 30 December 1813, the British schooner Bramble arrived at 
Annapolis with a letter from British Foreign Secretary Castlereagh, to 
Secretary of State Monroe, offering the American administration direct peace 
negotiations at Gothenburg in Sweden, in preference to Russian mediation. 
Constant awareness of British blockades, damaging both United States 
overseas trade and government revenue, as well as virtually preventing 
American naval intervention, may well have made immediate acceptance of
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the offer seem attractive, especially when considered with discouraging news 
of recent American progress in the land war. Disconcertingly outspoken 
criticisms of the war continued, especially from New England. First reports 
came from New London, Connecticut, of'blue lights' being shown at night, 
apparently by traitors, to warn the British blockading squadrons of vessels 
attempting to break the blockade of the Thames. These alone might have 
induced in Madison's Cabinet an increased sense of realism.(172)
The Bramble however, had also brought British newspapers. These 
included official reports of a comprehensive French defeat by Austrian, 
Prussian, Russian and Saxon Allies at Leipzig, between 16 and 19 October 
1813, which frustrated Napoleon's campaign in Germany. Just as British 
maritime blockade had hindered the American government's communication 
with potential European allies, this "Battle of the Nations" ended any hope of 
financial, diplomatic, or military help from France. Furthermore, it also meant 
that European markets were once again open to British exporters, making the 
French decrees which had formed the Continental System wholly ineffective. 
With British manufacturers and processors also importing their raw materials 
from alternative sources, such as raw cotton supplies from Brazil, adding to 
what could be smuggled from the southern United States, any further hope of 
the economic isolation of Britain was clearly unrealistic. As well as stopping 
Napoleon, the battle of Leipzig appears to have brought Madison to the 
conclusion that the last parts of the American restrictive system may as well 
be repealed.
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Economic Warfare in the Pacific.
During 1813, in addition to Warren's commercial blockade of the 
American Atlantic coast, the Royal Navy's economic warfare against the 
Americans had also been extended into the Pacific. By the end of November, 
the British government, the Admiralty, and a London financed fur-trading 
company had achieved their joint ambition to seize American assets in a 
contested area of Oregon, on the Pacific north-west coast of North America. 
The decision to attempt this had been taken as long before as the previous 
March. The British North West Company had successfully convinced the 
government that the seizure of an American fur-trading settlement on 
the Columbia river would serve national as well as their commercial interests. 
As a result, the company storeship Isaac Todd, with partner Donald 
McTavish, had left Portsmouth on 25 March 1813, escorted by the frigate 
Phoebe, 36, commanded by Captain James Hillyar. His sealed orders were to 
proceed to the settlement known as Fort Astoria, and "totally annihilate any 
settlement which the Americans may have formed either on the Columbia 
River or on the neighbouring Coasts".(173) The trading post was named after 
John Jacob Astor, the same foreign born entrepreneur who had earlier been 
sponsored by Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin, and who had, in return, 
raised over $2m of the $16m lent to the American government in April 1813. 
Astor had suspected British intentions, and had in June written two warnings 
to Secretary of the Navy Jones, but despite having given financial help to the 
government, had been told that naval resources needed on the Lakes could not 
now be spared to help him.(174) This may very well have affected his
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preparedness to contribute further financial help to Madison's administration 
when later, the need was even more urgent.
Reinforced with two 18 gunned sloops at Rio de Janeiro by Rear 
Admiral Manly Dixon in July, Hillyar rounded Cape Horn with his squadron, 
but lost touch with the Isaac Todd en route. Near the equator in October 
however, Hillyar sent the sloop Racoon, under Commander William Black, 
onto the Columbia river alone, while diverting himself southward into the 
Pacific to search for the American heavy frigate Essex, known to be preying 
on the British whaling fleet there.(175) However, before HMS Racoon 
reached Fort Astoria, McTavish had arrived with a party of seventy-one 
trappers, and by 12 November had persuaded local Americans to transfer the 
fort to North West Company ownership.(176) On his arrival on 30 November, 
Commander Black had only to formalise the arrangement, claiming 
sovereignty and renaming the settlement Fort George. By mid-December 
1813, Black could inform Croker in London that the Americans were "quite 
broke up", and left with "no settlement whatever on this River or Coast". 
While provisions lasted he would endeavour to destroy enemy vessels said to 
be "on Coast and about Islands", in weather which had "set in very 
bad".(177) As on the other side of the Continent, the Royal Navy's world- 
wide reach had contributed to the erosion of the American financial capacity 
to sustain the war it had declared on the predominant naval power. When 
compared to the cumulative damage to the American economy and its taxable 
capacity, the loss of an enterprise on the Pacific seaboard is less important, 
except perhaps in its impact on morale in Madison's administration.
287
Other aspects of the current economic warfare were also 
discouraging for the Republican administration. Throughout 1813, the ports 
of New England, primarily Boston, had remained open to neutral shipping, 
largely Swedish, Spanish and Portuguese, which Britain had allowed to 
continue in the hope of widening New England's differences with the rest of 
the Union. Nonetheless, New England's merchants, shippers and shipyards 
had suffered a marked decline in trade. Some referred openly to "Mr 
Madison's War", and had long called the inverted tar barrels on the 
mastheads of disused vessels, intended to inhibit rotting, as "Madison's 
nightcaps."(178) Some trade in grain and flour to Canada continued, but by 
1813, the re-export of West Indian products from New England in American 
vessels had fallen by 94.9% since 1811, to only just over 300,000 tons.(179) 
By 15 December 1813, Boston harbour held 91 ships, 2 barks, 109 brigs and 
43 schooners, totalling 245 vessels excluding coasters, an accumulation 
Mahan attributes to the "lack of employment".(180) Similarly, Niles' Weekly 
Register recorded that from 1 December to 24 December 1813, forty-four 
vessels were cleared from Boston for abroad, only five of which were 
American.(181) Evidently, by the end of 1813, even where neutral vessels 
were still so far allowed, and the cargoes imported in them paid some 
customs duties, the United States was not paying for its war by taxing foreign
trade.
By orders dated 25 January 1814, Warren was to be replaced by 
Vice- Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, although his command was not to 
include responsibility for the re-separated West Indian stations. Cochrane was 
quick to express concern that the volume of apparently neutral trade through
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New England ports like Boston could increase to such an extent that duties 
paid on imports arriving there might make a significant contribution to 
American fighting funds.(182) Cochrane officially assumed command on 1 
April 1814, and promptly took steps to address the problem. The foundations 
for effective British naval and commercial blockades had been laid under 
Warren's direction, despite his multi-faceted responsibilities and numerous 
constraints. How effectively his successor might build on these foundations 
remained to be seen.
One measure of the effectiveness of the British blockades under 
Warren might be the amount of prize money made during his United 
Command. His estimated earnings of almost £100,000, including flag-money 
shared with junior flag-officers, were exceeded by very few commanders in 
other contemporary theatres.(183) Warren's earnings apparently became one 
of his major concerns, and so accurately reflected the intensity of the British 
commercial blockade. Warren's reputation for avarice again surfaced in the 
correspondence of his prize agent and flag secretary George Hulbert, who in 
November 1813, wrote to his brother that Warren was "growing so miserably 
stingy & parsimonious, that nothing occupies his thoughts but remittances, 
and it is an increasingly worrying conversation ten times a day." This may 
have been something of an exaggeration since Hulbert continued that, "but 
for getting rid of the Flag occasionally, and the prizes having been tumbling 
in pretty thick, I should desire to quit the concern." This seems improbable 
since Hulbert too was to make a fortune of perhaps £40,000 while in 
Warren's employment .(184)
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Another measurement of its effectiveness might be the impact of the 
British commercial blockade on the political thinking of some Americans, 
evidently very real. As early as June 1813, a Philadelphia merchant confided 
his opinion of "the great folks at the Capitol" to a friend, impugning even 
their motives. "[W]as their intrigue for the advantage of their Country - they 
would not be Sencureable (sic) [Censurable] but Everything that they do 
appears to Sink the nation further into distinction (sic). I Expect the 
administration will be obliged to Treat for peace after the Nation is involved 
in a debt that the present generation will Not get clear of Should the Union 
remain".(185) Neither the near truth of this prediction, nor the effectiveness 
of Warren's blockades were yet as evident as they were to become.
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